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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The breakdown of communism at the end of the 1980s created an unprecedented 
momentum in the history of East Central Europe (ECE). It cleared the way for the 
social, political and economic transformation of a part of the European continent that 
had lived more than fifty years under communist rule. Between 1989 and 1992, com-
munist elites and opposition forces in most countries under former Soviet control 
negotiated, deliberated and ratified new constitutions, with which democratic norms 
and procedures were introduced and existing institutional designs radically altered. 
These changes paved the way for the first democratic elections in half a century, the 
dismantling of the political monopoly of the Communist Party, and the formal estab-
lishment of political and economic freedoms. However, with the constitutional en-
trenchment of these novel democratic “rules of the game”, institutional engineering 
was by no means completed. On the contrary, once political actors were experiencing 
how the new rules functioned in practice and what effects they generated, a process of 
institutional trial and error, adaptation and modification set off. Core constitutional 
rules on the organisation of elections, executive-legislative relations, and the compe-
tencies of presidents and constitutional review bodies remained politically contested 
across the region until the early 2000s. Rather than providing a stable and predict-
able framework of rules for debate and decision-making about pressing policy issues, 
the constitutions of ECE were themselves long subject of political disputes.  
These constitutional conflicts at times severely destabilised and delegitimised 
the fragile democracies of ECE. They may therefore easily be perceived as an im-
pediment to the process of democratic consolidation. Democracy, as a political sys-
tem that organises the peaceful resolution of political conflict, requires a clear frame-
work of norms and rules of conduct and, above all, that actors ‘adhere to democratic 
rules of the game’ (Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, 1995: 7; see also Elster, Offe 
and Preuss, 1998; Diamond, 1999). Political elites and citizens must be able to refer 
CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONS 
 2 
to the constitution as a legitimate higher order law that protects their rights and in-
terests (Stone Sweet, 2008: 221). If this legal framework becomes subject to conflict, 
one could argue that democracy itself is in jeopardy. Yet, one of democracy’s most 
valuable qualities is that it permits and accommodates the expression and reconcilia-
tion of competing ideas about society and the organisation of politics. As Larry Dia-
mond (1990: 49) aptly puts it: ‘[w]ithout competition and conflict, there is no democ-
racy’. Therefore, discussion about constitutional norms should not immediately be 
dismissed as harmful to democratisation. What is more, it might even be welcomed 
as a sign of (an emerging) democratic political culture that tolerates opposition and 
dissent (Dahl, 1971; Diamond, 1990). A political system that allows for the articula-
tion and reconciliation of competing ideas – including on the constitution – may in 
the end prove more flexible and durable than systems that suppress such ideas. Fifty 
years of communist domination in ECE offer perhaps the best proof for this presump-
tion. Accepting that democracy needs clear and legitimate norms and rules of conduct 
but should also tolerate and enable competition, constitutional conflicts present an 
intriguing puzzle. One the one hand, they may be indicative of a lack of support for 
constitutional norms and democratic values. But on the other hand, constitutional 
conflict may also be conceived as part and parcel to democratic politics, compatible 
with democracy’s core of competition and reconciliation.  
 The constitutional conflicts in post-communist ECE present a second interest-
ing puzzle. Much of the institutional theorising in political science considers state 
structures and institutions to be difficult to change. Once adopted, institutions are 
assumed ‘to be very stable and to resist change’ (Lijphart, 1994: 52). Various mecha-
nisms are claimed to account for this durability, from the structuring effects of insti-
tutions to the interests of actors in preserving the institutional status quo and their 
limited capacities to induce institutional change (March and Olsen, 2008: 12; Peters, 
1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996). The phenomenon of constitutional conflict, however, 
indicates that political actors do not necessarily perceive of institutions as fixed and 
actually may have an important role and interest in modifying the existing institu-
tional set-up. Political actors in constitutional conflict are engaged in discussions 
about how to interpret or implement constitutional norms in their day-to-day politi-
cal conduct. The reconciliation of such disputes may establish new ways of interpret-
ing or implementing existing constitutional norms, as well as modifications to the 
constitution itself. Constitutional conflict and conflict resolution thus have the poten-
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tial to generate institutional change, and place political actors at the heart of proc-
esses of institutional implementation and modification. Therefore, the occurrence of 
constitutional conflict in the post-communist region challenges accepted notions of 
institutional stability and change, and invites for a reorientation of the study of insti-
tutions towards a more actor-centred approach.  
This dissertation sets out to explore and understand the tension between the 
presumed and appreciated stability of constitutional frameworks on the one hand, 
and the occurrence of constitutional conflict in ten ECE countries following the adop-
tion of their first post-communist constitutions on the other.1 It aims to establish un-
der which circumstances political actors were engaged in constitutional conflict, 
whether these conflicts produced constitutional change, and to what extent they af-
fected processes of democratic consolidation. With its focus on constitutional conflict, 
reconciliation and change the dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of 
the political transformation of post-communist ECE, as well as of the role that politi-
cians play in processes of institutional stability and change. The following research 
question will guide the thesis.  
 
How, when and why have political actors in post-communist East Central 
Europe engaged in political conflicts about constitutional provisions on the 
competencies of, and relations between, state institutions, and how have these 
conflicts affected constitutional change and democratic consolidation?  
 
In this thesis, democratic consolidation is understood as the development of a polity 
towards a situation in which ‘democracy is unlikely to break down’ (Schedler, 2001: 
66). It is imperative for the resilience of democracy that political elites consider abid-
ing by democratic constitutional norms the only feasible option. In practice, this 
means that political elites accept the outcomes of elections, and cease from trans-
gressing their constitutional authority or the use of violence for private political 
means. In sum, democracy should be ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 
6). This dissertation concentrates on constitutional legitimacy as an essential indica-
tor of support for the ideal and system of democracy. Under the condition of a de-
mocratic constitution, ‘the commitment […] to accept the legitimacy of, and to be 
                                                 
1  The cases are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. For an overview of constitutional replacement dates, see table 3.3 on page 
55.  
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governed by, constitutional rules and principles’ (Stone Sweet, 2008: 219) provides a 
firm foundation for democracy to endure. The idea that a legitimate constitutional 
framework is important for democratic consolidation is well accepted in democratisa-
tion studies (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1999; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 2001; 
see Schmidt, 2008: 439). As early as the 1960s consensus theories emphasised the 
need for ‘widespread agreement […] on at least the basic questions about how politi-
cal power is won’ (Prothro and Grigg 1960: 276-6). Democracies are thus consistently 
believed to develop towards a situation in which ‘rules and norms are implemented so 
that they meet with acceptance and that violations towards them are dealt with sanc-
tions that are considered legitimate’ (Lane and Ersson, 2000: 3).  
This does not, however, imply that unanimous and enduring agreement on the 
institutional set-up of a country is a necessity for a stable democracy, let alone that it 
is desirable. Constitutional debates and regular constitutional changes in long estab-
lished democracies illustrate that there are no grounds for such claims (see Alexan-
der, 2001). On the one hand, permanent constitutional conflict and violations of core 
democratic norms may destabilise and delegitimize a political system and generate 
support for its replacement. But on the other hand, political conflicts over the consti-
tution may also be resolved in accordance with democratic norms, and confirm or 
establish legitimate interpretations of constitutional norms. Accordingly, constitu-
tional conflicts may fit in, or even contribute to, democratic consolidation. In order to 
determine the impact of constitutional conflict it is therefore necessary to investigate 
the process surrounding constitutional conflict, and to investigate both its sources 
and effects. To that end, this dissertation explores what is likely to motivate political 
actors when they engage in constitutional conflict, the historical, political and institu-
tional circumstances under which they occur, and their consequences for constitu-
tional and democratic development in post-communist ECE. 
This thesis introduces the concept of constitutional conflict to assess constitu-
tional legitimacy among political elites. Constitutional conflicts are instances of ex-
plicit disagreement about the interpretation, implementation, or modification of 
constitutional rules on the competencies of, and relations between, state institutions. 
They involve two or more groups or actors with competing ideas about how to inter-
pret or apply existing constitutional provisions on executive, legislative and constitu-
tional review institutions, or about whether to change or replace such provisions. 
Competing parties in constitutional conflict represent advocates of the constitutional 
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status quo on the one hand, and supporters of an alternative interpretation, imple-
mentation or wording on the other. Constitutional conflicts may emerge at some 
stage in decision-making processes or other forms of political interaction, as a result 
of different readings of the constitution and its implications for what the actors in-
volved are allowed, prohibited, or required to do.2 Typically, therefore, constitutional 
conflict concerns the scope of specific rights or duties, the “role” of political actors or 
state institutions in the political process, and the distribution of competencies and 
responsibilities among politicians. Some examples are presidential prerogatives in 
particular policy areas, formal competencies and permitted degrees of activism of 
constitutional review bodies, and conditions for parliamentary votes of no confi-
dence. Constitutional conflicts can also become manifest in the form of discussions 
about constitutional change, for example following amendment proposals.  
This focus on constitutional conflicts allows investigating which parts of the 
constitutional framework were challenged, by whom and how, as well as with what 
possible intentions and effects. This will generate a better understanding of the proc-
ess of democratisation and the role of actors and constitutional change therein. The 
first sub-question of this thesis is concerned with mapping the pattern of constitu-
tional conflict in post-communist ECE. 
 
What patterns of constitutional conflict have emerged in East Central Europe, 
following the adoption of the first post-communist constitutions? 
 
Based on new and unique data on constitutional conflict in ten ECE countries, re-
gional and national patterns of conflict will be mapped and explored. The dataset 
covers the period following the replacement of communist constitutions in ten ECE 
countries until 31 December 2005. It is unique for no such overview of constitutional 
conflict in ECE is yet available that systematically covers the region over a period of 
                                                 
2   Constitutional conflicts generally concern explicit discussions about the interpretation or imple-
mentation of specific articles in the constitutional document. Occasionally, however, constitutional 
conflict may also revolve around the introduction or application of legislation that is derived from 
the constitution and has important implications for the constitutional powers of, and relations be-
tween, state institutions. Examples from the ECE context are conflicts about the introduction or 
modification of electoral thresholds, about presidential appointment powers not explicitly men-
tioned in the constitution, or about modifications to the internal proceedings of constitutional 
courts. Although the constitution as such does not appear in such conflicts, their impact on the con-
stitutional status quo is considered equally large. The dataset of constitutional conflict in post-
communist ECE that was constructed for this dissertation makes a distinction between constitu-
tional conflicts about particular constitutional provisions, and conflicts that concern derived legis-
lation (see Appendix A).  
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almost 15 years. The countries included in the analysis share the burden of a commu-
nist past and simultaneously set off on their democratic journey, but patterns of con-
stitutional conflict across the region differ substantially. This variation is noticeable 
in terms of the intensity and dominant topics of constitutional debate, as well as their 
timing and sequence. For example, while constitutional conflicts in Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic were relatively infrequent and had limited destabilising effects, the 
Bulgarian and Slovak constitutional frameworks have been a recurring topic of politi-
cal debate during much of the period of analysis. Although halfway through the first 
decade of the 21st century constitutional engineering had largely disappeared from 
the political agenda in ECE, the paths that led to this stable situation varied signifi-
cantly. The second sub-question of the thesis is concerned with explaining this varia-
tion in conflict patterns.  
  
Which factors explain the cross-time and cross-country variation in levels and 
types of constitutional conflict in post-communist East Central Europe? 
 
Variation in conflict patterns becomes apparent at the aggregate level, when national 
developments of constitutional conflict are compared, as well as within countries and 
through time. Cross-national differences are substantial as regards conflict levels, 
timing and sequence, and the type of constitutional provisions subject to discussion. 
The thesis seeks to explain why the countries followed different pathways towards 
constitutional stabilisation by investigating the interplay between various historical, 
institutional, and political factors. 
In the first place, it is assumed that timing and sequence have played a role in 
the evolution of constitutional conflict. It is therefore expected that levels and inten-
sity of constitutional conflict display a path dependent logic, meaning that constitu-
tional choices and events in the past determine future developments (Pierson, 2000; 
Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). Concretely, this implies that if prior constitutional con-
flicts were resolved satisfactorily, they will not to re-appear on the political agenda, at 
least not in a similar form. In addition, vested interests may make it increasingly dif-
ficult and unattractive for political actors to challenge the constitutional status quo 
the longer it is in place. The expected pattern of constitutional conflict that follows 
from this assumption is one developing from many instances of contestation over a 
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wide scope of issues soon after constitutional replacement3, to more scattered consti-
tutional challenges towards the end of the period of analysis.    
The second factor that is assumed to affect conflict patterns is the constitution-
making process. Constitution making represented an important phase in the democ-
ratic transitions of many ECE countries as it organised negotiations between repre-
sentatives of the communist regime and the opposition, and established democratic 
constitutional frameworks. It is expected that constitution making processes matter 
as much, if not more, for constitutional legitimacy as the constitutional design itself 
(cf. Schmitter, 2001; Widner, 2005). Constitutional deliberation and adoption proce-
dures in the ECE countries varied in the degree to which they allowed for involve-
ment of opposition movements and citizens (Elster, 1995; Von Beyme, 2001: 6-7). It 
will therefore be investigated whether the inclusiveness and representativeness of 
these procedures has affected the degree of constitutional legitimacy among political 
elites. Specifically, “open” constitution-making processes, which allow for broad par-
ticipation in the negotiation and decision-making stages, are expected to generate 
higher levels of constitutional acceptance than exclusive procedures.  
The third factor this dissertation takes into account is the product of constitu-
tion making – the constitutional designs adopted in the first post-communist consti-
tutions. Notwithstanding the increasingly popular claim that the process of constitu-
tion making is at least as important as its outcomes for democratic consolidation, the 
choice of institutions and rules as well as how they are formulated may also affect 
constitutional legitimacy. This assumption is rooted, firstly, in the idea that a consti-
tutional democracy needs clearly formulated rules of conduct and interaction. If the 
meaning of particular constitutional provisions is not shared among politicians, con-
flicts of interpretation and application may arise (E. Ostrom, 2005). Yet, constitu-
tions represent ‘incomplete contracts’ that cannot provide exact and exhaustive blue-
prints for every contingency (Stone Sweet, 2008; Frye, 1997). Therefore, the imple-
mentation of constitutional provisions may depend upon how political actors inter-
pret them and on the development of a consensus about this interpretation. What is 
more, ambiguity may represent a conscious strategy of political actors in the constitu-
tion-making process, either because they cannot agree on a more precise formulation 
or because they expect to be able to enforce their interpretation at a later stage (El-
                                                 
3  The terms constitutional replacement and adoption will be used interchangeably throughout the 
thesis, as in all ECE cases – except Hungary and Poland – the adoption of the new democratic con-
stitution also meant the replacement of the communist Basic Law.    
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ster, Offe, and Preuss, 1998: 64). In sum, constitutional ambiguity is expected to 
constitute a catalyst for constitutional conflict as it leaves important constitutional 
rules and procedures unspecified.  
The choice of constitutional design may also affect the intensity and type of 
constitutional conflict in terms of its distributional consequences (see Knight, 1992). 
Following the work by Arend Lijphart and others, power-sharing constitutional de-
signs are expected to generate more legitimacy than those that concentrate political 
influence in the hands of few (Lijphart, 1992, 1994, 1999, 2002; Negretto, 2000). 
This hypothesis will be investigated on the basis of 3 dimensions of constitutional 
design: executive-legislative relations, presidential powers, and rules on access to and 
procedures within parliaments. In addition, constitutional protection through adjudi-
cation and constitutional amendment procedures is expected to diminish the likeli-
hood of constitutional conflict (Rasch and Congleton, 2006; Rasch, 2008). Interpre-
tations by constitutional review bodies allow for adapting the constitutional order 
without changing the actual text of the Basic Law (Voigt, 1999; Stone Sweet, 2002). A 
medium level of constitutional rigidity precludes circumvention of amendment pro-
cedures, while it allows for the adoption for constitutional changes that carry wide-
spread support.  
The fourth and final potential explanatory factor concerns the strategic moti-
vations actors may have when they engage in constitutional conflict. Given their sig-
nificance for the distribution of power among politicians, constitutional rules may 
become the target of disputes among actors who seek to fulfil particular short-term 
electoral or policy-related goals (Geddes, 1996; Lindner and Rittberger, 2003; Benoit 
and Hayden, 2004). Therefore, this thesis will also analyse the party-political back-
ground and political strength of actors that were involved in constitutional conflict. 
Specifically, it will be assessed whether constitutional competition between presi-
dents and cabinets, as well as between governments and parliaments can be ex-
plained by party-political affiliations, cabinets’ degrees of legislative support, and in-
ternal composition of cabinets.  
 
1.2  Constitutional conflict, reconciliation, and change 
 
Both conceptually and theoretically, this thesis draws on established studies into de-
mocratic consolidation, political conflict, and institutional design and change. Yet, 
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with its focus on constitutional conflict, conflict resolution, and constitutional 
change, a novel approach to the study of democratisation and institutional change is 
proposed. The concept of constitutional conflict is not entirely unique. Comparative 
research into executive-legislative arrangements has extensively treated the issue of 
conflict over formal competencies and power distribution among institutional actors. 
In this context, scholars have especially pointed at the risks of executive-legislative 
deadlock and intra-executive competition in presidential and semi-presidential sys-
tems (Linz, 1990a, 1990b, 1994; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Lijphart, 1999; Linz and 
Valenzuela, 1994; Elgie, 1999; Protsyk, 2005, 2006). The approach to constitutional 
conflict adopted in this dissertation is both broader and deeper than existing ac-
counts of institutional competition. In the first place, constitutional conflict is taken 
to mean disagreement among political actors over more than executive-legislative 
relations only. This thesis will take into account political debate concerning what 
Zielonka (1994: 87) has called ‘democracy’s three institutional pillars’: executive, leg-
islative, and judiciary institutions in the ECE region, as well as constitutional rela-
tions between them. That not only refers to the role of the president in the political 
process and his competencies in particular policy areas, but also to the balance of 
power between governments and legislatures, and the position of constitutional re-
view bodies in the political system. This broad institutional focus allows making an 
assessment of the effects of constitutional conflict for democratic consolidation and 
constitutional change across the political system.  
Besides a broad institutional focus, this dissertation employs an encompassing 
approach to the process of constitutional conflict, reconciliation and change. In order 
to understand the sources and effects of constitutional conflict, this thesis will inves-
tigate not only how often and which constitutional issues were subject to debate, but 
it will also take into account the type of political actors engaged in the discussions, 
their strategies and possible motivations, and the way in which constitutional con-
flicts were settled and translated into constitutional change. It is assumed that the 
occurrence of constitutional conflict in post-communist ECE can be explained by the 
interaction of institutional opportunities and incentives on the one hand, and strate-
gic and political motivations on the other. In other words, politicians will engage in 
constitutional competition if the institutional context provides them with possibilities 
and reasons to do so, and if they think it may generate short-term or enduring politi-
cal gains. Exclusion and uncertainty during constitution-making processes, constitu-
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tional ambiguities, and distributional consequences of constitutional design repre-
sent such institutional opportunities and incentives. They may stimulate politicians 
to challenge the constitutional status quo because they feel that their interests were 
not properly incorporated into the constitution-making process, because the distribu-
tion of competencies is not clearly defined, or because the constitution obstructs an 
equal distribution of political power. The political background, support, and strength 
of politicians, as well as party-political relations between political institutions repre-
sent the possible strategic motivations that may encourage politicians to engage in 
constitutional conflict. By analysing the interaction between these institutional and 
political circumstances, this thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the 
sources of constitutional contestation in post-communist ECE.  
In order to capture the consequences of constitutional conflict for constitu-
tional stability and democratic consolidation, this thesis will analyse how conflicts 
were resolved and the changes they brought about in the constitutional frameworks 
of ECE. Whether constitutional conflicts were settled and how, as well as the formal 
or informal constitutional changes they produced are of great significance for an as-
sessment of the impact of constitutional conflict. Constitutional conflicts may be set-
tled formally through constitutional review or by amending the constitution. Yet, it is 
also conceivable that constitutional competition leads to political compromises about 
the interpretation or application of constitutional norms, which in their turn may de-
velop into conventions. Finally, constitutional conflicts may be settled by extra-
constitutional and undemocratic means, for example violence or constitutional trans-
gressions. Based on these outcomes, it will be possible to assess the impact of consti-
tutional conflict for constitutional stability and change, as well as for democratic con-
solidation in the ECE region.  
 
1.3 Theoretical contribution 
 
This thesis taps into two important institutionally oriented bodies of literature within 
political science. In the first place, it aims at contributing to democratisation studies 
and its understanding of constitutional legitimacy, conflict and change. As will be ar-
gued more in-depth in chapter 2, democratisation studies generally emphasise stable 
and legitimate constitutional frameworks as a precondition for democratic consolida-
tion. As a consequence, conflict about institutions is commonly denounced as indica-
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tive of lacking or eroding support for the very democratic character of a political sys-
tem. Yet, with this approach democratisation scholars tend to neglect that constitu-
tional conflict and conflict resolution may also be part of democratic competition and 
decision-making. Constitutional conflict and change may moreover provide a degree 
of flexibility and responsiveness to the constitution that contributes to its legitimacy, 
rather than undermining it. By recognising this potential quality of constitutional 
conflict, democratisation studies may be better capable of dealing with the phenom-
ena of constitutional competition and change.    
 The second body of literature to which this thesis aims to contribute is the new 
institutionalism. While a theory of democratisation that acknowledges the dual na-
ture of constitutional conflict may be capable of assessing the impact of conflict, it 
cannot account for the sources of constitutional contestation. Yet, this is imperative if 
we want to understand what motivates and enables political actors to challenge the 
interpretation and application of constitutional rules. The new institutionalism, with 
its focus on institutional creation, stability, and change, as well as on interactions be-
tween actors and institutions may provide answers to such questions. Indeed, the 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989) provided by the norma-
tive/sociological institutionalism may explain why actors adhere to particular norms 
and rules of conduct. The rational choice idea of institutions as self-enforcing, Pareto 
optimal agreements may explain why political actors benefit from cooperating rather 
than engaging in self-maximisation (Weingast, 2002). And historical institutionalism 
contributes to our understanding of the conditions of constitutional stability and 
change through its focus on path dependency and exogenous shocks (Sanders, 2008). 
Yet, processes of constitutional conflict, reconciliation and change do not fit well with 
the largely stability oriented and deterministic accounts of institutions that dominate 
the new institutionalism. The new institutionalism tends to downplay the motivations 
and opportunities available to political actors in both the application and modifica-
tion of concrete institutional rules. It recognises that institutions are created, applied 
and modified by actors (see especially North, 1990; Tsebelis, 1990; Scharpf, 1997), 
but new institutionalist analyses generally take these processes for granted. The idea 
that institutions socialise individuals, are path dependent, and resolve collective ac-
tion problems blinds the new institutionalism for the opportunities and incentives 
that may stimulate politicians to challenge the constitutional status quo. A focus on 
constitutional conflicts over the interpretation and implementation of specific consti-
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tutional provisions, as well as on the resulting changes, may compensate for these 
blind spots.    
This thesis calls for a critical re-evaluation of the role of actors and institu-
tional change in processes of democratic consolidation. Given the motivations and 
opportunities available to actors to modify existing institutional structures, ‘we have 
to go beyond a focus on how a specific institution affects change and attend to how 
the dynamics of change can be understood in terms of the organisation, interaction, 
and collisions among competing institutional structures, norms, rules, identities, and 
practices’ (March and Olsen, 2008: 14). The concept of constitutional conflict pro-
vides an empirical devise with which the preferences, identities, and motivations of 
actors in these processes can be captured. It is moreover a conceptual tool can make 
democratisation studies and the new institutionalism aware of actor-induced institu-
tional dynamics they tend to overlook.   
 
1.4 Case selection, collection of data, and methodological considera-
tions  
 
The post-communist ECE region provides a near perfect testing ground for a com-
parative analysis of constitutional conflict and democratisation. In the first place, the 
ten countries included in this study have almost simultaneously adopted new consti-
tutions, or modified their existing Basic Laws. In a time span of just over three years, 
a true constitutional revolution took place in ECE, with the introduction of democ-
ratic institutions in all countries in the region. Nowhere else has such a large group of 
states been concurrently involved in a political, social and economic transformation 
of a similar scale. Also with regard to communist legacies, important parallels can be 
drawn throughout the region. Although there are marked differences in terms of ‘pre-
vious regime types’ and the associated levels of suppression ECE societies have ex-
perienced (cf. Linz and Stepan, 1996; Karl and Schmitter, 1995), the legacy of the past 
has been a heavy burden in all formerly communist countries. But in the end, every 
one of them had to set off the transformation process with a new constitution that 
     INTRODUCTION 
 13 
was drafted basically from scratch.4 Closely connected to the past and to societal dif-
ferences between the countries are the challenges they faced at the onset of the trans-
formation. The degree of integration into international political and economic struc-
tures, ethnic fragmentation, and past experiences with democracy are relevant differ-
ences that may be thought of in this context. Hence, Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic faced considerably less formidable challenges than, for example, the Baltic 
States, Romania and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, these differences are likely to represent 
no impediment for a comparison of the political transformation of the ten ECE coun-
tries included in this study. The similarities are simply too important. To some ex-
tent, however, the differences will be “modelled” in the analyses of constitutional con-
flict. The investigation of constitution-making processes in chapter 4, for example, 
will explicitly take into account pre-transition developments towards democracy as 
for example occurred in the Visegrád countries (Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslova-
kia).  
 It is this thesis’ aim to demonstrate how variation with regard to both ‘inde-
pendent’ and ‘dependent’ variables can be explained theoretically (cf. Keman, 2008: 
65). Dissimilarities with respect to national conflict patterns and explanatory factors 
are therefore a motive in its own right for the case selection, and for adopting a com-
parative research design. All ten countries are now integrated into the European Un-
ion and have witnessed a stabilisation of their constitutional structures since the late 
1990s, but the pathways towards this situation were anything but equal. As will be 
elaborated in detail in chapter 3, the intensity and duration of the consolidation proc-
ess varied substantially, from rapid and concentrated on only a few constitutional 
issues in the Czech Republic and Slovenia to enduring and covering many areas in 
Hungary and Poland. There are also marked cross-national differences with regard to 
the possible sources of conflict. The divergence in constitution making processes, 
constitutional ambiguity, and constitutional design is considerable. This assumed ‘co-
variation of independent and dependent variables’ calls for a comparative analysis 
according to the method of difference (Lijphart, 1971; Keman, 1999: 47-49; Peters, 
1998). Lijphart (1971: 687) holds that this method is applicable to cases that are ‘simi-
                                                 
4  Note that in Poland and Hungary the existing constitutions of respectively 1952 and 1949 were 
amended, and that in Latvia the 1922 constitution was reinstalled and amended. Although formally 
no new constitutions were adopted in these countries, we may nevertheless speak of a constitu-
tional break with the past. The 1989 amendments in Poland and Hungary as well as the ‘new’ Lat-
vian constitution dramatically changed the existing framework of institutions and political and so-
cial rights.   
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lar in a large number of important characteristics (variables) which one wants to treat 
as constants, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants 
to relate to each other’. In this case, the ceteris paribus condition (ibid: 683) is met 
by cross-national similarities with regard to communist legacies and comparable con-
stitutional starting points, while important cross-national differences in both de-
pendent and independent variables allow for pair wise and group comparisons within 
the set of ECE countries. These comparisons will be conducted on the basis of multi-
ple Most Similar Systems Designs (MSSD) that allow holding constant contextual 
factors, while different independent variables are allowed to vary (Przeworski and 
Teune, 1970; Keman, 1999).  
Potential opportunities and motivations for political actors to engage in consti-
tutional conflict are various, and in order to capture the different sources of constitu-
tional conflict three distinct levels of analysis will be applied. First, patterns of contes-
tation at the regional level will be established, taking into account aggregate levels of 
constitutional conflict and the distribution of conflicts over constitutional dimensions 
in the ten ECE countries. This overview serves first and foremost to establish the re-
gion-wide developments in terms of conflict evolution and the most contested institu-
tional arenas. It shows how the region as a whole has consolidated, and indicates 
whether the timing and sequence of particular constitutional debates confirms a path 
dependent logic. Secondly, the analytical focus shifts to the national level, connecting 
constitution-making procedures, constitutional ambiguities and constitutional design 
with patterns of conflict. Among the ten ECE countries in this study there are no two 
cases that are entirely similar with respect to all independent variables. Yet, on each 
dimension important parallels between countries can be discerned, which allows for 
group wise comparative analyses. Thus, on the basis of characteristics of constitution-
making procedures, groups of countries will be constructed that are assumed to dis-
play similar levels of constitutional conflict (chapter 4). Such cross-national compari-
sons along an MSSD-logic will also be applied in order to assess the impact of consti-
tutional ambiguity and constitutional design (chapters 5 and 6, respectively). The ef-
fects of ambiguous constitutional design on conflict and change in intra-executive 
relations will be analysed by means of case studies of Hungary and Poland. This in-
depth approach allows detailed investigation of national conflict patterns, as well as 
of how conflicts evolved and may be related to constitutional change. The conse-
quences of constitutional design will be investigated across the ten ECE polities in-
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cluded in this study. Through separate analyses the power-sharing character of three 
constitutional dimensions will be linked to national patterns of constitutional conflict 
about these dimensions. Since no two countries are entirely similar with regard to all 
constitutional dimensions, the groups of comparable countries differ in the separate 
analyses. Thirdly and finally, the analysis will turn to variation in constitutional con-
flict between cabinets. By means of fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
(FS/QCA), the party-political circumstances of constitutional conflict during 100 
cabinet periods will be investigated. While the cross-national analyses connect sys-
tem-level characteristics with patterns of constitutional conflict, an analysis of devel-
opments within countries is sensitive to strategic motivations and party-political dif-
ferences between actors involved in conflict.  
Throughout the thesis qualitative and quantitative information will be used to 
analyse constitutional conflicts in the ECE region. A dataset was constructed that 
contains detailed information on each constitutional conflict, including its timing, the 
actors involved, the constitutional issues subject to discussion, and – when available– 
its outcome. Therefore, data on frequencies of conflict can consistently be enriched 
with relevant background information on topics, actors and consequences. Through-
out the thesis there will also be references to the conflict descriptions in appendix A. 
The data collection was conducted on the basis of multiple sources that were triangu-
lated in order to enhance validity and reliability of the data (Grix, 2004: 121). Trian-
gulation benefits the quality of the data, as findings are ‘likely to be much more con-
vincing and accurate if […] based on several different sources of information’ (Yin, 
1994: 92). The starting point for the data collection was the quarterly “Constitution 
Watch” in East European Constitutional Review, and the annual “Political Data 
Yearbooks” of the European Journal for Political Research. Instances of conflict 
were derived from the detailed descriptions of constitutional and political develop-
ments in these journals, and background information on particular conflicts was col-
lected on the basis of Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. In a first step to validate the 
data, instances and patterns of conflict were verified against academic case studies 
and comparative analyses of constitutional developments in ECE. Multiple academic 
sources were used to cross check the data for each country, and to add omitted con-
flicts or information where necessary. As a final step, the data were put to an external 
and critical test. Renowned country experts with shown academic interest in constitu-
tional developments in the countries were asked to validate the data, and to check 
CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONS 
 16
them on accuracy and completeness. Several amendments and changes were pro-
posed, most of which were added to the data set. The full dataset, as well as the list of 
country experts and a sample of the survey that was sent to the experts are included 
in appendices A and B.   
 
1.5 Alternative explanations  
 
It is worth stressing three factors that may be linked to constitutional conflict in the 
post-communist ECE region, but that will be omitted from the analyses. The first that 
perhaps immediately springs to mind is the “EU-factor”. All countries included in this 
study are now integrated into the European Union, and were fully involved in the ac-
cession procedures during the period of analysis. It cannot, therefore, be denied hat 
the EU has in one way or another played a role the political and economic transfor-
mation of ECE. The European Union’s formal membership criteria, related to the 
adoption of the aqcuis communautaire and the Copenhagen criteria, provide con-
crete and forceful mechanisms on the basis of which the European Commission can 
demand institutional and administrative reforms (Malová and Haughton, 2002; 
Pridham, 2005; Grabbe, 2007). Yet, the question whether the EU has been able to 
exert influence on constitutional design and change in the ECE region cannot be an-
swered so plainly. Malová and Haughton (2002: 101) argue that the desire ‘to join 
Europe’s best and wealthiest club helped engender the replication of Western Euro-
pean institutions’ in the ECE region. According to these authors, the EU accession 
process has, be it indirectly, caused an institutional convergence towards West Euro-
pean models. This is most visible in the dominance of parliamentarism, ceremonial 
heads of state, PR legislative electoral systems, and ‘European style’ constitutional 
review (Stone Sweet, 2008: 222). Yet, the European Union has had a role neither in 
the initial choice of these institutions, nor in their evolution during the 1990s and 
early 2000s. The constitutional conflicts that emerged in the region, as well as the 
ensuing settlements, were ECE’s own way to deal with the ambiguities and conse-
quences of constitutional choices in the early 1990s. The different pathways towards 
constitutional stabilisation should therefore be considered as processes of institu-
tional learning and change that evolved largely independent of the EU accession 
process.     
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 Diffusion is another mechanism that may have played a role in the occurrence 
and evolution of constitutional conflict in post-communist ECE. Diffusion can be de-
fined as cross-national dispersion of norms, ideas, and practices and has also been 
applied to explain assumed ‘domino effects’ during the communist breakdown in ECE 
(Starr, 1991). Imitation of best practices and learning effects may thus play a role in 
processes of democratisation and constitutional engineering. With regard to constitu-
tional conflict and change, countries in the region may have learned from the experi-
ences of other countries with particular constitutional questions or challenges. In-
deed, there is some evidence that lustration strategies were copied throughout ECE in 
order to deal with the remnants of the communist past (Welsh, 1996). However, such 
transnational parallels do not alter the fact that a complex of factors at the national 
level – constitution making processes, constitutional design and ambiguities, and 
party-political developments – provided much stronger stimuli for constitutional 
conflict. Given the extensive variation with regard to these factors, as well as the dis-
tinctiveness of national conflict patterns, there are no reasons to assume that diffu-
sion has played a decisive role in constitutional choice, conflict and change through-
out ECE.     
 The third and final factor that potentially affected the occurrence of constitu-
tional conflict in ECE is what may be labelled the “personality factor”. If personality 
traits of politicians are becoming more important in Western democracies (cf. 
Caprara et al, 2007), they were certainly significant in the ‘poorly institutionalised 
and volatile party systems’ of post-communist ECE (Baylis, 2007: 82). Political fig-
ures such as Lech Wałęsa, Václav Klaus, Vladimír Mečiar, and Václav Havel were 
dominant politicians in the pre-transition era, either as dissidents or within the 
higher ranks of the communist party. They continued to exert much influence after 
the communist breakdown and were frequently involved in constitutional conflicts. 
Former dissidents Wałęsa and Havel could rely on massive popular support, which 
they perceived as a mandate to stretch their constitutional prerogatives as presidents 
(Baylis, 1996; Wolchik, 1997: 189; Jasiewicz, 2001: 164). The resulting clashes over 
executive power were especially fierce with those prime ministers who lacked popular 
support due to their economic reform programmes, or because of their link to the 
communist party (Baylis, 2007: 92-93; Kopecký, 2004). This suggests that the way in 
which politicians conceived of their role as president or prime minister had an impact 
on the occurrence and type of constitutional conflicts. This may have been the case 
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for a limited number of politicians, but they were able to do so as a result of the am-
biguities that were present in many constitutions (see chapters 4 and 5). This consti-
tutional fuzziness provided a window of opportunity for politicians seeking to stretch 
their formal competencies, which would have been a lot more difficult without such 
leeway in the constitution.  
 
1.6  Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis will be structured as follows. Chapter 2 elaborates on the theoretical con-
tribution this study aims to make. The concepts of constitutional conflict and conflict 
resolution will be positioned within democratisation studies and the new institution-
alism. While both literatures provide insights into institutional creation, effects, sta-
bility and change, it will be argued that they overlook the leeway available to actors 
when implementing and interpreting constitutional rules. This blind spot in democ-
ratisation studies and the new institutionalism can be explained by their emphasis on 
institutional stability and a deterministic and holistic understanding of institutions. It 
will be argued that the concepts of constitutional conflict and conflict resolution, as 
well as a focus on the institutional and political circumstances under which they oc-
cur, allows capturing institutional dynamics and sources of change that are often 
overlooked by these literatures.    
 Chapter 3 lays the basis for the analysis of the sources and effects of constitu-
tional conflict by mapping conflict patterns in post-communist ECE. The chapter 
provides data on regional, annual, and national conflict levels, as well as on the dis-
tribution and timing of particular constitutional discussions. On a regional level, con-
stitutional conflict gradually disappeared from the political agenda towards the early 
2000s, suggesting a pattern of consolidation through increasing legitimacy and sta-
bility of constitutional frameworks. Splitting up the period of analysis into two stages 
– respectively the first five years following constitutional adoption and the ensuing 
period – reveals, however, that this trend does not hold for all types of constitutional 
discussion. Especially presidential powers and executive-legislative relations re-
mained prominent issues of conflict until the late 1990s. Brief descriptions of na-
tional conflict patterns and important constitutional discussions in the ten polities 
under review further confirm the sub-regional variation. In terms of total conflict lev-
els, timing and sequence, as well as distribution across constitutional dimensions, 
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cross-national variation is substantial. Based on patterns of conflict with regard to 
timing and scope, national conflict patterns will be classified into four distinct path-
ways towards constitutional stabilisation.  
Chapter 4 takes a first step towards explaining the conflict patterns that were 
outlined in chapter 3. It deals with the extent to which constitution-making proce-
dures have affected the degree of constitutional legitimacy in post-communist ECE. It 
is hypothesised that constitutional bargaining and adoption processes that are open 
to participation by relevant political groups and citizens generate legitimate constitu-
tions, as represented by low levels of conflict during the first five years after constitu-
tional replacement. A comparison of constitution-making processes and levels of con-
stitutional conflict ensuing constitutional adoption indicates that a clear effect is ab-
sent, though. Although some of the countries confirm the expected relation between 
constitution making and conflict, open constitution-making procedures were no 
guarantee for legitimate constitutions, while exclusive processes did not necessarily 
ignite intense constitutional conflict. A combination of constitutional ambiguity and 
political circumstances in the early 1990s provides a better explanation for the con-
flict patterns. Among cases with different models of constitution making, constitu-
tional ambiguities ignited high levels of constitutional conflict during periods of po-
litical polarisation, especially regarding the issue of economic reforms. In Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, and Poland, presidents, governments and political parties thus used unclear 
provisions in the constitution to push through their political agendas. In Estonia and 
Hungary, on the other hand, such ambiguities remained largely latent as the issue of 
economic reform created less political tension.     
Chapter 5 deals more extensively with the effects of ambiguous constitutional 
design. The analysis focuses on Hungary and Poland, and describes the development 
of constitutional conflicts surrounding ambiguities related to the distribution of ex-
ecutive power between presidents and cabinets. The analysis finds that presidential 
involvement in the areas of defence, national security, and foreign policy were fre-
quently recurring topics of conflict in both countries. At the same time, the way in 
which intra-executive conflicts were resolved and translated into constitutional 
change differed substantially. In Hungary, constitutional court rulings were instru-
mental in the settlement of constitutional competition between President Göncz and 
different cabinets. Even though its rulings were sometimes confusing, the court con-
tributed to an early stabilisation of intra-executive relations. In Poland, constitutional 
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conflicts were initially settled through political compromise, or led to other political 
outcomes such as the ousting of a prime minister by President Wałęsa. However, 
these informal outcomes did not resolve intra-executive conflict definitively, and con-
stitutional discussions kept resurfacing. With the adoption of a new constitution in 
1997, intra-executive relations in Poland finally stabilised. These findings indicate 
that in the dynamic context of ECE of the early 1990s, formal constitutional change 
contributed to a more rapid and durable stabilisation of constitutional relations than 
informal settlements.   
Chapter 6 is concerned with the effects of constitutional design on national 
patterns of constitutional conflict. Drawing especially on the work of Arend Lijphart, 
hypotheses will be formulated on the conflict-proneness of constitutional designs 
adopted in post-communist ECE. In particular, constitutional power sharing and 
constitutional protection mechanisms are expected to contribute to constitutional 
legitimacy. The findings of the analyses indicate that medium levels of constitutional 
protection – through constitutions neither too flexible nor too rigid, and averagely 
strong and active constitutional courts – can be associated with lower levels of consti-
tutional conflict. With regard to presidential powers and executive-legislative rela-
tions, two contrasting developments can be noted. On the one hand, attempts on the 
part of presidents to concentrate power in the presidential office ignited fierce intra-
executive competition. Conflict about executive-legislative relations, on the other 
hand, was primarily associated with the development from dominant legislatures to-
wards executive-legislative power sharing. As power sharing prevailed on both consti-
tutional dimensions, conflict and reconciliation have been instrumental in the devel-
opment of moderate constitutional design in ECE. 
In chapter 7 the analysis turns to actors’ potential party-political and strategic 
motivations for engaging in constitutional conflict. Constitutional struggles between 
executive and legislative institutions during 100 ECE cabinet periods will be analysed 
by means of FS/QCA methodology (Ragin, 2000; 2007). Building on coalition theory 
and assumptions derived from executive-legislative studies, it will be hypothesised 
that politically strong cabinets are less prone to constitutional challenges by presi-
dents and parliaments than weak cabinets. Specifically, cabinets that include the 
president’s party, enjoy majority support in the legislature, and consist of a single 
party are expected to be least vulnerable to challenges by presidents and parliaments. 
The analyses indicate that majority support in parliament, in combination with 
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shared party background of presidents and cabinets, is a sufficient condition for low 
levels of president-cabinet competition in post-communist ECE. Likewise, cabinets 
that contained the president’s party and enjoyed majority legislative support re-
mained devoid of challenges by parliament, but only in case these cabinets consisted 
of a coalition of parties. Coalition government, moreover, constituted a sufficient 
condition for low levels of intra-executive conflict. These findings suggest that party-
political relations and strategic motivations constituted vital incentives for politicians 
to engage in constitutional competition, or to refrain from doing so.      
Chapter 8 discusses this study’s findings in light of the research question, as 
well as their relevance for our understanding of processes of democratisation and 
institutional change in the ECE region. In addition, the chapter will reflect on this 
study’s theoretical and methodological approach to constitutional conflict, and on its 
contribution to the literatures of democratisation studies and new institutionalism. 
Finally, placing the findings in a broader perspective, this study’s possible implica-
tions for constitutional developments beyond ECE will be discussed.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Constitutional conflict, reconciliation and change: actors and institutions 
in democratisation processes 
 
In so far as democracy is based on conflict, it may take two attitudes to make a quarrel 
(Dankwart A. Rustow, 1970: 345) 
 
It is obvious that any system that engages only in exploitation will become obsolescent in 
a changing world, and that any system that engages only in exploration will never realise 
the potential gains of its discoveries (James March and Johan Olsen, 2008: 13) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In chapter 1 the concept of constitutional conflict was introduced as an empirical de-
vice and a theoretical concept that can further our understanding of democratisation 
processes in post-communist ECE, and the role of actor induced institutional change 
therein. This chapter will elaborate on the theoretical contribution this dissertation 
seeks to make, by placing the concept of constitutional conflict within the literatures 
of the new institutionalism and democratisation studies. While these theoretical bod-
ies provide significant insight into the occurrence and relevance of constitutional con-
flict during political transformation processes, they both have shortcomings with re-
gard to our understanding of the interactions between actors and institutions and of 
institutional stability and change. It will be argued that these limitations can be tack-
led by means of a focus on constitutional conflict and conflict resolution.  
This chapter will address two questions. The first is: what are the implications 
of constitutional conflict for democracy and democratic consolidation? This is an im-
portant matter if we want to assess the consequences of the different patterns of con-
stitutional conflict across the ECE region. It will be argued that constitutional conflict 
and conflict resolution may both undermine and support democratic consolidation. 
On the one hand, constitutional conflict and conflict resolution can be perceived of as 
part and parcel of democratic competition, and may therefore contribute to constitu-
tional legitimacy. However, constitutional conflict may also seriously affect the bal-
ance of power between political actors, and delegitimise and destabilise the political 
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system or its democratic character. This dual nature of constitutional conflict is often 
overlooked in democratisation studies, which tend to emphasise the importance of 
consensus about the rules of the political game and stability of the constitutional 
framework.   
The second question relates to the thesis’ contribution to the new institutional-
ism and asks: what motivates political actors to engage in constitutional conflict? Al-
though this concerns an empirical query, it is in the first place geared towards deep-
ening our understanding of interactions between institutions and actors, and the lat-
ter’s capacities to produce institutional change. Various strands in the new institu-
tionalist literature generate valuable insights into how institutions structure, enable 
and impede actor behaviour, and the role of actors in the emergence and change of 
institutions. However, their tendency to perceive of institutions as deterministic of 
actor behaviour, as well as their predominantly holistic approach downplays the role 
of actors in institutional change and development. The implementation and stability 
of institutional rules depends to a large extent on how actors interpret and apply 
them, and on conflicts over the distributional consequences of these rules (see also V. 
Ostrom, 1980; E. Ostrom, 1983, 2005; Tsebelis, 1990; Knight, 1992). Uncertainty and 
exclusion during processes of institutional creation, ambiguously formulated rules 
and competencies, and institutional illegitimacy provide potential incentives and op-
portunities for political actors to engage in attempts to re-interpret or modify the in-
stitutional framework. The conflicts that are generated by such attempts imply less 
institutional stability than the new institutionalism generally allows for in its under-
standing of institutional effects and change. The concept of constitutional conflict – 
as the materialisation of disagreement about the interpretation and implementation 
of constitutional rules – can fill this void by highlighting an important potential 
source of institutional change.   
The chapter will be structured as follows. In section 2, two roles institutions 
play in democratisation studies will be discussed. First, there is widespread consen-
sus among scholars that a stable and legitimate framework of rules is a precondition 
for a democratic political system. Such stability and legitimacy stimulate political ac-
tors and citizens to commit to the “rules of the game”, and to abide by them in their 
daily conduct, based on the expectation that others will do alike. This idea of ‘self-
enforcing’ institutions is considered imperative for democracy (Przeworski, 2001). 
The second role of institutions in democratisation studies pertains to the effects of 
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institutional design on democratic stability and conflict management. Some institu-
tional frameworks are assumed conducive to democracy, while others tend to amplify 
societal conflicts and undermine democratic consensus building. Although both these 
views of institutions and democracy are valid and meaningful in their own right, they 
tend to emphasise too much the importance of constitutional consensus and stability. 
In so doing, they do away too quickly with actor-induced constitutional changes that 
may actually contribute to constitutional legitimacy.  
Section 3 focuses on the new institutionalism, and addresses the question of 
how constitutional conflict can be explained. Within this highly diversified school of 
thought, several views exist of how to define institutions and how and why institu-
tions originate and change (see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999, 2005; Rothstein, 
1996; Rhodes, Binder and Rockman, 2008). Diverse as these approaches may be, 
each provides useful theoretical insights about the conditions of constitutional stabil-
ity and change. At the same time, within the new institutionalist strands that will be 
discussed – normative, rational choice, and historical – institutions tend to be stud-
ied in a deterministic way (cf. Scharpf, 1997, 2000). Paradoxically, the role of actors 
in institutional design and change is often claimed to lie at the core of the new institu-
tionalism, but rarely becomes explicit in its analyses. The motivations and opportuni-
ties available to actors when interpreting and applying institutional rules, and the 
dynamics and change that consequently may occur are therefore overlooked. The 
concepts of constitutional conflict and conflict resolution help visualise these dynam-
ics and may contribute to a re-evaluation of the role of actors in institutional change. 
Section 4 concludes and discusses how insights from democratisation studies and the 
new institutionalist literature will be applied and amended in this dissertation.  
 
2.2 Institutions and democratisation  
 
Two strands in democratisation studies focus on the role of institutions in processes 
of democratic development. Both offer valuable insights into relations between insti-
tutions and democratisation. Yet, both fail to provide a satisfying framework for 
studying how the behaviour and attitudes of political actors towards political institu-
tions affect democratisation. Structurally oriented scholars concentrate on the effects 
of constitutional design for democratic stability and consolidation, but overlook how 
politicians may try to adapt these institutions after their creation. Behavioural and 
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attitudinal approaches, on the other hand, emphasise the legitimacy of the institu-
tional framework among citizens and elites, but assume too much the stability of ac-
tor preferences. 
 
2.2.1 Support for democracy and democratic institutions 
 
With democracy being an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 1964), scholars in 
political science and beyond do not cease debating the sources of democratisation 
and the preconditions for a stable democratic system (Potter et al, 2001). Yet, there is 
widespread agreement on the importance of support for the ground rules of the de-
mocratic political game, both among political elites and the citizens of a polity. If de-
mocracy’s basic framework of institutions, rights, and values is not recognised by a 
majority of the population, it cannot be expected to endure. Well-known representa-
tives of this view are Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. According to them, democracy is 
not consolidated until people and politicians consider it to be ‘the only game in town’ 
(Linz and Stepan 1996a: 5, 1996b; see also Chull Shin and Wells 2005, Schedler, 
2001; Diamond 1999). It is assumed that support for democracy and democratic in-
stitutions should be reflected not only constitutionally but also behaviourally and in 
the attitudes of the people and their leaders (Schedler, 2001: 70-80; Linz, Stepan and 
Gunther, 1995: 78-81). The democratic ideal and its ground rules – free, competitive 
elections, the rule of law, the constitutional separation of powers – should be consid-
ered the only viable option, even in case of political loss, e.g. after electoral defeat. 
This notion is also emphasised by Elster, Offe and Preuss, who argue that consoli-
dated democracies are characterised by ‘a solid hiatus between rules and decisions’ 
(1996: 28). That is, there may be discussion about institutions and legislation, but the 
rules for carrying out such disputes – the ‘meta-rules’ (E. Ostrom, 1986, 2005) or 
‘second- and third-order rules’ (Alexander, 2002a: 1161) – should in principle remain 
immune from contention.  
Democratisation scholars recognise that acceptance of a given framework of 
rules among politicians and across society generally needs time to evolve. Philip 
Schmitter, for example, states that ‘the consolidation of democracy depends on ac-
tors’ and citizens’ ability to come up with a solution to their intrinsic conflicts over 
rules’ (2001: 69). Nascent and young democracies typically lack the ‘quasi-automatic 
mechanisms of acceptance of rules’ (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1996: 28) that character-
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ises consolidated democracies. One of the principal delaying factors in this process is 
that new institutions must “prove” that they generate acceptable results for contend-
ing parties in political disputes. Dankwart Rustow (1970) has famously labelled this 
‘the habituation phase’ in democratic transitions. The choice of democratic institu-
tions often follows an extended political struggle and is commonly made under condi-
tions of uncertainty and distrust. Whether or not these institutions will be stable and 
enduring depends on the results of the distributional struggles in which they are ap-
plied. If such struggles lead to highly unequal outcomes, the institutional framework 
is easily blamed and runs the risk of being pulled down. Yet, once the institutional 
framework has “survived” this difficult and hazardous first stage of the democratisa-
tion process, commitment to the democratic system is assumed to increase while, 
simultaneously, the risk of regime breakdown diminishes.  
Underlying this expectation is the idea that political and societal actors are 
willing to commit to the democratic game as well as to its outcomes if they believe 
that it constitutes a more attractive alternative than dictatorship. Adam Przeworski 
(1991, 2005) writes in this context of the ‘self-enforcing nature of democracy’ (see 
also Fearon, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2004; Weingast, 1997, 2004). Democ-
racy, according to Przeworski (2005: 1), ‘is not a contract because there are no third 
parties to enforce it’. Instead, democracy’s survival depends on the presumption that 
the value of (electoral) victory under a framework of democratic institutions is 
greater than the expected values of dictatorship. And even more importantly, (elec-
toral) defeat will be valued better than the non-democratic alternative, since in a de-
mocratic system all actors and groups have a reasonable chance to win elections in 
the foreseeable future.5 So even though the short-term outcomes of the democratic 
political game may be uncertain, institutions bring long-term predictability to the 
political process, which is necessary for political actors to commit to these institu-
tions.   
  
 
 
                                                 
5  Such rationalist analyses have also been applied to democratic transitions. Gerard Alexander 
(2002), for example, argues that the conservative right in Western Europe agreed with the intro-
duction of democratic institutions in the early 20th century, as it perceived the long-term payoffs of 
democracy higher than the risks associated with sustaining authoritarianism (i.e., mass protests, 
violence, in the short run, revenge on the longer term). 
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2.2.2 The effects of constitutional design 
 
Although institutions are clearly necessary to provide predictability to political inter-
actions and to generate commitment to democracy, it is also widely recognised that 
institutions tend to benefit some more than others. Their impact upon the political 
game is therefore not as “neutral” as one might believe based on the assumption that 
democracy is self-enforcing. Institutions have important distributional consequences 
and reflect and affect the allocation of power within a given society (Knight, 1992; 
Negretto, 2000). This is the subject of analysis for scholars who are interested in the 
consequences of constitution-making and constitutional design, another important 
institutionalist strand within democratisation studies.  
There is a rich tradition of scholarly research into the implications of specific 
constitutional designs for democratisation, democratic performance and democratic 
breakdown (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Linz, 1990, 1994; Shugart and Carey, 
1992; Lijphart 1991, 1992b, 1994, 2004; Ishiyama and Velten 1998; Przeworski et al., 
2000). The central question within this body of literature is whether and how institu-
tional arrangements can be crafted so that they contribute to democratic consolida-
tion and stability. The core argument is that institutions have important power shar-
ing or power-concentrating consequences, and can therefore benefit particular 
groups at the expense of others (Schmid, 2004; Negretto, 2000). Legislative electoral 
systems design, executive-legislative relations, constitutional rigidity and review, and 
federal versus unitary constitutions are recognized as the most significant institu-
tional choices for new democracies, especially if they are internally divided (Lijphart 
1992, 2004; Linz 1992, 1994). Through careful engineering, such institutions may be 
instrumental for a society to cope with challenges such as ethnic and linguistic divi-
sions and the need for power sharing in any type of polity (Lijphart, 2008). Specific 
constitutional recommendations in this context are proportional electoral systems 
design, parliamentarism, constitutional review, and decentralised government (Li-
jphart, 1999; 2008). However, the notion that carefully crafted institutional design 
may contribute to democratisation has generated much criticism as well. Especially 
the presumed universal applicability of “constitutional advice” by such scholars as 
Lijphart and Linz has been met with fierce scepticism. Cultural, behavioural and his-
torical factors may affect the performance of institutions in ways that can be contrary 
to our expectations (Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Ishiyama and Velten 1998; see also 
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Schmidt, 2008: 326-327), and power sharing constitutional design may undermine a 
political system’s efficiency and stability (Horowitz, 2001).    
Partly in line with these criticisms is a recent emphasis on the effects of proc-
esses of constitution-making and constitutional reform. Such processes may be as 
significant or even more important for conflict resolution, stability and democratisa-
tion as the actual institutional design (Elster, 1996; Schmitter, 2001; Widner, 2005; 
Moehler, 2006). Philippe Schmitter points out that ‘no particular political configura-
tion […] is likely to have an identical or generic impact upon the consolidation of de-
mocracy’ (2001: 4). More important for the democratisation process is the extent to 
which the constitution-making process has been fair and representative. All relevant 
political groups and the population should be involved as much as possible in consti-
tutional deliberation and adoption in order to ensure that no parties or groups be-
come or feel excluded.6 Only then will the chosen constitutional framework reflect the 
best possible compromise between the institutional preferences of all relevant 
groups.     
 
2.2.3 Constitutional conflict and democratisation  
 
What can be said on the basis of the previous discussion about the significance of 
constitutional conflict for democratic consolidation? Democratisation studies point at 
the importance of legitimacy of political institutions among political elites and the 
population, and emphasise stable, carefully crafted institutions. Stated boldly, if poli-
ticians perceive of the institutional framework as predictable and fair, they will ad-
here to the rules and democracy becomes self-enforcing. If, however, the constitu-
tional framework becomes the subject of contention, democratisation may be failing. 
In democratisation studies, conflict about formal institutions is associated with a 
combination of bad constitutional design and a lust for power among political actors. 
Political instability, deadlock, and democratic breakdown are the associated negative 
consequences.   
 However, is this not a much too pessimistic and limited conception of constitu-
tional conflict? Constitutional theories point out that constitutions should be repre-
                                                 
6  This should include representatives of the former ruling elite, as they might still represent signifi-
cant parts of the population. Such inclusion of possibly anti-democratic groups may be painful and 
lead to popular protest, yet reconciliation and ‘pacted transitions’ contribute to dealing peacefully 
with the past and nurture a democratic political culture (Linz and Stepan, 1996).     
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sentative of the dominant values and norms in society (Rasch, 2008; Pasquino, 1998; 
Stone Sweet, 2008). A constitution thus reflects important ideas about political jus-
tice and power distribution, but may sometimes need adjustment in response to 
changes in these ideas. A constitutional order that entrenches outdated political 
norms and rules runs the risk of becoming illegitimate, being ignored, or even over-
thrown. Discussion and reconciliation are, therefore, central to a democratic political 
culture. In its essence, democracy is about conflict and conflict resolution (Diamond, 
1990; Dahl, 1971; Keman, 1997), which enable politicians and groups to discuss im-
portant values and how they should be reflected in constitutional norms. If these con-
flicts result in agreements about how to adapt the political system to a changing soci-
ety, they may contribute to democracy rather than eroding it. As Andreas Schedler 
puts it, ‘challenges [to democracy] may end up strengthening democracy’, while ‘the 
absence of manifest threats creates latent feelings of security (2001: 72-74).  
  The nature of constitutional conflict in democracy and democratisation proc-
esses is thus dual. On the one hand, constitutional conflict can have severe destabilis-
ing effects and indicate a lack of support for democratic institutions. On the other 
hand, however, constitutional conflict may be interpreted as a sign of a democratic 
culture that allows criticism of the political system and its dominant power relations. 
To assess the consequences of constitutional conflict, one should take into account 
the intentions of politicians, and the effects of the outcomes of conflict on the institu-
tional framework. The questions to be posed when constitutional conflict is observed 
are then: what motivates politicians to engage in constitutional conflict, what strate-
gies do they apply, and what changes do they bring about? Do they challenge the de-
mocratic character of the constitution, are democratic norms transgressed or re-
placed, or do they aim at institutional adjustments that fit, or even contribute to de-
mocratic competition and reconciliation? It is therefore important to investigate the 
sources of constitutional conflict and to ‘distinguish between change within fairly sta-
ble institutional […] frameworks and change in the frameworks themselves’ (March 
and Olsen, 2008: 13). The new institutionalism, with its focus on institutional crea-
tion, stability and change, may provide theoretical backing and concrete hypotheses 
on political actors’ motives to engage in constitutional conflict.  
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2.3 ‘The’ new institutionalism in political science 
 
In the previous section it was argued that in order to assess the significance of consti-
tutional conflict, the intentions of political actors and the effects of conflicts on the 
institutional framework should be taken into account. The new institutionalism may 
help answering these questions. It engages in questions of institutional effects and 
change, and provides insight into interactions between actors and their institutional 
environments (Peters, 1999; Rothstein, 2004). However, the stability-oriented and 
functionalistic view of institutions that dominates democratisation studies can be ob-
served in the new institutionalism as well. Although they differ in their theoretical 
and methodological approach to institutions, the various new institutionalist strands 
are primarily concerned with the effects of institutions, and overlook strategic at-
tempts by political actors to modify institutional arrangements (cf. Alexander, 2001a, 
2001b and Benoit and Hayden, 2004). The new institutionalism explains why politi-
cal actors adhere to institutions, why institutions are enduring and stable, and gener-
ally considers institutional change difficult. The role of actors in applying and at-
tempting to modify institutions following their creation – which is manifest during 
instances of constitutional conflict – is therefore generally underestimated (cf. Hay, 
2008). In the following sections, it will be argued that a focus on constitutional con-
flict and conflict resolution, as well as on concrete rules within institutional frame-
works, offers more insight into institutional change and the role of actors therein. 
First, the most influential approaches within the new institutionalism will be dis-
cussed, with specific emphasis on their strengths and shortcomings with respect to 
the issue of institutional stability and change.     
 
2.3.1 Roots and varieties of the new institutionalism 
 
The new institutionalism is generally considered to have emerged within political sci-
ence in the early 1980s with the seminal work of James March and Johan Olsen 
(1984; 1989). It was a reaction to the rational choice and behavioural schools that had 
dominated political science during much of the post-war period (Keman, 1998). 
While the latter criticised the formalistic approach of the old institutionalism, new 
institutionalists denounced the behaviouralist tendency ‘to reduce the explanation of 
political processes to social, economic, or cultural variables’ (Rothstein, 1996: 139; 
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see also Blondel, 1991). A renewed interest in institutions found its inspiration, 
among others, in the economic crises of the 1970s, which showed how political and 
economic institutions mattered (Sanders, 2008: 40-41). At the same time, ‘the meta-
hypothesis of convergence’ (Rothstein, 1996: 141) came under pressure. Increasingly 
sophisticated comparative political analyses found that countries around the world 
were not converging into a single political and institutional direction. Instead, persis-
tent and growing differences in terms of politics and policy making proved to be the 
rule rather than the exception. Scholars increasingly turned to institutions in order to 
explain political diversity in terms of class strength, mobilisation, and success and 
failure of democracy.  
An interest in institutions is what the new institutionalism unites yet it ‘is not a 
single animal but rather […] a genus with a number of specific species within it’ (Pe-
ters, 2005: 2). One of the main questions that divide the field is the extent to which 
actors are capable of conscious institutional creation. While rational choice institu-
tionalism conceives of institutions as ‘products of Pareto optimal agreements’ be-
tween strategic and rational actors, its sociological or normative counterpart propa-
gates a conception of institutions as norms and values that are embedded in society 
(Rhodes, Binder, Rockman, 2008: xiv-xv). Historical institutionalists position them-
selves in between, and combines cultural and rational accounts of institutional crea-
tion and development. Despite these differences, important weaknesses characterise 
each of the different new institutionalist schools. The most important limitations are 
a deterministic and holistic view of institutions, a focus on stability, and an underes-
timation of the role of actors in institutional implementation and post-formation 
change.  
   
2.3.2 Normative/sociological institutionalism 
 
James March and Johan Olsen’s influential institutional theory has become known as 
the normative or sociological institutionalism (Peters, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
In their definition of institutions, March and Olsen emphasise the importance of 
norms, values, and routines. Rather than formal regulations that explicitly prescribe 
actors what to do, institutions comprise less visible – yet, by no means insignificant – 
normative templates that drive actors towards certain behaviour. Institutions are ‘col-
lections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate action in terms of 
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relations between roles and situations’ (March and Olsen, 1989: 21). Central to this 
definition of institutions is the “logic of appropriateness”, which presumes that actors 
will behave in certain ways because they think it is socially appropriate rather than 
because it furthers their personal interests. Individuals consequently act in the inter-
est of the organisation they identify with or are a member of, and they are willing to 
set aside their personal goals and interests. These ideas are applied to explaining how 
organisations function, as well as to questions of institutional emergence or change. 
March and Olsen emphasise that institutions, in the form of rules, norms and con-
ventions, derive their meaning from the society in which they are formed. Rule fol-
lowing behaviour is explained by the fact that institutions fit societal norms and val-
ues, and thus define what is socially acceptable. Similarly, institutional change is per-
ceived to originate from developments in ‘a broader cultural environment’, which 
may delegitimise existing norms and values and ignite a process of institutional 
learning (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 949-950).    
The sociological institutionalist view leaves little room for actors to apply and 
modify institutional rules. Individuals are socialised within given normative and in-
stitutional settings, and driven by abstract ideas of socially acceptable behaviour 
rather than themselves the creators of such norms and rules of conduct (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991). Institutional changes are primarily perceived as reactions to 
changing circumstances in the social environment, which subsequently also reshape 
the preferences and behaviour of actors. Rule defying behaviour or contestation of 
existing norms and conventions with the purpose of changing them does not easily fit 
the normative/sociological institutionalist theory. Only the existence of ‘orthogonal 
cultures’ (Peters, 1999: 36) might allow such institutional dynamics and could ignite 
processes of change. However, as was argued in section 1.3, constitutional conflict 
does not necessarily imply a clash between parallel worldviews, for example democ-
ratic versus autocratic. Political actors may argue for a different application or the 
abolishment of specific rules without undermining the entire political system and its 
basic values and norms.  
Sociological institutionalism is primarily interested in the socialising capacities 
of institutions and conceives of them as deterministic of actor behaviour and practi-
cally immune from actor-induced change. Below the surface of norms and culture, 
however, rules and procedures are more susceptible to change without necessarily 
implying a shift in the status quo about appropriate behaviour. If constitutional con-
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flict is to be incorporated within a normative/sociological institutionalist perspective, 
the greatest challenge is to distinguish between changes within and changes of the 
overarching normative framework (see March and Olsen, 2008).       
 
2.2.3 Rational choice institutionalism 
  
With their focus on institutions as ‘humanly devised constraints’ and ‘rules of the 
game’ (North, 1990), rational choice institutionalists seem to have more to offer for 
our understanding of constitutional conflict. In the rational choice view, institutions 
and rules of conduct are created by human beings and represent solutions to specific 
collective action problems, which would not be solved if left to interactions between 
utility maximizing individuals (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 943; Rothstein, 1996; Keman, 
1996). Rules bring order and predictability into situations so that no confusion or 
controversy arises as to what is required, allowed, or forbidden (Ostrom 1986, 2005). 
Rational choice institutionalists hold a view of individuals that is opposite to that of 
the normative/sociological institutionalism. Theirs is a ‘calculus approach’, which 
perceives of actors as driven by utility maximization (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hay, 
2008: 60-61). Individuals are driven by – and capable of recognising – their personal 
interests and will behave strategically in pursuit of realising these interests. However, 
since pure egoism precludes the solution of collective problems, rules and institutions 
are necessary in order to ‘enforce mutually beneficial exchange and cooperation’ 
(Weingast, 1996: 670). According to rational choice institutionalism, institutions are 
then typically perceived as Pareto optimal agreements, which provide incentives and 
benefits that stimulate actors to cooperate rather than to pursue a strategy of pure 
self-maximization. An example of this view was given earlier with Przeworski’s con-
cept of self-enforcing democracy, which represents a situation in which adhering to 
the rules (i.e. accepting election results) is in the interest of those in power (see also 
Weingast, 1996: 680).   
 Rational choice institutionalism provides a clear and elaborate conception of 
why institutions are needed and how they affect actor preferences and behaviour. Yet, 
it can also be criticised for lacking an explicit theory of why institutions take particu-
lar forms and how they change (cf. Peters, 1999). Institutions are commonly ex-
plained with reference to the purpose they serve (i.e. cooperation among utility 
maximising individuals), while the preferences of actors are believed to be stable. If 
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the purpose for which the institution has been designed is not met, institutions can 
and will be changed consciously and with the initial purpose in mind. This presumes 
that the effects and outcomes of institutions are clearly implied and that it is, there-
fore, in the interest of politicians to adhere to the rules of the game (Shepsle, 2008: 
28-29). However, various situations can be thought of where it is not so clear what 
the effects of institutions will be. Elinor Ostrom (1983, 2005) has pointed out that for 
rules to function properly, it is important that their meaning is shared among all rele-
vant actors. Configurations of rules should therefore be both complete and consistent, 
meaning that they specify all possible action situations and rule out alternative inter-
pretations of a rule. But rules and institutions, let alone constitutions, hardly ever 
provide a complete blueprint for every contingency and there are often different pos-
sible interpretations of how to implement a particular rule. The source of such ‘in-
complete contracting’ (Frye, 1997; Stone Sweet, 2000) and institutional ambiguity 
lies in the institutional creation stage, and this is exactly what rational choice institu-
tionalism overlooks. During the process of institutional creation, actors have to deal 
with great amounts of uncertainty – about the preferences and strategies of other ac-
tors, as well as about the future implications of their own choices. Institutions can 
therefore have unintended or unexpected consequences, which undermine the central 
rational choice institutionalist notion that actors can ‘anticipate that they will be bet-
ter off with the institution than without it’ (Peters, 1999: 55). The combination of un-
certainty and strategic behaviour may moreover lead to institutional compromises in 
which the exact implementation of rules is left undefined. Such institutional ambigu-
ity actually may help actors to commit to the institutions as they have a chance that 
their institutional preferences will prevail in the future. However, how the rules will 
be applied to actual situations is then left open-ended. The distinction between insti-
tutional creation and implementation becomes blurred and the effects of the institu-
tion dependent upon future conflicts and agreements between politicians.  
Rational choice institutionalists emphasise the (positive) effects of institutions 
but overlook that institutional design cannot always be reduced to optimal agree-
ments between rational actors. Uncertainty and ambiguous institutional design un-
dermine some of the core rational choice assumptions related to the effects of institu-
tions and the capacity of actors to foresee these effects. This implies, above all, that 
the distinction between “rational” institutional creation and “neutral” institutional 
application is not as clear-cut as rational choice institutionalists tend to assume.  
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2.3.4 Historical institutionalism  
 
The third major new institutionalist approach is that of historical institutionalism. It 
resembles the normative/sociological school in that it also tends to focus more on 
why institutions persist than on their creation. In their conception of actor-institution 
interactions, historical institutionalists borrow both from the rational choice and the 
normative/sociological perspectives. Similar to rational choice institutionalists, they 
perceive of actors from a calculus approach, implying that they seek cooperation in 
order to deal with collective action problems. Yet, this is often combined with a ‘cul-
tural perspective’, which stresses that in the long run behaviour becomes ‘bounded by 
an individual’s world view’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939).7 In combination, these ap-
proaches lead historical institutionalists to conclude that institutions are resistant to 
change. Institutions represent ‘punctuated equilibria’ (Krasner, 1984) both because 
they provide incentives to cooperate and because they define socially acceptable be-
haviour and become part of a cultural or political legacy. Central to historical institu-
tionalism’s conception of institutional resilience is the mechanism of path-
dependence. Pierson and Skocpol characterise the logic of path dependency as fol-
lows: ‘outcomes at a critical juncture trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the 
recurrence of a particular pattern into the future’ (1996: 699). Hence, historical insti-
tutionalism places a similar emphasis on self-enforcing institutions as rational choice 
scholars in order to explain institutional stability. Path dependence occurs when rele-
vant political actors support the institutional status quo both because they associate 
change with short-term costs and uncertainty about long-term benefits (Alexander, 
2001: 254). Historical institutionalism is moreover concerned with the distributional 
effects of institutions. Actors and groups that are favoured by the institutional status 
quo – ‘vested interests’ (Collier and Collier, 1991) – tend to resist change while actors 
who prefer change are generally too weak to enforce their institutional preferences. 
From a historical institutionalist view institutional change is therefore rare, and indi-
vidual actors will have little opportunity to bend the chosen institutional path. Only 
                                                 
7  Not everyone shares Hall and Taylor’s characterisation of historical institutionalism as a combina-
tion of rational choice and normative/sociological institutionalist perspectives on actor-institution 
interactions, and recent historical institutionalist studies take a predominantly calculus approach 
to actors-institution interactions (see for a discussion Hay, 2008: 60-63).  
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exogenous shocks like economic crisis, war, and regime breakdown provide political 
actors the rare opportunity to change or replace existing institutional arrangements.  
With the logic of path dependence and their use of both rational and cultural 
perspectives, historical institutionalists provide a comprehensive theory of institu-
tional creation, maintenance, and change (Sanders, 2008). Indeed, historical institu-
tionalist accounts have forwarded convincing explanations of political phenomena 
such as welfare state development, democratisation, and state building (see Pierson 
and Skocpol, 1996). Yet, this focus on long-term continuities and large-scale devel-
opments can also be conceived as a drawback of the historical institutionalism. In a 
recent contribution, March and Olsen criticise the emphasis historical institutional-
ists put on path dependency and institutional stability. ‘The assumption’, they argue, 
‘that institutional structures persist unless there are external shocks, underestimates 
both intra- and interinstitutional dynamics and sources of change’ (2008: 12). March 
and Olsen argue that historical institutionalists overlook the possibility that incre-
mental changes may, taken together, constitute major institutional shifts. The logic of 
path dependence perceives of institutions in a too holistic way, and omits the possi-
bility that relevant rules and procedures may be changed despite long-term path de-
pendence. Gerard Alexander’s critique is even more fundamental and questions one 
of the central mechanisms of path dependence (2001). He argues that the presumed 
power of vested interests to block institutional change is often overrated. Referring to 
various examples of institutional change in European 20th century democracies, 
Alexander shows that ‘[a] range of circumstances led vested interests to be forced 
into, acquiesce to, or expect benefit streams from, revision of existing rules’ (2001: 
257). The most significant of these circumstances are changing political prospects for 
vested interests, for example due to increasing or waning electoral support. Such 
shifts, which can hardly be called critical junctures, have stimulated vested interests 
to initiate revisions of existing institutions such as electoral systems and executive-
legislative arrangements (ibid, see also Alexander, 2002b).  
The crux of these critiques is that historical institutionalism treats institutions 
as holistic and enduring, and underestimates the interest and opportunities political 
actors might have in changing the institutional status quo. The new institutionalism 
is generally concerned with explaining the durability of large-scale political processes 
over long periods of time, and therefore tends to define away incremental changes 
(Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005: 1277). Political conflict over institutions following 
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moments of institutional creation is consequently off the historical institutionalist 
radar.  
 
2.4 Towards understanding constitutional conflict and change  
 
The previous sections have argued that both democratisation studies and the broader 
body of new institutionalism suffer from limitations that stand in the way of a satisfy-
ing understanding of the interaction between actors and institutions in democratisa-
tion processes. Most importantly, institutional theories have a tendency to focus on 
the effects of stable institutional structures, while downplaying the role of actors in 
interpreting, implementing and modifying institutions after their creation. Much of 
this can be explained by the fact that institutions are assigned a deterministic role in 
structuring the behaviour and preferences of individual actors. Rule defection and 
institutional change are therefore generally deemed a rarity, either because actors are 
incapable of, or uninterested in, abandoning existing institutions or because institu-
tional change can only occur as a result of exogenous shocks. Incremental changes 
and attempts by political actors to re-interpret and modify specific institutional rules 
are therefore overlooked by the new institutionalism. Yet, political actors may have 
opportunities and incentives for such attempts more often than the new institutional-
ism believes.  
In order to fill this void, ‘[t]here is a need for improved understanding of the 
processes that translate political action into institutional change, [and] how an exist-
ing institutional order impacts the dynamics of change’ (March and Olsen, 2008: 16). 
A focus on constitutional conflict, conflict resolution, and change can fulfil this need 
as it provides a connection between actors and institutions that is generally absent in 
the new institutionalism. Many institutions carry an inherent room to manoeuvre 
which political actors may step into for reasons of personal or political advantage. 
The consequent conflicts and potential for change underscore the idea that we cannot 
predict the stability of political systems and the success of democratisation processes 
purely on the basis of institutional design. Instead, constitutional conflict brings to 
the fore that institutions themselves can become subject to political contestation and 
should therefore be recognised as being endogenous to processes of political competi-
tion. This is not to say that the entire new institutionalist literature or the core as-
sumptions of its different strands should be rejected altogether. The occurrence of 
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constitutional conflict and change does not rule out that institutions provide incen-
tives to cooperate, can be stable over time, and affect the behaviour, preferences and 
norms of individuals. However, a focus on constitutional conflict as a potential source 
of institutional change can make us aware of the opportunities and circumstances 
under which actors may induce institutional change. This dissertation’s principal aim 
is to explore patterns of constitutional conflict in post-communist ECE and to explain 
what stimulates political actors to engage in such conflicts. The remainder of this the-
sis will investigate the different possible sources of constitutional conflict in the post-
communist ECE region. They represent institutional opportunities and incentives 
and strategic motivations for politicians to challenge the constitutional status quo 
and to induce institutional change. While grounded in the different new institutional-
ist strands, they also capture some of the major shortcomings of the new institution-
alism.  
Chapter 3 takes the first step in our investigation of the sources and effects of 
constitutional conflict, and will map the patterns of constitutional conflict in post-
communist ECE. Its aim is, moreover, to assess the relevance of path dependency for 
the evolution of constitutional conflict. By analysing annual levels of constitutional 
conflict and types of institutional arrangements subject to contention, the role of tim-
ing and sequence in the transformation process will be established. Yet, unlike “tradi-
tional” historical institutionalist approaches, the focus on constitutional conflict and 
reconciliation acknowledges the role of actor behaviour, disagreement and incre-
mental change.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Patterns of constitutional conflict in post-communist East Central 
Europe 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter the first sub-question of this dissertation will be addressed, concern-
ing the patterns of constitutional conflict in post-communist ECE following constitu-
tional replacement. The aim of the chapter is to draw a “multidimensional map” of 
constitutional conflict based on the dataset that has been constructed for this study. 
The chapter provides insight into the regional evolution and cross-national variation 
of constitutional contestation. It will present annual and aggregate levels of conflict 
throughout the region and in individual countries, topics of conflict, data on the tim-
ing and sequence of particular constitutional discussions, and in-depth descriptions 
of national conflict developments. This information constitutes the first step towards 
comprehending the process of constitutional conflict, conflict resolution and change 
in the transformation of post-communist ECE. The patterned variation this chapter 
puts to the fore will be the starting point for analyses of the sources and consequences 
of constitutional conflict in the ensuing chapters.  
This chapter will be structured as follows. Sections 2 until 4 concentrate on 
conflict levels and types at the regional level. The data sketch the constitutional trans-
formation process during the post-communist period, and point out the most impor-
tant constitutional discussions therein. Based on this information the hypothesis in-
troduced in the previous chapter pertaining to the path dependent logic of constitu-
tional conflict will be addressed. The overall downward trend of aggregate annual 
conflict rates indicates that opportunities to challenge the existing constitutional 
framework diminished over time, suggesting a confirmation of path dependency. Yet, 
several constitutional issues remained subject to re-interpretation and modification 
attempts until the late 1990s. This indicates that political actors did not perceive of 
initial institutional choices and outcomes of constitutional conflict as definitive. 
Presidential powers, the institutional underpinnings of parliaments, and executive-
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legislative relations remained prominent on the political agenda. ECE politicians thus 
still found ‘it worthwhile to take the risk of launching a new process of bargaining and 
political change’ (Colomer, 1995 in Alexander, 2001: 255).  
From section 5 onwards the analytical focus shifts to the country level, starting 
with an overview of conflict rates and topics of constitutional debate in the ten coun-
tries included in this study. The data indicate that beyond the regional trend there is 
considerable cross-national variation. This goes first and foremost for aggregate and 
annual conflict levels, but also pertains to the specific institutional arrangements 
upon which discussions focused. Even though presidential powers were the most con-
tentious issue in a majority of the cases, the distribution of conflicts across constitu-
tional dimensions shows considerable variation. Brief descriptions of constitutional 
conflict development in ten ECE countries subsequently provide background infor-
mation and specific examples of conflicts. Based on the timing and distribution of 
conflict across constitutional dimensions in each country, section 6 classifies the ten 
ECE cases into four different categories of conflict development: early-concentrated, 
late-concentrated, early-broad and late-broad. Section 7 concludes and anticipates on 
the subsequent chapters, where different sources of constitutional conflict will be in-
vestigated in order to explain cross-national variation.   
 
3.2 Towards a map of constitutional conflict in post-communist ECE  
 
Between April 1989 and July 1993, ten ECE countries amended their communist con-
stitutions or replaced them altogether for a new, democratic constitution. In all cases 
the constitutional changes concluded a dynamic transition period, often characterised 
by complex negotiations between communist elites and opposition forces. The 
changes also represented the start of a new political era under democratic norms and 
rules of conduct. However, it became immediately clear that the adoption of these 
new constitutions did not mean the end of debating on constitutional issues and insti-
tutional relations. Right from the start, conflicts concerning a variety of constitutional 
topics evolved in all ECE countries that would last until the early 2000s.  
The following sections present an overview of constitutional conflict in the 
post-communist region. First, aggregate conflict levels will be provided covering the 
period between constitutional replacement in each country and December 2005. The 
period of analysis will subsequently be split into two stages – consisting of the five 
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years following constitutional replacement in each country and the remaining period 
– in order to resolve potential problems of comparability due to differences in the 
timing of constitutional replacement.8 In addition, the two stages are introduced in 
order to capture possible junctures in the process of political and constitutional 
transformation, and help to assess the impact of path dependence on constitutional 
conflict evolution. During the first five years, political actors are assumed to engage in 
constitutional conflict in attempts to ‘repair injustices and mistakes in the constitu-
tional bargaining process’ (Widner, 2005). Conflicts during the second stage of trans-
formation are less likely to have a direct connection with constitution-making proc-
esses. The conflict rate during the second stage is moreover expected to be lower, as 
topics that were subject to conflict in the first stage are unlikely to re-appear. Sec-
ondly, the distribution of conflicts across different constitutional dimensions will be 
reported. Four broad constitutional areas were subject to conflict across the ECE re-
gion: i) the election methods and prerogatives of presidents, ii) executive-legislative 
relations, iii) legislative electoral procedures and parliamentary processes, and iv) the 
role and powers of constitutional review bodies. These four dimensions constitute the 
institutional cornerstones of constitutional democracy that were outlined in chapter 
1, and all were subject to conflict across the region.  
 
3.3 Levels of constitutional conflict 
 
The evolution of constitutional conflict across the ECE region indicates that the first 
half of the 1990s represented the most intense period of conflict, followed by a grad-
ual stabilisation of constitutional frameworks towards the early 2000s. Overall, 152 
instances of conflict were reported throughout the region, with twelve years passing 
between the first and last conflict. The annual conflict rates in the early 1990s re-
mained relatively low, which may to a large extent be explained by the differences in 
timing of constitutional replacement. While amendments to the Hungarian and Pol-
ish constitution were already enacted in 1989, most other countries adopted new con-
stitutions between 1991 and 1993. An absolute peak of 29 conflicts was reported in 
1994, and 1993 and 1995 also displayed high levels of contestation throughout the 
region. Between 1995 and 1996 the conflict level dropped temporarily, but it rose 
                                                 
8  The period between the moment of constitutional replacement (adoption of a new constitution, or 
amendments to the communist Basic Law) and December 2005 varies from more than 16 years in 
Poland to just over 13 in Hungary.  The constitutional replacement dates are provided in table 3.3.   
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again to around 15 conflicts annually in the period 1997-99. From the year 1999 on-
wards the annual conflict rate declined, and beyond 2002 no conflicts were found. 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of aggregate annual conflict levels throughout the re-
gion.  
 
Figure 3.1 Evolution of annual conflict levels in 10 ECE countries 
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In chapter 1 it was argued that during the first five years following constitutional re-
placement institutional choices would be perceived to be the least ‘locked in’, due to 
the limited amount of time that had passed since constitutional adoption (Widner, 
2005; Elster, 1996). Following this initial period of relative constitutional flexibility, 
it is expected that modifications to the constitution become increasingly difficult and 
unattractive due to mechanisms of path dependence such as increasing returns and 
vested interests. A relatively straightforward way to assess the impact of such mecha-
nisms is to consider the distribution of conflicts across the two stages that were intro-
duced above. If constitutional development in post-communist ECE has been subject 
to path dependency, a first indicator would be a clear drop in the aggregate conflict 
level during the second stage of transformation.  
The figures in Table 3.1 indicate that 60 percent of all constitutional conflicts 
in the ECE region occurred within the first five years following constitutional re-
placement. Hence, the hypothesis that the majority of conflicts would be concen-
trated in the immediate post-constitution-making stage and that conflict levels would 
subsequently drop can be corroborated. However, it is questionable whether the drop 
in conflict levels can be perceived to be that significant. As figure 3.1 already indi-
PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 
 45 
cated, the years 1998 and 1999 were characterised by relatively high levels of conflict. 
By then, the first five years after constitution making had passed in all countries. In 
addition, Table 3.1 indicates that no less than 40 percent of all conflicts occurred dur-
ing the second stage of the analytical period. Even though this second stage of politi-
cal transformation constitutes a much longer period, these figures suggest that some 
constitutional discussions were not definitively settled during the first stage, or only 
emerged later during the transformation process. This provides a first indicator that 
constitutional developments in the region were not subject to path dependency. In 
order to determine whether the focus of constitutional discussions shifted to different 
topics in the second stage, the following section will discuss the distribution of con-
flicts across four constitutional dimensions and their timing and sequence in the 
transformation process.  
 
Table 3.1 Distribution of constitutional conflict across 
two stages of transformation  
Stage Conflicts 
I Five years post constitution-making  92 
II Remaining period  60 
Stages I + II 152 
 
3.4 Topics of constitutional conflict  
 
In chapter 1, constitutional conflict was defined as explicit disagreement between po-
litical actors about the interpretation, implementation, or modification of constitu-
tional provisions on the competencies of, or relations between, state institutions. Ac-
cordingly, this thesis has aimed to cover conflicts about constitutional rules on execu-
tive, legislative, and judiciary institutions in the ECE region. In order to capture these 
institutions, the data that were collected accordingly relate to four constitutional di-
mensions: i) the election method and prerogatives of presidents, ii) executive-
legislative relations, iii) legislative electoral rules and internal parliamentary proce-
dures, and iv) the role and powers of constitutional courts.  
The most prominent topic of constitutional conflict across the region was the 
role and powers of the president in ECE. No less than 45 percent of all instances of 
constitutional conflict concerned the position of the head of state and the scope of his 
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prerogatives. A basic distinction can be made between two main topics of contesta-
tion within this category. On the one hand, conflicts focused on the method of select-
ing the head of state. There were several proposals for modifying the constitution to 
introduce direct presidential elections. This frequently ignited fierce conflicts, as 
presidential election methods had also been an issue in many round table negotia-
tions and constitutional bargaining processes (Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 1996). The 
application and modification of eligibility rules for presidential candidates was an-
other frequent topic of discussion. In Latvia and Bulgaria, for example, there were 
several attempts to restrict criteria for presidential candidates, based on their previ-
ous affiliation to the communist regime or on language requirements. By far the most 
contentious issue, however, was the scope and application of presidential executive 
prerogatives. Conflicts about presidential powers in specific policy areas such as de-
fence and foreign affairs were quasi-omnipresent in the region (see also Taras, 1997; 
Baylis, 1996; Protsyk, 2005, 2006). In Poland, for example, various disputes per-
tained to the question whether the president could unilaterally nominate and dismiss 
ministers in the so-called “presidential portfolios” of defence, national security and 
foreign affairs (see also chapter 6). Similar discussions about the powers of the presi-
dent occurred in Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, pitting heads 
of state and prime ministers against one another. Other specific presidential preroga-
tives that were frequently subject to conflict were nomination and dismissal powers 
of state officials (e.g. ambassadors and high-ranking military personnel), attendance 
at cabinet meetings, and the authority to call elections and referenda.  
The second most contentious issue throughout the ECE region concerned leg-
islative electoral rules and parliamentary procedures. In 29 percent of all conflicts, 
the interpretation, application or modification of these issues was challenged. This 
category consists of conflicts over constitutional provisions that regulate access to 
and the internal proceedings of ECE parliaments. Although parliamentary elections 
are mainly regulated in separate legislation, constitutions often contain provisions on 
the organisational aspects of elections, electoral thresholds, and on eligibility re-
quirements for candidates and political parties as well. Similarly, the internal pro-
ceedings of legislatures are often arranged in parliamentary standing orders. How-
ever, core functions of parliaments and the rights and duties of MPs as well as of the 
presidium and legislative committees are commonly part of the constitution. In the 
subcategory of electoral rules we find conflicts about the introduction or modification 
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of electoral thresholds and about non-numerical eligibility criteria for parties and 
individual politicians. With regard to these latter issues, there have been attempts in 
several post-communist states to ban particular parties or politicians from parlia-
ment on the basis of their affiliation to the communist regime, or based on language 
or citizenship requirements. Another set of conflicts consists of contention on inter-
nal parliamentary procedures, such as voting rules, the allocation of seats in parlia-
mentary committees, distribution of speaking time among coalition and opposition 
parties, and seat allocation after party switching by individual MPs.  
Almost 20 percent of the conflicts concerned the constitutional balance of 
power between parliaments and governments. Again, the data allow for a distinction 
into two subtypes. The first subtype concerns conflicts regarding the conditions and 
procedures for continuation and termination of cabinets. The procedures regarding 
votes of (no) confidence, parliamentary approval for cabinet reshuffles, and the con-
ditions for ministerial hearings are part of this subtype. The second group of conflicts 
within the executive-legislative category relates to the balance of power between par-
liaments and executives, for example the extent of parliamentary control (or, execu-
tive autonomy) in particular policy areas. Specific areas in which executive-legislative 
relations have been contested were defence, media affairs, and executive discretion 
under special circumstances such as parliamentary recesses and for the adoption of 
European legislation.   
The smallest – but by no means insignificant – category of constitutional con-
flict relates to discussions about the role and powers of constitutional review bodies. 
In all ECE countries constitutional courts or constitutional review chambers – en-
dowed with the right to rule on the constitutionality of legislation and to judge on 
constitutional disputes – were introduced in the early 1990s. Despite this region-wide 
commitment to the principle of constitutional adjudication, there were eleven cases 
of conflict about the prerogatives of constitutional review bodies. They focused on 
such issues as the extent to which court rulings are immutable, the ability to rule on 
the constitutionality of legislation, and internal voting procedures. These debates may 
not seem very prominent numerically, but they touch upon the core of the constitu-
tional set-up of a state and its inter-institutional relations. In that context, it is even 
more important to note that there have also been conflicts resulting from government 
proposals to abolish constitutional courts and transfer their powers to less influential 
judicial institutions. Although ECE constitutional review bodies successfully shielded 
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off challenges of this kind, these conflicts had a huge impact on relations between 
courts and cabinets and pertain to the separation of powers. Chapters 5 and 6 deal 
more extensively with the specific powers of constitutional review bodies in the re-
gion, and how these bodies were engaged in constitutional conflict, conflict resolu-
tion, and change. The distribution of conflicts across the four constitutional dimen-
sions and their respective sub-categories is summarised in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Distribution of conflicts across constitutional dimensions 
Dimension Conflicts  Sub-categories/examples Conflicts  
Election procedure and eligibil-
ity 12 Role and powers of 
presidents  68 (45%) Executive and nomination / 
dismissal powers  56 
Electoral thresholds and eligi-
bility 15 Legislative relations 
and parliamentary 
processes 
44 (29%) 
Voting procedures, seat alloca-
tion, committee structure 29 
Continuation and termination 
of cabinets 11 Executive-legislative 
relations 29 (19%) Parliamentary control, checks 
and balances  18 
Role and powers of 
constitutional review 
bodies  
11 (7%) 
Specific competencies, inde-
pendence, abolishment 11 
   
How were these different types of constitutional conflict distributed across the two 
stages of post-communist transformation? Based on that distribution we can assess 
the timing and sequence with which particular constitutional debates arose to the 
political surface across the region, and whether they remained a topic of contention 
beyond the initial post-constitutional stage. Figure 3.2 shows how conflicts over dif-
ferent constitutional dimensions were distributed across the two stages. The bars 
suggest that there were discussions related to each of the four constitutional dimen-
sions during the second transformation stage. The degree of contestation on all di-
mensions was lower than during the first five years following constitution making, 
but this downward trend is not that substantive if we note that the amount of con-
flicts on the presidential, executive-legislative and parliamentary dimensions 
dropped by less than a third. Around 40 percent of all conflicts concerning these di-
mensions occurred during the second stage. There was thus no shift towards a differ-
ent set of conflicts after the first five years following constitutional replacement. This 
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suggests that initial institutional choices and the constitutional conflicts during the 
post-constitution-making stage did not inhibit political actors from attempts to con-
test the constitutional status quo in the late 1990s. Hence, the basic idea of path de-
pendency cannot be confirmed. Yet, these figures show only a partial picture. They do 
not allow determining whether, indeed, the same constitutional topics re-appeared 
during the second stage, or if these conflicts touched upon different constitutional 
provisions. To find this out, the next sections will investigate national patterns of con-
flict and provide detailed descriptions of the constitutional issues that were dis-
cussed. This information will allow making a more fine-grained assessment of the 
timing and sequence of particular constitutional conflicts in the post-communist re-
gion. 
 
Figure 3.2 Constitutional dimensions in two transformation stages 
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3.5 Constitutional conflict in ten ECE countries 
 
On the regional level we saw that the annual constitutional conflict rate declined 
gradually, and that stabilisation of ECE constitutional frameworks truly set in after 
1999. However, constitutional contestation was not confined to the immediate post-
constitution-making stage and left a clear imprint on ECE politics of the late 1990s as 
well. Presidential powers, executive-legislative relations and legislative processes re-
mained prominent on the political agenda. To what extent are these regional patterns 
reflected in developments at the national level? In order to answer this question, the 
analytical focus shifts to patterns of constitutional contestation at the country level. 
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Table 3.3 serves as a point of departure, displaying the levels of constitutional conflict 
in each of the ten ECE cases. In addition, the table shows the distribution of conflict 
across the stages of political transformation and across four constitutional dimen-
sions. It can immediately be discerned from this table that below the surface of the 
regional trends, there is considerable cross-national variation. Conflict levels, distri-
bution across the stages of political transformation, and the distribution across con-
stitutional dimensions differ substantially throughout the region. In order to place 
these data in a national perspective, this section will provide brief descriptions of im-
portant country-specific developments with regard to constitutional conflict. First, 
total and stage specific conflict rates will be provided, after which will be spelled out 
on which constitutional dimensions conflicts in each country were focused. Examples 
of specific constitutional conflicts will be provided, with reference to the actors that 
were involved, whether and how conflicts were resolved and the extent to which they 
constitutional changes.  
 
Table 3.3 Conflict levels, distribution across stages and dimensions in 10 ECE cases 
Country 
Constitution re-
placed 
Con-
flicts 
Stage 
I 
Stage  
II 
Role 
president 
Legislative 
process 
Ex-Leg 
relations 
Role 
courts 
Bulgaria 12 July 1991 25 16 9 11 (44%) 6 (24%) 4 (16%) 4 (16%) 
Czech R 16 December 1992 10 6 4 6 (60%) 2 (20%) 2 (20%) - 
Estonia 28 June 1992 9 4 5 6 (67%) 2 (22%) - 1 (11%) 
Hungary 18 October 1989 13 6 7 7 (54%) 3 (23%) 2 (15%) 1 (8%) 
Latvia 6 July 1993 13 9 4 5 (38%) 5 (46%) 1 (8%) 2 (16%) 
Lithuania 25 October 1992 15 11 4 6 (40%) 4 (27%) 4 (27%) 1 (6%) 
Poland 4 April 1989 20 9 11 13 (65%) 4 (20%) 3 (15%) - 
Romania 8 December 1991 8 4 4 4 (50%) 2 (25%) 2 (25%) - 
Slovakia 1 September 1992 29 21 8 9 (31%) 12 (41%) 6 (20%) 2 (7%) 
Slovenia 23 December 1991 10 8 2 1 (10%) 4 (40%) 5 (50%) - 
Total  152 92  60  68 (45%) 44 (29%) 29 (19%) 11 (7%) 
 
Bulgaria 
With 25 conflicts reported since the new constitution was adopted in July 1991, Bul-
garia has had the second most conflict-prone political transformation of the ten ECE 
cases. This might come as a surprise given Venelin Ganev’s proposition that ‘Bulgaria 
has been spared one specific type of political turmoil, namely institutional chaos’ 
(2001: 194). According to Ganev, there has been severe criticism and conflict among 
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the different institutions in post-communist Bulgaria, but this was geared towards 
policies, and not the institutional set-up of the country. However, he also mentions 
that the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), in power during much of the 1990s, has 
made frequent attempts to change the institutional power balance in its favour. The 
fact that the judiciary generally blocked such instances of constitutional tinkering can 
be interpreted as sign of the political system’s strength but it does not make the 
twenty-five instances of constitutional contestation irrelevant for our understanding 
of Bulgaria’s political and constitutional transformation during the 1990s.  
The Bulgarian constitution was adopted in July 1991 in a specially elected con-
stituent assembly that was dominated by the BSP. Although soon after the constitu-
tional enactment a conflict erupted about the constitutionality of the Turkish minor-
ity oriented party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (see Ganev, 2004), the first 
few years of political transformation were relatively calm. In 1994 and 1995, however, 
the country experienced a surge of constitutional conflict, which to a large extent ex-
plains the high level of conflict in the post-constitution making stage. The Bulgarian 
constitution accords the head of state limited executive and ceremonial powers, but 
provides for direct election of the president. This design carries the imprint of the 
BSP’s wish for a parliamentary system with a weak presidential office (Ganev, 1999: 
127). Still dissatisfied with the constitutional compromise and the election of opposi-
tion leader Zhelyu Zhelev, the BSP engaged in various challenges against the presi-
dent during the 1990s. Most of these conflicts focused on the president’s powers in 
the fields of foreign affairs and defence. In 1995, for example, the constitutional court 
prevented the BSP-dominated parliament from pulling away from the president the 
right to hold hearings with prospective ambassadors and to give his opinion before 
approval by the council of ministers (Bulgarian Constitutional Court, 1995). And also 
in October 1998, it was the Bulgarian Socialist Party that questioned president Stoy-
anov’s authority to grant NATO-troops to pass through Bulgarian airspace. 
Apart from the prerogatives of the Bulgarian president, other constitutional 
provisions were contested as well. In January 1995, the ruling BSP attempted to re-
strict the prerogatives of parliamentary vice chairmen, to abolish the important legis-
lative parliamentary committee, and to adapt the voting procedure in other parlia-
mentary committees (Constitution Watch, Spring 1995: 5-6). Notwithstanding fierce 
protests, the opposition was unable to prevent the BSP parliamentary majority from 
seriously strengthening its position. The Bulgarian constitutional court has also been 
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under fire. And again, it was the BSP that aimed its arrows at what it perceived to be a 
biased judiciary (Ganev, 2003: 604). At the height of its anti-court campaign, in the 
fall of 1995, the ruling coalition tried to expel the constitutional court from its build-
ing, granted itself extraordinary budgetary control of the Supreme Judicial Council, 
and prohibited constitutional court judges to defend their decisions on national TV 
(Schwartz 1998: 106-107).  
Many constitutional conflicts in Bulgaria can be related to attempts by the BSP 
to restrict the influence of its political opponents in the presidential office, in parlia-
ment, and the judiciary. Although it goes too far to relate all conflicts to the BSP’s 
troubled relation with the Bulgarian constitution, it is quite telling that the level of 
conflict decreased after the party’s defeat in the 1997 parliamentary elections.     
 
Czech Republic 
Constitutional developments in the Czech Republic were inherently connected with 
the country’s origins as part of former Czechoslovakia. Just a month after the Federal 
Assembly voted to abolish the Czechoslovak state, the new Czech constitution was 
approved by the national parliament with an overwhelming majority of 172 to 6. This 
‘remarkably consensual vote’ and the fact that the Czech constitution was ‘less [am-
bivalent] concerning its content and symbolic value’ than its Slovak counterpart (Ko-
pecký, 2001a: 42-43) may explain why relatively few constitutional conflicts were re-
ported. Among the few constitutional conflicts that occurred, the position of the 
Czech president has been a recurring topic throughout the 1990s. Sixty percent of the 
instances of conflict concerned the office of the president. Three conflicts were re-
lated to the presidential election procedure, and in three other cases the discussion 
focused on the authority of the head of state in defence (twice in 1993) and in the 
nomination process of a new Central Bank director (2000).  
Another constitutional issue that raised political discussion in the Czech Re-
public was the introduction of the Senate, and the question whether former Federal 
Assembly members should automatically become senators (Kopecký 2001a: 40).  The 
decision to establish the upper house was made during the constitutional negotia-
tions in 1992, but the Senate would exist only on paper until 1996, following the in-
troduction of the ‘Act on Elections to the Chamber of Deputies and to the Senate of 
Parliament’ (Klimá, 1998: 505). Until then, the Czech parliament had acted as a pro-
visional senate. It was especially the parliamentary majority of Václav Klaus’ Civil 
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Democratic Party (ODS) that resisted the introduction of legislation that would have 
established the upper house. In 1994, this led to fierce conflicts with both president 
Havel and with the parliamentary opposition, who both were in favour of the senate.     
  In terms of the cross-time and cross-topic distribution of constitutional con-
flict, the Czech patterns largely confirm the regional developments that were outlined 
in the previous sections. Sixty percent of the instances of contestation occurred dur-
ing the five years following the adoption of the constitution, and presidential powers 
concerned the most frequently debated topic. The powers and prerogatives of the 
Czech constitutional court have not been an issue of constitutional debate following 
the court’s establishment in 1993. In spite of its broad powers ‘[t]he Court has not 
been the most visible of institutions’ (Kopecký 2001b: 342). This might explain why 
other institutional actors have not felt the need to attempt and restrict its powers. In 
short, constitutional stabilisation in the Czech Republic was a rather smooth process.  
 
Estonia 
Estonia’s record of constitutional contestation has been modest in a comparative per-
spective. There were 9 instances of constitutional conflict since the adoption of the 
new constitution in June 1992. 44 percent of the conflicts occurred during the first 
five years following the adoption of the new constitution, which puts Estonia in the 
small group of cases where the majority of conflicts occurred during the second stage.    
Interestingly, Estonia is the only country where no conflicts about executive-
legislative relations occurred. In 1997 and 1998 there were two instances of contro-
versy about the introduction of language requirements for members of parliament. 
This resulted in fierce criticism by representatives of the Russian-speaking minority, 
and the plans were called off under international pressure. The most pressing consti-
tutional issue in Estonia was the scope of the president’s powers, and has been a con-
stant factor between 1992 and the early 2000s. Starting in May 1993, rumours were 
that Estonia’s parliament was preparing a law aimed at curtailing the president’s 
powers. It allegedly did so in response to president Lennart Meri’s refusal to approve 
a law that limited the provision of free housing to former employees of the Soviet 
Communist Party (Constitution Watch, Summer 1993: 8). Being Meri’s third presi-
dential veto in a short period, and moreover a controversial one, parliament threat-
ened to use the constitutional “stick”. Meri refrained from blocking the law a second 
time after a slightly modified version was passed by parliament. Although this first 
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clash between parliament and president was successfully contained, the scope of the 
president’s powers vis-à-vis other institutions in the constitutional framework reap-
peared several times in the Estonian political arena. Conflicts arose about the presi-
dent’s right to refuse ministerial appointments (January 1994), about the distribution 
of army command between the head of state and the council of ministers (December 
1994 and September 1997), the president’s constitutional right to reject nominations 
to the board of directors of the Central Bank (May 2000), and about the necessity of 
parliamentary approval after the president dismissed high army officials (July 2000). 
President Meri was involved in all of these conflicts, which makes Vello Pettai’s char-
acterisation of him as ‘a fairly brazen office holder, eager to set precedents and de-
termine the full scope of his powers’ (Pettai, 2001: 131) accurate.  
 
Hungary        
The current Hungarian constitution has been in place since 1949, and is the oldest of 
the basic laws in the ten ECE countries. This constitutional continuity is to a certain 
extent reflected in the pattern of constitutional conflict following the amendments of 
the constitution in October 1989. Thirteen instances of contestation were reported to 
have occurred in post-socialist Hungary, most of which related to the interpretation 
of presidential constitutional prerogatives and the presidential election procedure. 
Similar to Estonia, a larger number of instances of institutional contestation occurred 
after the first five years following constitutional renewal. 54 percent of the conflicts 
occurred between October 1994 and May 1999.   
Issues that have been subject to discussion in Hungary were various aspects 
related to electoral legislation (1997 and 1998), the alleged activist role of the Hun-
garian constitutional court (March 1995), and government interference in national 
media (July 1994). Interestingly, the scope of presidential authority was mainly de-
bated in the years 1990 and 1991, while discussions concerning executive-legislative 
relations took place as late as 1998. One of these conflicts focused on the question 
whether government could hold a non-binding referendum on NATO accession, a 
proposal that was heavily criticised and successfully blocked by the opposition in July 
1997. Another, relatively low-profile conflict in the legislative category was rooted in 
discrepancies between the constitution and the parliamentary standing rules, on the 
basis of which it was unclear whether the Justice and Life Party (MIEP) had cleared 
the electoral threshold. The presidential election method appeared several times on 
PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 
 55 
the Hungarian political agenda until the late 1990s, although relatively in the margins 
of political debate. Small opposition movements proposed the introduction of direct 
presidential elections in 1990, 1995, and 1999. The most serious of these was the May 
1995 citizen initiative organized by the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP). The 
FKGP had collected more than 100,000 signatures, the constitutional minimum for a 
referendum proposal. However, the constitutional court rejected the initiative be-
cause it might result in a change of the constitutional order it interpreted as too fun-
damental to be allowed by referendum.  
The Hungarian constitutional court has been a prominent actor in many con-
stitutional conflicts, but mainly so as an arbiter (see also chapter 5). It was the object 
of criticism itself once, after the court had made 13 unfavourable decisions with re-
gard to the economic package of the Horn government in March 1995 (Constitution 
Watch, Summer 1995). However, the critique did not materialise in any serious at-
tempts to restrict the court’s prerogatives.       
 
Latvia     
Following the declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in September 1991, 
Latvia reinstalled its 1922 constitution, and amended it with provisions on basic 
rights and freedoms and the functioning of democratic institutions. Overall, the insti-
tutionalisation of relations between and within Latvia’s state institutions has been 
quite smooth. The 13 constitutional conflicts that were found are primarily concen-
trated in the first five years after constitutional replacement. They were scattered 
across the different dimensions, but many of them remained restricted to proposals 
for constitutional change. Two particular issues stand out that deserve some special 
attention.   
First, the politics of lustration and the position of the Russian minority runs as 
a red thread through many of the conflicts that occurred in post-socialist Latvia. At 
several occasions, proposed amendments to electoral legislation and to the constitu-
tion, aimed at banning former KGB-employees and communist party officials, pro-
voked fierce discussions. Often these proposals seemed to be ad hoc attempts to ban 
particular politicians from the Latvian political scene, rather than part of a larger 
programme of coming to grip with the past. At least, this is how politicians such as 
Yuri Boyars in March 1993, Alfred Rubiks in May 1996, and Anatolijs Gorbunovs in 
June 1999 interpreted them (Jaskovska and Moran, 2006). It took until late 1999 be-
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fore controversy regarding the constitutionality of such provisions was cleared. In its 
decision the Latvian constitutional court ruled that legislation that banned former 
KGB- and USSR-employees should be related to a person’s verifiable illegal activities, 
not his or her ideological standpoint (Constitution Watch, Fall 1999). 
A second interesting point is that the Latvian constitutional court has been 
under serious pressure. The court was established in 1996. In late 1995 progress on 
passing the ‘Law on the Constitutional Court’ was stalled due to disagreements about 
the court’s envisaged role in Latvia’s political system. The law granted the court the 
right to independently review laws passed by parliament, and deemed constitutional 
court decisions immutable (Constitution Watch, Fall 1995: 16). A group of MPs, fear-
ful of losing legislative dominance, proposed that parliament should have a final 
check on court rulings. This proposal did not make it in the final version of the law on 
the constitutional court, which was adopted in February 1996. In June 1999 the dis-
cussion on the constitutional court resurfaced, although the executive branch now 
initiated it. Minister of justice Valdis Birkavs proposed to abolish the constitutional 
court and to transfer its functions to the Supreme Court. Court chairman Aivars 
Endzins stroke back by revealing that Prime Minister Šķēle, who had backed the pro-
posal, and several other politicians had tried to influence a court case on granting 
state propriety to high ranking officials (Constitution Watch, Fall 1999). After a meet-
ing between the court chairman and justice minister Birkavs, relations between the 
executive and the constitutional court were restored, and Prime Minister Šķēle pro-
claimed his support for an independent judiciary.    
 
Lithuania 
Similar to most cases, constitutional conflict in Lithuania was primarily concentrated 
in the early years of political transformation. In fact, 73 percent of the conflicts oc-
curred in the first five years after the adoption of the new constitution in October 
1992. This makes Lithuania one of three countries in this study where more that two-
thirds of the conflicts were concentrated in the post-constitution making stage. This 
can be interpreted as a sign of relatively rapid stabilisation of the constitutional 
framework, although it must be noted that with three conflicts in 1997, the last 
months of the post-constitution-making stage were anything but tranquil. Thereby, 
with 15 instances of contestation the Lithuanian constitution was also the fourth most 
conflict-prone of the ECE region.   
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The Lithuanian constitution was adopted after fierce discussions in the Su-
preme Council between the former communists of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour 
Party (LDDP) and the internally divided majority Sajudis Popular Front (Urba-
navicius, 1999: 152). The most contentious issue that split the parties was whether a 
parliamentary (LDLP-supported) or a presidential regime should be adopted. In the 
end a compromise was reached in the form of a semi-presidential system. There were 
various unresolved issues though, which made one observer conclude that Lithuanian 
constitution-makers ‘created […] the ultimate stopgap constitution: one in which 
nearly all alternatives are present, and for which, after a few years of testing and insti-
tutional learning […] the advantages of one form of government over the other may 
become clear’ (Gelazis, 2001: 174-175). Indeed, during the first half-decade of consti-
tution-in-practice there were various instances of conflict over executive prerogatives 
of the Lithuanian president, over executive-legislative relations, and electoral legisla-
tion.  
Control over Lithuania’s foreign policy has twice led to constitutional conflict, 
pitting president Algirdas Brazausakas against parliamentary forces. As Nekrasas 
(1999: not numbered) notes, ‘the real influence of the president in foreign affairs is 
very dependent on his relations with the majority of the Seimas (the Lithuanian par-
liament, JdR) and with the government’. This was reflected already in August 1993, 
when president Brazauskas intervened directly in negotiations with Russia about the 
withdrawal of its last troops, claiming that the official Lithuanian delegates had been 
ineffective. Brazauskas omitted to consult with parliament, which resulted in criti-
cism, most fiercely from the nationalist opposition (Constitution Watch, Fall 1993). 
Two typical executive-legislative conflicts broke out during the post-constitution-
making stage as well. The first, in June 1994, evolved after a cabinet reshuffle by 
Prime Minister Šleževičius who faced a motion of no confidence by the opposition. 
Article 101 of the constitution states that a reshuffle of more than half of the ministers 
requires parliamentary approval, which was anything but feasible given the seat dis-
tribution in the Seimas. Šleževičius moved forward by creating a new ministry and 
splitting another in two, making the confidence vote superfluous. This led to fierce 
criticism by the opposition, which upheld the vote of no confidence and claiming the 
new ministries unconstitutional. In May 1996 a conflict between parliament and gov-
ernment made it to the constitutional court, which was asked to rule on the constitu-
tionality of a stamp tax law. With the law, the amount of tax would be determined by 
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the LDLP cabinet, which was claimed to be in contradiction to article 67 of the consti-
tution that gives parliament the exclusive right to levy taxes. The constitutional court 
ruled in favour of the government though, claiming that parliament itself had granted 
government the right to levy taxes (Constitutional Court of Lithuania, 1996). 
 
Poland 
Twenty instances of constitutional conflict were reported for Poland, which makes it 
the third most contested constitutional framework of the region. Poland is also 
among the three cases where a majority of conflicts occurred in the second stage of 
political transformation. What should be borne in mind, however, is that it took until 
1997 before a new constitution was adopted, and that an interim constitution (the so-
called ‘Little Constitution’) was enacted in October 1992 (Van der Meer-Krok Pas-
kowska, 1999). Hence, it is not surprising that the first five years following constitu-
tional amendment in April 1989 were not the most conflict-prone in post-communist 
Poland. Instead, sixty percent of all conflicts were concentrated in the five years after 
the adoption of the 1992 interim-constitution.  
A striking characteristic of the conflict pattern in Poland is the high degree of 
contestation about the role and prerogatives of the president. No less than thirteen 
conflicts were rooted in disagreement about the powers of the head of state. This pat-
tern confirms the claim of various observers that the design of the Polish presidency 
has been at the heart of constitutional debates throughout the 1990s, and was a driv-
ing force behind the search for a new constitution (Jasiewicz 1997; Van der Meer 
Krok-Paszkowska, 1999; Wyrzykowski, 2001). What moreover stands out as remark-
able is that the bulk of conflicts about presidential prerogatives occurred during the 
tenure of Lech Wałęsa, while his successor Alexander Kwaśniewski was involved in 
only two instances of contestation. Furthermore, a large concentration of conflicts on 
the presidential dimension occurred between October 1993 and August 1995. This 
once more underscores that the 1992 interim constitution did little to resolve the am-
biguous distribution of competencies between the Polish president and the council of 
ministers (Van der Meer-Krok Paszkowska, 1999). These ambiguities have given an 
activist president such as Lech Wałęsa the opportunity to claim greater influence in 
the ministries of defence and foreign affairs, as well as in the nomination of high state 
officials. The new constitution of April 1997 significantly clarified the distribution of 
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tasks, which resulted in a subsequent drop of conflicts over intra-executive relations 
(see for an in-depth discussion chapter 5).    
In numerical terms as well as with regard to their political impact, other con-
stitutional topics were dwarfed by the conflicts over presidential powers in Poland. 
There were some discussions about legislative procedures, such as in May 1997 when 
several opposition parties questioned the validity of a referendum on the new consti-
tution. Forty-three percent of the registered voters had participated in the referen-
dum, while the 1992 constitution required a fifty percent turnout. Another act of 
equal constitutional weight did not include this requirement, and the Supreme Court 
concluded that the referendum was valid (Cole, 1998: 3). Executive-legislative rela-
tions were a topic of contention too, but these conflicts concerned mainly procedural 
aspects and did not impact on Polish politics in a very significant way. 
 
Romania 
In absolute terms, Romania has had the lowest degree of constitutional contestation 
of all ten ECE cases. This low level of conflict reflects Renate Weber’ paradoxical con-
clusion about constitutionalism in post-communist Romania. She argues that ‘the 
weaknesses of the current Constitution have played an important role in society at 
large, raising awareness about the necessity of several constitutional amendments, 
which could transform the Romanian Constitution into a reliable basis for democ-
racy’ (2001: 213). Several serious ambiguities in the constitution did not ignite politi-
cal chaos and constitutional conflict, but instead there was widespread agreement 
about the need for adopting changes to the 1991 Basic Law. The delayed implementa-
tion of provisions on local autonomy and the law on referenda, as well as the ‘imper-
fect system of checks and balances’ did thus not stand in the way of observance of the 
Romanian constitution and support among elites and the population (Weber, 2001: 
241-242).  
The 8 conflicts that were reported were evenly distributed across the two 
stages of political transformation, and the last conflict dates of December 1999. In 
line with the regional pattern, half of the conflicts focused on the constitutional posi-
tion of the Romanian president, while executive-legislative relations and parliamen-
tary processes both account for twenty-five percent. An interesting interpretation 
conflict emerged in October 1996, when opposition parties challenged incumbent 
president Ion Iliescu’s candidacy for the coming elections (Constitution Watch, 
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Spring/Summer 1996: 21). Iliescu had become president in December 1989 after the 
collapse of the Ceausescu regime, was elected in May 1990, and re-elected in 1992 
following the adoption of the new constitution by the Constituent Assembly. The con-
stitution, however, rules out that a president serves more than two terms, and already 
in 1992 there was controversy over Iliescu’s candidacy. The constitutional court then 
ruled that Iliescu’s 1992 candidacy was his second and therefore would be his last. 
Now the court ruled that the 1992-1996 term was Iliescu’s ‘first term under the con-
stitution’, meaning that he was eligible to run for a new term (Constitution Watch, 
Winter 1996: 20). The ruling caused much controversy, and there were even politi-
cians who wanted to take the case to the European Court of Justice. Soon however, it 
became clear that Iliescu would lose the elections, and the constitutional controversy 
was of no immediate concern anymore. Iliescu’s successor Constantinescu was en-
gaged in two presidential conflicts in 1999, one about foreign policy prerogatives 
(April 1999) and another about the of Prime Minister Radu Vasile, whose own party 
CD-NPP had withdrawn its support for the ruling coalition. Vasile however refused to 
resign, claiming that the president had no constitutional right to dismiss the prime 
minister, only ministers (Constitution Watch, Winter/Spring 2000).9 In the end, Va-
sile was persuaded by his party to resign, and later even expelled from the CD-NPP.  
Other conflicts in post-communist Romania focused on various issues, such a 
cabinet reshuffle for which Prime Minister Petre Roman had allegedly failed to ask 
parliamentary approval (October 1993), a January 1994 law granting government the 
right to rule by decree during parliamentary recess, and a threat in November 1998 
by Ion Iliescu’s Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) to boycott the bicameral legislature 
after its motion against president Constantinescu was refused discussion in the Sen-
ate. This latter conflict was rooted in the absence of clear parliamentary standing 
rules, causing opposition parties to claim that their right to speaking time was not 
respected.    
 
Slovakia 
‘During the 1990s, Slovakia stood out as the “hard case” of the Postcommunist world’ 
(Deegan Krause, 2003: 67), and this has often been blamed on the politics of one 
man, Vladimir Mečiar (see for example Haughton, 2005). In contrast to many other 
                                                 
9  Article 85.2 of the Romanian Constitution reads: "in the event of government modification or va-
cancy of office, the president shall dismiss and appoint, on the proposal of the prime minister, some 
members of the government", and remains silent about the dismissal of the prime minister.  
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parties in the ECE region, Slovakia’s largest political faction – Mečiar’s Movement for 
a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) – was a highly disciplined and centralised organiza-
tion, which enabled it to dominate Slovak politics in a sometimes authoritarian way 
during the 1990s. Mečiar’s attempts to consolidate his power and to hinder the oppo-
sition led to much political turmoil (Kopecký, 2001a: 139), and this is reflected in the 
fact that the Slovak constitutional framework has been the most frequently discussed 
of all ECE frameworks. A total of 29 instances of constitutional contestation were re-
corded, which accounts for almost twenty percent of all conflicts in the region. More-
over, 21 conflicts occurred during the two Mečiar cabinets, 15 of which in his second 
term between 1994 and 1998. At the same time, 72 percent of the Slovak conflicts 
were concentrated in the first five years following the adoption of the new constitu-
tion in September 1992. In that respect, the conflict pattern indicates that Slovakia 
went through an intense but relatively rapid institutionalisation process. In many 
ways, the Slovak conflict pattern reflects the observation made by Darina Malová that 
‘the hastily drafted constitution […] proved insufficient to provide guidance to politi-
cal leaders and to foster democratic consolidation’ (2001: 347). Indeed, there was 
contestation over a broad range of constitutional issues throughout the 1990s, cover-
ing all four constitutional dimensions.  
Compared to most other ECE countries, there have been relatively many in-
stances of debate over parliamentary procedures in Slovakia. Two specific issues were 
particularly much discussed: the use of referenda for amending the constitution, and 
the filling of vacant seats in the Slovak parliament. In 1997 and 1998 there was much 
controversy about a referendum to amend the constitution providing for direct elec-
tion of the president (Malová 2001: 365-366). The referendum was initiated by the 
parliamentary opposition, which feared that the fragmented parliament of that time 
would not be able to elect a successor for president Kovác. Prime Minister Mečiar was 
opposed to the initiative, claiming that the constitution could not be amended by a 
referendum. When president Kovác scheduled the referendum for 23 and 24 May 
1997, the issue was brought before the constitutional court, which ruled in an am-
biguous way. In its ruling, the court stated that the constitution can be amended by 
referendum, but that the way in which the referendum question was formulated con-
tradicted the law on referenda (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovakia, 
1997a). The referendum was subsequently cancelled. The issue resurfaced in 1998, 
after Kovác scheduled a new referendum. Mečiar, who had assumed several presiden-
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tial powers after the parliament had failed to elect a new president, later annulled this 
referendum. Only in January 1999 the matter was resolved, with the amendment of 
the Slovak constitution, providing for direct presidential elections (Malová, 2001: 
367). The other issue related to legislative processes that caused much conflict was 
the issue of MPs that switched parties. Facing increasing numbers of MPs that left the 
party between 1990 and 1994, the HZDS initiated several attempts to impose party 
cohesion, e.g. by requiring a payment of 5,000,000 Slovak Krone (around $166,000) 
should MPs switch to another party or start their own faction (Malová and Deegan 
Krause, 2000). One case of an expelled parliamentarian, František Gaulieder, made it 
to the constitutional court, which ruled that the mandate of Gaulieder had been vio-
lated (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovakia, 1997b).   
Furthermore, Slovakia confirms the regional pattern of frequently contested 
presidential prerogatives, and relatively few executive-legislative clashes. It is thereby 
one of the six cases where the constitutional court has been on the receiving side of 
constitutional challenges. Twice, in 1994 and 1995, the HZDS launched attacks on the 
constitutional court. It did so after court rulings, respectively on a health ministry 
order and on the HZDS initiative to set up a special parliamentary committee to in-
vestigate the circumstances surrounding the vote of no confidence against the Mečiar 
government in March 1994 (Constitution Watch, Fall 1995: 30). Following the latter 
ruling, a deputy chairman of the HZDS submitted a draft amendment to the Act on 
the Constitutional Court severely restricting the court’s powers by introducing a una-
nimity requirement for rulings by the Constitution. The amendment was not adopted, 
but it clearly showed how the government tried to break ‘the last institutional barrier 
that could be used by the opposition’ (Malová and Rybář, 2000: 106).  
 
Slovenia  
According to Milo Cerar, ‘Slovenia's elites peacefully arrived at a consensus on almost 
all of the pressing issues involved in democracy and state-building’ (2001: 378). And 
even though the rapid and consensual constitution-making process was followed by a 
period of slower reform and increased political tension, ‘[p]olitical parties compete 
without calling into question the basic constitutional institutions, [and] the interpre-
tation of the constitution […] has brought predictability and certainty to the law’ 
(ibid). The pattern of constitutional conflict in post-communist Slovenia confirms 
this reading of events. Since the country simultaneously adopted a constitution and 
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gained independence from Yugoslavia in December 1991 there have been 10 recorded 
instances of constitutional conflict in Slovenia. Eight of these occurred during the 
first five years of independence. This represents the highest degree of conflict concen-
tration of all ECE cases, and this figure adds to the picture of a smooth and rapid sta-
bilisation of the Slovenian constitutional framework.  
In terms of content, constitutional conflict in Slovenia focused mainly on legis-
lative processes and on relations between the executive and legislature. With its low 
degree of contestation about presidential prerogatives Slovenia can be called an out-
lier among the ten cases. Only one conflict within this category occurred in March 
1993, when discrepancies between the new constitution and the 1991 defence act re-
garding the competencies of the commander-in-chief led to a struggle between presi-
dent Milan Kučan and defence minister Janez Janša. Janša utilised the constitutional 
fuzziness and omitted to inform the president about several defence policies (Grizold, 
1994: 92). Although the legal ambiguity underlying the conflict was not resolved until 
a new defence act was adopted in January 1995, the issue did not lead to any further 
intra-executive clashes.   
As in a number of other ECE cases, the holding of referenda as a means to 
change legislation led to political discussions in Slovenia. In 1995 and 1996 several 
political parties proposed referendums, respectively to amend citizenship legislation 
and the electoral law. The 1995 proposal to abolish dual citizenship was deemed in 
violation of the constitution by the constitutional court (Constitutional Court of Slo-
venia, 1995). In 1996 a so-called referendum-race erupted after several parties pro-
posed competing initiatives for holding referendums on amending the electoral law. 
Parliament could not agree on which of the initiatives should be put up for popular 
voting, and again, the constitutional court intervened. The court ruled the initiatives 
unconstitutional, but not because the electoral law cannot be changed by referendum. 
The referendums were scheduled too close to the parliamentary elections (Constitu-
tional Court of Slovenia, 1996, see also Birch, 2003: 32).           
Of the five executive-legislative conflicts that were recorded for the Slovenian 
case, two were related to the conditions for interpellations of a minister or the entire 
cabinet (June 1993 and July 1996). Two other conflicts were rooted in alleged omis-
sions by Slovenian cabinets to ask for parliamentary approval for respectively a cabi-
net reshuffle (April 1994) and a secret security agreement with Israel (April 1998). 
Although these conflicts are clearly constitutional in nature, they had a minor impact 
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on Slovenian politics. They were, moreover, mostly referred to the constitutional 
court, whose rulings were unambiguous and accepted by the contending parties. The 
Slovenian constitutional court thus played an important and constructive role in the 
interpretation of constitutional conflicts.        
 
3.6 Categorisation of national conflict patterns  
 
The case descriptions in section 3.5 indicated that particular constitutional discus-
sions occurred in some countries, while they remained absent in others. It was al-
ready suggested that case specific explanations may be linked to these discussions, as 
for example the role of the BSP in Bulgaria and Vladimir Mečiar in Slovakia. How-
ever, the conflict patterns described above also show interesting cross-national paral-
lels that allow for a classification of the ECE cases. Two dimensions of constitutional 
conflict are of particular interest for a comparative analysis of the evolution of consti-
tutional conflict. First, the timing of constitutional conflict matters as it indicates how 
long it has taken before political actors agreed on the overall constitutional frame-
work. High amounts of conflict in the second stage of transformation suggest that is 
was difficult to solve constitutional issues within the first five years ensuing constitu-
tion making. Thus, there is a clear distinction between countries where the majority 
of conflicts were concentrated in the first five years after constitutional replacement, 
and countries with significant amounts of conflict in the remaining period. In addi-
tion, it is interesting to take into account the distribution of conflicts across the dif-
ferent constitutional dimensions. While in some cases all four dimensions were sub-
ject to constitutional discussions, in other countries there were dimensions that re-
mained exempt from contestation. Based on this information it is possible to distin-
guish between conflict patterns with a broad scope (all four dimensions concerned) 
and concentrated conflict patterns (less than four dimensions). Combined, the distri-
bution of conflicts across the two transformation stages and across constitutional di-
mensions constitutes four different pathways towards constitutional stabilisation. 
The four pathways and the corresponding countries are depicted in Figure 3.3.   
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Figure 3.3 Categorisation of cases on two dimensions of constitutional conflict 
Focus 
 
Concentrated  Broad 
Early  Czech Republic, Slovenia 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slo-
vakia 
Timing 
Late  Estonia, Romania, Poland, Hungary  
 
 
In the left upper cell we find countries where the stabilisation process has been early 
and concentrated, namely the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In these cases the major-
ity of conflicts occurred during the first five years following constitutional replace-
ment, and not all constitutional dimensions were concerned. Specifically, there were 
no instances of contestation about the role and powers of constitutional courts in 
these countries. In the Czech Republic the bulk of conflicts focused on presidential 
powers, and in Slovenia the parliamentary and executive-legislative dimensions were 
primarily contested. Given the rapid stabilisation and concentrated focus of conflicts, 
the Czech and Slovenian pathways may be characterised as comparatively smooth. 
The right upper cell contains cases where constitutional stabilisation also set in early, 
but covered all constitutional dimensions. This concerns Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Slovakia. In these cases the post-constitution-making stage was the most con-
flict-prone period, but it also covered the entire constitutional framework. These 
cases are, on top of this broad scope, characterised by high conflict rates. Therefore, 
their pathway can be labelled early and intense. In one other case all constitutional 
dimensions were subject to contestation, namely Hungary. Yet, 54 percent of the 
Hungarian conflicts occurred after the first five years following the constitutional 
amendments of October 1989. Therefore, Hungary is located in the lower right cell, as 
the single case of late and broad stabilisation. In a comparative perspective, Hun-
gary’s pathway is the most protracted as it covered a long period as well as all consti-
tutional dimensions. Finally, Estonia, Poland, and Romania constitute the category of 
a late, yet concentrated pathway towards stabilisation. In Estonia there were no con-
flicts about executive-legislative relations, while contestation about constitutional 
courts was absent in Poland and Romania. The timing of conflicts in these countries 
was either characterised by a clear concentration in the second stage (Poland and Es-
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tonia) or an equal distribution across the two stages (Romania). In all three cases the 
majority of conflicts focused on the presidential dimension.   
 
3.7 Conclusions and looking ahead 
 
This chapter has investigated constitutional conflict evolution in post-communist 
ECE. Mapping constitutional contestation across time, space and constitutional di-
mensions has provided insight into the itineraries of the ten ECE countries under re-
view, as well as into regional developments. The evolution of annual conflict rates 
indicated that there was a clear trend towards stabilisation of constitutional frame-
works on a regional level. Dividing the time frame into two distinct stages of political 
transformation, however, pointed out that the downward trend was not that steep. 
The bulk of constitutional conflict was concentrated in the first five years following 
the adoption of post-communist constitutions, but 40 percent of the instances of con-
testation occurred during the remaining period. This suggests that it took considera-
bly longer to resolve some of the constitutional discussions in the region. 
Across ECE, the position and prerogatives of presidents was the most fre-
quently contested topic, accounting for almost half of the conflicts. The institutional 
underpinnings of parliaments and legislative processes came second, followed by ex-
ecutive-legislative relations and the role and powers of constitutional courts. All four 
categories of constitutional conflict were represented in both the post-constitution-
making stage and in the later years of transformation. This absence of a radical break 
between conflict levels in both stages indicates that constitutional conflict settlements 
in the early transformation did not generate the legitimacy that might have prevented 
politicians from new attempts to challenge the constitution. The path dependency 
argument that early institutional choices generate vested interests, and therefore in-
hibit attempts to modify or re-interpret the constitutional status quo therefore does 
not seem to hold.  
The case studies of national constitutional conflict developments showed even 
more clearly the variation below the regional surface. In terms of absolute conflict 
levels, distribution across the transformation stages, and dominant constitutional 
dimensions there was considerable cross-national variation. Notwithstanding some 
national peculiarities, it was possible to categorise the cases based on the timing and 
scope of constitutional contestation. There were countries where stabilisation of in-
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ter- and intra-institutional relations set in early in the transformation, and touched 
upon all four institutional topic areas. In other cases, the majority of constitutional 
discussions also occurred within the first five years after constitutional replacement 
but did not concern all constitutional dimensions. Still others had both a much longer 
and broader pathway towards constitutional stabilisation. And in a latter category of 
countries, stabilisation took long, but was relatively narrow in scope.   
Understanding and explaining the sources and consequences of the regional 
trends and national trajectories of constitutional conflict is the subject of the remain-
ing chapters. Chapter 4 constitutes the first step in this query and will analyse the 
effects of constitution-making procedures in the region. The chapter explores 
whether the extent to which bargaining and adopting the constitution was open to 
political groups and citizens affected the rate of constitutional contestation during the 
first five years following constitutional replacement.  
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Chapter 4  
 
Legitimacy of constitution-making and constitutional acceptance * 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Why has it taken long for constitutional frameworks to stabilise in some ECE coun-
tries, while in others the “rules of the game” were much more swiftly accepted by po-
litical elites? This chapter seeks to answer this question by exploring the relation be-
tween different constitution-making procedures and subsequent patterns of constitu-
tional conflict in seven ECE cases: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. In chapter 3 it was argued that the pathways towards 
constitutional stabilisation in these countries differed substantially with regard to 
both the timing of constitutional conflict and the distribution across different consti-
tutional dimensions. The seven countries that were selected for the analysis in this 
chapter represent the four different pathways towards constitutional stabilisation as 
distinguished in chapter 3. The pathways of the Czech Republic and Slovenia were 
characterised as rapid and concentrated, those of Bulgaria and Slovakia as early and 
broad, those of Estonia, Poland and Romania as late and concentrated, and Hun-
gary’s pathway towards constitutional stabilisation was labelled late and broad. This 
chapter will make a first attempt to explain this cross-country variation.  
The chapter builds upon a growing body of academic literature and policy 
documents that emphasise the importance of the constitution-making process in 
post-authoritarian societies. Rather than the particular institutional choices made 
during periods of transition, it is increasingly claimed that procedural aspects of con-
stitution building are critical for democratic stability, conflict resolution, and consti-
tutional legitimacy (Elster, 1995; Hart, 2003, 2003; Elgie and Zielonka, 2001; 
Schmitter, 2004; Widner, 2005). Representativeness of constitutional deliberation 
and ratification procedures as well as involvement of the citizenry is considered par-
                                                 
*  This chapter is a minor revision of ‘Contested Constitutions: Legitimacy of Constitution-making 
and Constitutional Conflict in Central Europe’, East European Politics and Societies, 23 (3): 315-
338 © 2009 SAGE Publications. The definitive version is available at http://eep.sagepub.com/.  
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ticularly important as it is assumed to contribute to more legitimate outcomes. In 
spite of mounting attention for this notion, it has rarely been scrutinised in system-
atic comparative research (for exceptions see Carey, 2007, and Widner, 2008). The 
one and a half decades that have passed since the breakdown of communism in ECE 
provide a unique opportunity to generate case-based knowledge to test some of the 
assumed effects of constitution making. Specifically, it will be analysed whether and 
how constitution-making procedures affected constitutional acceptance by political 
elites in post-communist ECE. Constitution making processes in the ECE region will 
be compared on the basis of three dimensions: the origin of the document, the arena 
of deliberation and adoption, and popular involvement through referendums. In case 
of open constitution making, a new constitution was deliberated upon and adopted by 
a specially elected constituent assembly, followed by a popular referendum. Closed 
constitution making refers to the amendment of communist constitutions in political 
arenas that lack electoral legitimacy, such as a communist parliament, and without 
citizen involvement through a referendum. To gauge elite constitutional acceptance 
this chapter investigates rates of constitutional conflict during the first five years fol-
lowing constitutional adoption or modification. It is expected that if major dissatis-
faction with the constitution making procedures exists, it will be voiced during that 
period. As Jennifer Widner (2005: 6) argues, ‘if “process” has an effect at all, we are 
most likely to observe its impact in the immediate aftermath of ratification, before the 
incentives built into the substantive terms overwhelm any memory of what tran-
spired.’ 
The chapter finds that open constitution-making procedures do not necessar-
ily produce more legitimate constitutions, and that closed constitution making is no 
sufficient cause for contestation. Conflict rates during the first five years after consti-
tutional replacement varied substantially, both among countries with open and 
closed constitution-making procedures. A clear link between constitution making and 
constitutional acceptance can therefore not be established. These findings demon-
strate that a purely procedural approach to constitution making cannot capture varia-
tion in constitutional legitimacy in ECE. A closer look at conflict patterns in the seven 
countries under review indicates that two factors affected elite behaviour towards 
new constitutions. First, the “resurrection” of left wing, anti-reform cabinets in Bul-
garia, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania provoked a temporary increase of conflict in 
the periods 1993-95 and 1997. Discord about economic reforms pitted opposition 
LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
 71  
parties against governments and cabinets against presidents, the latter assuming a 
more active role in these times of political crisis. Accordingly, struggles about the 
scope of presidential authority were pertinent in these four cases. Another factor that 
undermined constitutional acceptance was the ambiguity of constitutional provisions. 
In all seven cases, ambiguous competency distribution among members of the execu-
tive, and a lack of clarity about constitutionally permitted degrees of government in-
terference in the judiciary were present in the constitution. Yet, these ambiguities did 
not evoke constitutional conflict everywhere. This suggests that constitutional ambi-
guity is a latent source of constitutional conflict that can become activated if political 
actors have political incentives to challenge or question the interpretation of constitu-
tional rules.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, this chapter’s contribution to the 
study of democratisation will be discussed. The concept of constitutional conflict will 
be linked with the idea of constitutionalism, which pertains to the acceptance of con-
stitutional principles and rules by political elites and citizens. Although constitution-
alism is imperative for democracy it may fluctuate through time in response to socie-
tal or political pressures for constitutional change. Constitutional conflict can be ap-
plied as an analytical tool to observe these fluctuations, as well as to assess their 
sources and impact. Section 3 discusses the importance of processes of constitution 
making for subsequent democratic development, as well as constitutionalism. Three 
dimensions will be distinguished, on the basis of which the openness of constitution-
making processes can be determined. Section 4 continues with an overview of consti-
tution making procedures in post-communist ECE. The most important develop-
ments leading to constitutional replacement in each of the seven cases will be de-
scribed, and form the basis for a ranking of constitution-making processes in section 
5. This ranking indicates the degree of openness of constitution making in each of the 
cases. Section 6 analyses the implications of constitution making for constitutional 
conflict in post-communist ECE, and discusses important findings. Section 7 con-
cludes.  
 
4.2 Constitutional acceptance and democracy  
 
According to constitutional theorist Pasquale Pasquino, a democratic constitution 
ideally fulfils two basic functions (1998: 45). On the one hand, it entails a morally su-
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perior set of norms, rights and principles that provides generally accepted guidelines 
for social and political life. On the other hand, a constitution specifies the allocation 
and distribution of powers among state institutions and political actors, e.g. between 
parliaments and governments, as well as certain rules of conduct within these institu-
tions. Stated simply, constitutions define the division of labour among politicians. As 
Elgie and Zielonka (2001: 28) put it: ‘by clarifying prerogatives of different institu-
tions and spelling out decision-making procedures, constitutions create the stability 
and predictability necessary for the democratic system’. For a constitution to success-
fully perform both of these functions, both citizens and politicians should recognise it 
so that the ground rules of the political system are not constantly modified or 
breached. A consolidated democracy requires that political actors ‘obey the laws, the 
constitution, and mutually accepted norms of political conduct’ (Diamond, 1999: 69). 
The idea of constitutionalism captures this need for the acceptance of ground rules or 
meta-rules. According to Alec Stone Sweet (2008: 219) constitutionalism entails ‘the 
commitment, on the part of any given political community, to accept the legitimacy 
of, and to be governed by, constitutional rules and principles’. This implies, in the 
first place, that constitutionalism is a variable – the commitment to accept the consti-
tution may vary across countries, democratic or non-democratic. But it also means 
that the legitimacy of a given constitution and the rules and principles it establishes 
may fluctuate within a country over time. Peoples’ and politicians’ ideas about how to 
organise a political system may change as a reflection of, for example, generational or 
other demographic changes, international developments, or new technological in-
sights. In other words, the dominant values in a society can change, which may also 
mean that the appreciation of (or value accorded to) constitutional norms changes. 
This can put the legitimacy of the existing constitution under pressure, and generates 
support for amending or removing particular provisions in the Basic Law. It follows 
from this logic that if a constitution is to reflect ‘the collective identity of the people – 
their values, aspirations, and idealised essence’ (Post, 2000; Shaw, 1999; Wolin, 1989 
in Stone Sweet, 2008: 220), a constitution may at times need revisions in order to 
avoid constitutionalism from eroding.10    
                                                 
10  Stone Sweet (2008: 220-221) distinguishes between three types of constitutions: absolutist, legisla-
tive supremacy, and higher law. While the first is typical of authoritarian regimes, the second type 
seems at first sight more compatible with democratic norms. Legislative supremacy constitutions 
endow parliaments with the authority to change constitutional statutes by majority votes. However, 
the constitution is not entrenched and runs the risk of becoming a political instrument of the ruling 
majority. The higher law type, which is increasingly common in democracies, protects the constitu-
LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
 73  
How should we determine the commitment of a community to its constitutional 
norms, and how to account for fluctuations in the “level of constitutionalism”? In 
comparative democratisation research, the degree of constitutional legitimacy among 
citizens has received ample attention. By means of large-scale surveys such as the 
New Democracies Barometer or The Four Nations Survey (see Mishler and Rose, 
1999; Morlino and Montero, 1995) citizens’ attitudes towards democracy and particu-
lar institutions has been investigated. The extent to which constitutions are accepted 
at the level of political elites has remained much more underexposed so far, but may 
be considered at least as important (Barnett, 2003). The concept of constitutional 
conflict can fill this void, both conceptually and empirically. In chapter 2 it was 
shown that constitutional conflict and critique is often perceived as harmful for de-
mocratisation processes, indicating that democracy is not “the only game in town”. 
However, such an assessment of constitutional conflict represents a one-dimensional 
view that overlooks the potentially neutral or positive side to constitutional conflict 
and reconciliation. In addition, it is not consistent with the idea of constitutionalism 
that was outlined above. Constitutional conflicts indicate that the allocation of com-
petencies and the distribution of power among politicians and state institutions are 
not (fully) accepted by political actors. But this does not necessarily mean that the 
entire democratic framework is at stake. Political actors may deem specific constitu-
tional rules illegitimate or incompatible with their values, and may try to modify 
these rules without undermining the political system’s democratic character. There-
fore, constitutional conflict does not automatically imply that constitutionalism 
among political elites is entirely absent. In order to determine what motivates politi-
cal actors to engage in such conflicts, and whether it implies a temporary decline of 
constitutionalism or a permanent constitutional crisis, the sources of constitutional 
conflict need to be investigated. Constitution-making processes represent one such 
possible source of a lacking constitutional legitimacy. The extent to which politicians 
perceive the procedures for deliberating and deciding upon the new constitutional 
framework as acceptable may determine their acceptance of the constitution itself.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
tion from such risks by specifying, often strict, amendment rules and introducing a system of con-
stitutional justice that defends constitutional rights.    
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4.3 The impact of constitution making  
 
In democratisation studies and among policy makers there is increasing attention 
and support for the argument that procedural differences in constitution-making and 
constitutional engineering affect subsequent democratisation, regime stability, peace, 
and conflict resolution (Elgie and Zielonka, 2001: 34; Benomar, 2004; Moehler, 
2006; Schmitter, 2001). Jon Elster is probably the best-known scholar who has em-
phasised the relevance of processes of constitution making in the context of transi-
tions from state socialism to democracy (Elster, 1992, 1995, 1996; Elster, Offe and 
Preuss, 1996). Elster admits that constitution-makers’ goals and preferences are im-
portant to understand constitutional choice. But the way in which these preferences 
are aggregated into final decisions may transform initial preferences, thus rendering 
the process itself at least as important. Philippe Schmitter states it even more boldly: 
‘what is more important and will have a more predictable impact than the specific 
nature of institutions a particular country chooses is the process whereby it does so’ 
(Schmitter, 2001: 4-5, emphasis in original). This is not to say that constitutional 
choices do not matter for subsequent political developments, but these choices and 
their legitimacy are to a large extent dependent upon the constitution-making proc-
ess. More specifically, it is the openness of this process that determines whether con-
stitutional choices are acceptable to all parties. The more key stakeholders feel that 
their preferences have been taken into account in the bargaining process, the more 
legitimate the final product will be. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) also acknowl-
edge this when they distinguish between various constitution-making models with 
different degrees of legitimacy. They refer to their “optimal model” as 
  
one in which decisions about issues of potentially great divisiveness and intensity are ar-
rived at in a consensual rather than a majoritarian manner and in which the work of the 
constituent assembly gains further legitimacy by being approved in a popular referendum 
that sets the democratic context in which further changes take place (Linz and Stepan, 
1996: 83). 
 
Hence, consensual decision making in a constitutional assembly and approval by the 
population through a referendum will contribute to the acceptance of the constitu-
tion. Actors or groups who feel that their preferences and interests were not taken 
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into account during the constitution-making process may voice their dissatisfaction 
at a later stage, potentially triggering conflict with the initial constitution makers. 
Participation, representativeness, and consultation of groups not directly involved in 
constitutional engineering may thus enhance constitutional legitimacy and reduce the 
likelihood of constitutional conflict.  
In the process of choosing a new constitution, three dimensions can be distin-
guished, each of which can be “open” to different degrees. The first is the origin of the 
constitution. Politicians can choose to adopt an entirely new constitution, amend the 
existing document, or re-adopt a previous basic law (Schmitter, 2001: 4-5). Arguably, 
drafting and adopting a new document widens the scope for deliberation, as the en-
tire institutional framework becomes subject to political debate. From the formula-
tion of Basic Rights and Freedoms to the colours of the national flag and the distribu-
tion of competencies between state institutions, everything has to be discussed, and 
choices within each domain are theoretically open. Amending an existing constitution 
and even more so re-adopting a previous document is less open to deliberation, as the 
document is partly or in its entirety excluded from deliberation. Tony Verheijen thus 
stresses that ‘adapted communist constitutions are bound to create problems for the 
relations between political institutions because of the ambiguities and contradictions 
which result from the mix between a communist type constitution and round table 
agreements’ (2000: 98). However, there is also a potential drawback to adopting a 
new constitution. In some cases it may be better to exclude certain controversial deci-
sions from the constitution-making process as they risk generating too much conflict 
and instability. Elster, Offe and Preuss (1996: 64) refer to the issues of abortion and 
church-state relations that may explain why no new constitution was adopted in Po-
land. The second dimension of constitution making is the arena of deliberation and 
adoption. Students of constitution-making agree that the most desirable way of 
choosing a country’s constitutional framework is through a specially elected constitu-
tional assembly (Elster, 1992; Schmitter, 2001; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Constitu-
tional assemblies carry the most legitimacy as they are especially created to “assem-
ble” as many groups as possible for deliberation on the new constitution. Further-
more, their term is often fixed, and elections to the regular parliament take place af-
ter the new constitution has been adopted. Constitution drafting in a regular parlia-
ment, in a constitutional assembly that is automatically converted into a regular par-
liament or in an indirectly elected (appointed) constituent assembly is considerably 
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less open. When constitution-making and regular decision-making are not properly 
disconnected, participants are stimulated to focus on short-term political concerns, 
or to reserve special competencies for themselves in the constitution (Elster, 1996, 
1997: 130). This creates ground for dissatisfaction among actors not involved in con-
stitution making, or other state organs such as the executive. The third dimension of 
constitution making is involvement of the population. This may take place before, 
during and after the constitution-making process, for example through consultation 
rounds and other forms of deliberation. Constitutional referendums are however the 
most common instrument to assess popular support for the new basic law. Popular 
referendums on constitutions enhance the legitimacy of the constitution and increase 
the costs for political actors of challenging it. In case citizens were involved in proc-
esses of constitution making, they can be expected to be better capable of checking 
the behaviour of politicians. In terms of the so-called ‘monitoring theory’ politicians 
will generally anticipate on this, and be less likely to violate the rules (Widner, 2005: 
4).   
 
4.4 Constitution making procedures in East Central Europe 
 
Constitution-making processes in the early 1990s varied substantially across the 
seven ECE countries included in this chapter. With the exception of Hungary and Po-
land, new constitutions were adopted in all countries following the breakdown of 
communism. In Hungary, the existing communist-era text remained in place and was 
heavily changed in 1989. Basically all fundamental constitutional provisions were 
amended, which effectively meant that a new constitution took effect.11 In Poland a 
heavily fragmented parliament, along with disagreements between the two legislative 
chambers prevented a consensus to emerge on various constitutional drafts in the 
early 1990s. Eventually, an interim constitution was adopted in 1992. This so-called 
“Little Constitution”12 aimed to clarify relations between parliament, government and 
president and was incorporated into the existing constitutional order (Van der Meer-
Krok Paszkowska, 2000: 38). A new constitution was adopted in 1997. 
                                                 
11  The 1989 amendments introduced human right protection, a parliamentary elected president, a 
democratically elected parliament, and an independent judiciary. Hungary changed its name from 
the Hungarian People’s Republic into the Republic of Hungary, and it was described as ‘a constitu-
tional state implementing a multi-party system, parliamentary democracy and social market econ-
omy’ (Szickinger, 2001 and Ludwikowski, 1996: 180).   
12  Officially, the “Constitutional Act on the Mutual Relations between the Legislative and Executive 
Institutions and on Local Self-Government.” 
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 With regard to the constitution-making arena, procedures among the seven 
countries varied substantially. In Romania and Bulgaria, constitutional drafting took 
place in specially elected constitutional assemblies with fixed two-year terms. With 
their constitutions adopted in July and December 1991 respectively, Bulgaria and 
Romania were also the first two countries in the region that replaced the communist 
era Basic Law in its entirety. Although Elster, Offe and Preuss (1996: 69) emphasise 
that the Bulgarian roundtable talks ‘took the form of real negotiations’, debates and 
decisions on most constitutional issues were postponed to the constitutional assem-
bly. The Bulgarian Great National Assembly was formed in June 1990 and was com-
prised of 400 deputies. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) held 211 seats and was the 
first communist successor party in Central Europe to win democratic elections 
(Ganev, 2004: 70-71). The Romanian Constitutional Assembly was composed of all 
members of parliament and the senate, and was elected in May 1990. Here too, a sin-
gle party was able to secure a majority in the constitutional assembly. The National 
Salvation Front (NSF), a heterogeneous group of ex-communists and dissidents led 
by former communist leader Ion Iliescu, won about 7o per cent of the seats in both 
houses (Weber, 2001: 217). In Estonia, a Special Constitutional Assembly was drawn 
from the two parliaments existing at that time: the democratically elected 499-
member Congress of Estonia and the incumbent communist-era legislature. After 
bickering about the number of deputies each was to deliver, both institutions agreed 
upon a 30-30 ratio in the Constitutional Assembly.13 The assembly started its work in 
October 1991 and it took until April 1992 before the first complete draft was finalised 
(Pettai, 2001: 114). In Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, constitution making 
took place in democratically elected regular parliaments. Both the Czech and Slovak 
National Councils had started drafting new constitutions before the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia in November 1992. Some important reforms had already been intro-
duced between 1990 and 1992, and the assemblies charged with constitution making 
were elected in June 1992. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia became inevitable when 
the Slovak National Council declared Slovakia’s sovereignty in July 1992, and consti-
tutional deliberations for the future independent states set off in both national coun-
cils. The Slovak National Council agreed upon a constitution for an independent Slo-
                                                 
13  Of the sixty members in the constitutional assembly, forty were political newcomers from the Esto-
nian nationalist movement and only thirteen can be labelled part of the old communist elite. Seven 
were representatives of the Russian-speaking minority. See on the Estonian Constitutional Assem-
bly Taagepera (1994), Easter (1997), and Pettai (2001). 
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vakia even before the Federal Council voted on the ending of Czechoslovakia on 25 
November 1992. The adoption of the Czech constitution followed in December of that 
year (see Kopecký, 2001a, 2001b). After the roundtable talks of 1989, pseudo-
democratic elections to the Senate and Sejm (Polish parliament) were held in Po-
land.14 Although the roundtable talks generated a number of significant changes to 
the communist constitution, the intention remained to enact an entirely new docu-
ment, especially as the amendments ‘failed to address the regulation and structure of 
state institutions […] and the rights and freedoms of citizens’  (Wyrzykowski, 2001: 
417). Both houses were involved in constitution drafting and the deadline for adop-
tion was set for 3 May 1991. This deadline was missed though, partly due to dis-
agreement between parliament and senate on the procedure for drafting and adopt-
ing the new constitution. When the Sejm was dissolved and early elections were held 
in October 1991, the ensuing fully democratically elected but highly fragmented par-
liament also failed to agree on various drafts. In serious need of clarifying executive-
legislative relations, the “Little Constitution” was finally adopted on 17 October 1992, 
which would serve as an interim constitution until 1997. Hungary is a special case 
when it comes to the arena of deliberation. The constitutional amendments were dis-
cussed and voted upon in 1989, long before constitution making in the other coun-
tries set off. Moreover, the amendments were passed by a communist parliament 
(elected in 1985), but only after roundtable talks with a wide variety of opposition 
groups. Many of these organisations, such as the Union of Young Democrats (FI-
DESZ), the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the Christian Democratic Peo-
ple’s Party (KNDP), would later be represented in democratically elected parliaments. 
Although not intended as such, discussions in the roundtable talks focused mainly on 
constitutional issues, and the proposed reforms were accepted by parliament almost 
verbatim. István Szickinger (2001: 412-413) consequently labels the Hungarian 
roundtable talks a ‘quasi-constitutional assembly’, but others have been critical of its 
legitimacy as many groups were denied access or veto powers during the negotiations 
(see e.g. Sajó, 1996: 92; Tökès, 1996: 305-309).  
Romania and Estonia are the only two cases where constitutional referendums 
were held. The Estonian referendum was organised in July 1992, and with a turnout 
                                                 
14  A compromise was reached on the 1989 transition elections during the Polish Roundtable Talks. It 
was determined that the communists would be guaranteed 60 per cent of the 460 seats in the Sejm, 
5 per cent were reserved for small Catholic parties previously represented in communist parlia-
ments, and 35 per cent of the seats would be open to competition. The Senate, however, would be 
fully democratically elected (Van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska, 2000: 19).   
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of over 66 per cent and 92 per cent voting in favour of the new constitution the result 
was unequivocal.15 The Romanian referendum took place on 8 December 1991, and 
was accepted by 77 per cent of the voters (the turnout was 66 per cent). In Bulgaria, a 
referendum was scheduled but later called off (Ganev, 2001: 188), and also in Poland 
the April 1992 Constitutional Act stipulated in vain that a referendum would be held. 
On 16 November 1989 a referendum was held in Hungary, following a deadlock over 
the presidential office during the roundtable talks. The referendum was initiated by 
the Free Democrats and contained questions on the method of electing the president 
and on restricting the Communist Party’s dominance. The result was a victory for the 
opposition, but the communist-dominated parliament immediately repealed the re-
sults (Szickinger, 2001: 413). 16 In no other case was the population directly involved 
in the constitutional adoption process.  
 
4.5 Constitution-making environments in ECE  
 
As illustrated by the case descriptions, constitution-making procedures across ECE 
varied substantially. Moreover, they show that constitution making often developed 
in ways different than originally planned. This was especially the case where regular 
parliaments were charged with drafting and adopting new constitutions, making the 
process more dependent upon political short-term concerns. In addition, the extent 
to which constitution-making procedures were open to involvement by political 
groups and citizens varied considerably. Based on the openness of constitution mak-
ing in the seven cases, a ranking of “constitution-making environments” (CMEs) can 
be constructed. It is displayed in table 4.1. All three dimensions of constitution mak-
ing – origin of the document, arena of deliberation, and popular involvement – were 
taken into account. Depending on the extent to which they allow for deliberation and 
involvement by political groups and citizens, each country is given a score. 5 repre-
sents the highest possible ranking, indicating (i) a new constitution, drafted and 
adopted by (ii) a specially elected constituent assembly with a fixed term, and fol-
lowed by (iii) a popular referendum. A score of zero represents the most closed CME, 
                                                 
15  It should be noted, however, that the second question on the ballot, which asked whether 5000 
non-citizens who had applied for Estonian citizenship should be allowed voting rights in the up-
coming presidential and parliamentary elections, failed with 47 per cent voting against (Pettai, 
2001: 128).   
16  The Free Democrats were actually against direct presidential elections as they were expected to 
favour the popular socialist candidate Imre Pozsgay. The public voted in favour of indirect elec-
tions. Parliament did place minor restrictions on the HSWP to appease the opposition.  
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with an amended communist constitution, constitution-making in the incumbent 
communist parliament and no referendum.  
 
Table 4.1: Openness of constitution-making environments (CMEs) 
Country Constitution-making environment  
CME  
Ranking 
Romania  New document, elected constituent assembly, referendum 5 
Bulgaria New document, elected constituent assembly 4 
Estonia New document, appointed constituent assembly, referendum 4 
Slovakia  New document, elected regular parliament 2 
Czech Republic New document, elected regular parliament 2 
Poland Amended communist constitution, elected regular parliament 1 
Hungary Amended communist constitution, communist parliament 0 
Note: CME rankings were calculated by adding the scores on the individual dimensions: 
Origin of the document: new document = 1, amended communist constitution = 0. 
Arena of deliberation and adoption: elected constitutional assembly with fixed term = 3, ap-
pointed constitutional assembly = 2, regular democratic parliament = 1, communist parlia-
ment = 0. 
Approval of constitution by referendum: 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
 
Considering the assumption that an open constitution-making process reduces the 
probability of constitutional conflict following the enactment of the constitution, the 
higher ranked countries are expected to be less conflict prone. Table 4.1 indicates that 
the lowest levels of constitutional acceptance should consequently be expected in Po-
land and Hungary (respectively scoring 1 and 0). In both countries the communist 
constitution was amended. Although the communist-era text in Hungary changed 
beyond recognition in 1989, it was coded as an amended document since the proce-
dure that was followed in the Hungarian parliament was that of constitutional 
amendment. While voting on the 1989 amendments in Hungary took place before the 
first free elections of 25 March 1990, the Polish Little Constitution – effectively an 
amendment to the communist-era text – was adopted by a democratically elected 
parliament. Neither of these countries held constitutional referendums. On the other 
end of the spectrum, Romania’s constitution should carry most legitimacy. Its spe-
cially elected fixed-term constituent assembly adopted an entirely new document that 
was later endorsed by the population in a referendum (leading to a score of 5). In Es-
tonia, the constitutional assembly was drawn from an elected parliament and the in-
cumbent, non-democratic, Supreme Council. Although this special assembly was not 
directly elected, it did deliberate on a fully new document, which was later presented 
to the Estonians in a referendum. Hence Estonia’s ranking equals that of Bulgaria, 
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where the new constitution was drafted and adopted by a specially elected constitu-
tional assembly, but not put to popular vote (both score 4). The Czech and Slovak 
constitutions were also newly drafted, but deliberation took place in regular yet de-
mocratically elected parliaments. No referendums were organised, which explains 
why these countries end up in the middle category with a score of 2. A medium level 
of constitutional conflict is consequently expected for the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics.   
 
4.6 Assessing the effects of constitution-making  
 
In chapter 3 we saw that the rate of constitutional conflict in the first stage of political 
transformation varied considerably across the region. The seven countries considered 
in this chapter also display substantial differences with regard to levels of constitu-
tional conflict during the first five years following constitutional replacement. To 
what extent can this cross-country variation be explained by differences in the consti-
tution-making procedures? Did the fact that the Hungarian amendments were initi-
ated and controlled by the communist party result in a period of intense post-
enactment conflict? And were the constitutions of Bulgaria and Romania considered 
the most legitimate Basic Laws in the region because of the way in which they were 
deliberated and ratified? When the ranking of constitution-making environments in 
post-communist ECE is compared with the patterns of constitutional conflict during 
the first five years following constitutional replacement, it appears that the assumed 
relations do not hold across all cases. Table 4.2 summarises the CME scores as well as 
absolute and mean annual conflict levels for the seven cases.   
 
Table 4.2: Constitution-making environment and conflict levels 
Country 
CME 
score 
Conflicts in 1st five 
years 
Share of con-
flicts 
Romania  5 4 .50 
Bulgaria 4 16 .64 
Estonia 4 4 .44 
Slovakia  2 21 .72 
Czech Republic 2 6 .60 
Poland 1 9 .45 
Hungary 0 6 .46 
Note: share of conflicts denotes the share of all conflicts in a country that 
occurred during the first 5 years following constitutional replacement.  
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Romania and Estonia, with respectively four and five rule conflicts recorded during 
the five years following constitutional replacement, fit the expected pattern reasona-
bly well. Both countries adopted new constitutions in special constitutional assem-
blies (elected in Romania, partly elected in Estonia), and both held constitutional ref-
erendums. In Romania, the National Salvation Front (NSF) held a two-thirds major-
ity in both houses of parliament, and heavily dominated the Romanian deliberation 
and drafting process (Ludwikowski, 1996: 124). This could have undermined consti-
tutional legitimacy, as a number of opposition parties did not gain access to parlia-
ment and the NSF had a majority that was large enough to adopt the constitution uni-
laterally. Nevertheless, both the constitution-making process and the resulting con-
stitutional document reflected the NSF’s ‘commitment to democracy’ (Weber, 2001: 
218) and political and public debate. 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, and to some extent Poland, display levels of 
conflict that are not in line with what would be expected on the basis of their consti-
tution-making procedures. In Hungary, the rate of constitutional conflicts during the 
period 1989-94 was relatively low considering the limited possibility of access to the 
procedures for both political opposition and citizens. This may suggest that the ef-
fects of the roundtable talks should not be underestimated after all. In spite of the 
limited degree of formal influence that opposition forces could exert, and despite the 
repealed November 1989 referendum, the most important constitutional issues were 
dealt with at the roundtables. Moreover, the opposition’s presence and informal pres-
sure during the constitutional debates granted the roundtable talks a great deal of 
symbolic legitimacy, which is why they ‘amounted to much more than a mere side-
show’ (Bozóki, 2002: xv).  
Slovakia catches the eye with 21 conflicts, while on the basis of its CME it was 
assumed to end up in the middle category. A closer look at the period of constitution 
drafting provides some clues as to why so many constitutional conflicts occurred. The 
Slovak constitution was drafted and adopted in no time; it took the Slovak National 
Assembly just over three months (Malová, 2001: 351). This presumably served to 
maintain national prestige over the Czechs, and resulted in a very strong legislature 
in which any majority could dominate cabinet composition and legislation, a weak 
system of checks and balances, and lack of a clear distinction between exclusive and 
shared presidential responsibilities (Kopecký, 2001a: 36; Ludwikowski, 1996: 171). 
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The velvet, but sudden divorce of the Czech and Slovak Republics, and the subse-
quent wish to immediately draft a new constitution may explain why constitution 
makers in Slovakia were poorly prepared. Rather than structuring politics, the result-
ing document was responsible for much of the political turmoil in post-communist 
Slovakia. This is most clearly illustrated by the many conflicts about unclear constitu-
tional provisions on executive-legislative and intra-executive relations. The constitu-
tion was especially vague on the competencies of vice speakers of parliament, on the 
possibility of combining membership of parliament and cabinet posts, and on presi-
dential appointment and dismissal powers.  
Such ambiguities were apparent in other constitutions as well, particularly 
with regard to the distribution of executive authority. Poland’s 1992 interim constitu-
tion is a good case in point, as it was particularly unclear on the president’s compe-
tencies in the fields of defence and national security, as well as on the president’s ap-
pointment and dismissal powers (see chapter 5 for specific examples). A clash be-
tween president Lech Wałęsa and Prime Minister Pawlak about the nomination of a 
new commander of state police in August 1994 can illustrate this (Constitution 
Watch, 1994: 45). While Wałęsa referred to his constitutional duties and claimed full 
discretion in personnel policies, Pawlak stated that the nomination was subject to co-
decision between the president and prime minister. According to Krzysztof Jasiewicz, 
this conflict was part of a larger struggle between the president and the left-wing 
SLD/PSL coalition about ‘control over the so-called presidential portfolios: Internal 
Affairs, National Defence, and Foreign Affairs’ (Jasiewicz, 1997: 152). After a bizarre 
string of events, during which Wałęsa threatened to veto the 1995 state budget, the 
president managed to convince the SLD to submit a motion of no confidence against 
Pawlak, which was accepted by the Sejm on 1 March 1995. In the course of events, 
Wałęsa managed to convince the Sejm of his interpretation of the constitution and to 
secure control of the presidential portfolios (ibid: 154). Basically every constitution in 
this study contained ambiguities of this kind, provoking similar intra-executive con-
frontations. The majority of these struggles focused, as in Poland, on presidential au-
thority in the fields of defence, and foreign policy, and on appointment and dismissal 
powers.  
 Bulgaria’s conflict pattern, with 16 conflicts between July 1991 and July 1996 
following constitution making in a special constituent assembly, is remarkable as 
well. Especially the high amount of conflicts in 1995, twelve in a single year, begs for 
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further explanation. In fact, in most countries there has been a concentration of con-
flicts during one or two years of the first half-decade. Figure 3.1 showed that espe-
cially the period 1993-95 was extremely conflict dense. A closer look at political de-
velopments shows that this period was characterised by radical cabinet turnovers in 
Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. In these four cases pro-reform cabinets of 
the centre or right lost elections, and were replaced by left leaning or nationalistic 
coalitions. The 1994 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria resulted in a landslide vic-
tory for the BSP. They won 43.5 percent of the votes and formed a coalition with the 
much smaller BZnS. The new government’s policies were characterised by delays of 
economic reforms.  In Slovakia, the Mečiar III cabinet (1994-1998), which consisted 
of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovak National Party (SNS) 
and the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), ‘shared a strong common focus on 
Slovak national identity […] and a willingness to accept leadership by strong hand 
with little regard for the checks and balances necessary for the endurance of democ-
racy’ (Deegan-Krause, 2001: 264). In Romania, Ion Iliescu’s Democratic National 
Salvation Front (FDSN) formed a coalition with the far left Socialist Labour Party 
(PSM) and the extreme-rightist Greater Romania Party (RM). In Poland, a coalition 
was formed in October 1993 between the Alliance of Democratic Left (SLD) and the 
Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL). 
This anti-reform upsurge was possible due to growing discontent among citi-
zens in the region about the difficulties of economic transition (Grzybowski and Mi-
kuli, 2004: 197). Fast and unbalanced privatisation and liberalisation instigated a 
deterioration of peoples’ living conditions, many being worse off than under commu-
nism. Given the contentiousness of the economic reform issue, and the authoritarian 
tendencies of some of these cabinets, conflicts with parliamentary opposition and 
with presidents were abundant. Even though most confrontations focussed on policy 
matters, constitutional issues increasingly became part of the debates. This was the 
case in Slovakia, for example, where president Kováč assumed a much more active 
role in an attempt to counterbalance Mečiar’s radical and anti-democratic and anti-
reform agenda. The growing rift between the prime minister and the president cul-
minated in rumours that Mečiar had been involved in the abduction of Kováč’ son 
and in the latter losing his membership of the HZDS (Haughton, 2003). In Bulgaria, 
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) President Zhelyu Zhelev attempted to expand his 
authority during both of his terms, but the most intense constitutional struggles were 
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those with the 1995-97 BSP government of Prime Minister Videnov. In Poland, politi-
cal hostilities caused problematic intra-executive relations as well. Lech Wałęsa, al-
though officially independent still connected to the right-leaning post-Solidarity 
camp, had an extremely difficult relation with the centre-left coalition of Waldemar 
Pawlak, leading to intense struggles over the 1995 budget and the presidential portfo-
lios. In Estonia and Hungary on the other hand, the political landscape was much less 
divided over the reform issue, which in light of the above might explain the absence 
of similar conflict patterns.     
In short, there is no evidence for the effects of constitution-making procedures 
as presumed by the democratisation literature. Although some of the countries do 
confirm the expected patterns, other factors seem to have played a much more vital 
role. One important cause of conflict is rooted in the ambiguity of constitutional pro-
visions, which left room for different interpretations of constitutional rules among 
political actors. In that sense, the constitutions of ECE could not provide one of their 
main functions: a stable allocation of competencies among politicians. This clearly 
affected the acceptance of constitutional rules by political actors in a negative way. 
The second source of conflict is related to a particular political cleavage that was pre-
sent in Central Europe in the early 1990s. The political struggle between pro-reform 
and pro-moderation parties was often fought through the constitution, instead of in 
accordance with it. It should be noted that these two factors are also connected. Am-
biguities were present in the constitutions of all countries, but they did not lead to 
similar levels of constitutional conflict in each of them. Conflict rates were especially 
high where political animosities were most intense. One could argue that political 
actors, attempting to prevail in the political struggle over economic reforms, used 
constitutional ambiguity as a window of opportunity. Being aware of the specificity of 
this rift for post-communist politics, these events show that open constitution-
making procedures are certainly no sufficient condition for durable, legitimate consti-
tutions. Much depends on the interaction between intensity of political debates, 
which may provoke politicians to challenge the rules of the game.  
 
4.7 Conclusion and discussion 
 
This chapter investigated whether the nature of constitution-making processes in 
seven post-communist ECE countries has affected the rate of constitutional conflict 
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during the first five years following constitutional replacement. It represented a first 
step in explaining the varying patterns of constitutional conflict in post-communist 
ECE. It was argued that constitutional conflicts are indicative of a lack of acceptance 
of constitutional rules, which implies that constitutionalism is at stake. Building on a 
growing body of literature that emphasises the importance of constitution-making for 
constitutional legitimacy, democratic consolidation and conflict resolution, the rela-
tion between the openness of constitution-making procedures and conflict patterns in 
seven ECE countries was explored.  
The comparison of constitution-making processes and patterns of constitu-
tional conflict during the first five years following constitutional adoption or modifi-
cation indicated that open constitution making is no guarantee for elite constitutional 
acceptance. Similarly, closed constitution making does not mean that the legitimacy 
of constitutions among elites is necessarily low. Instead, the main finding was that 
ambiguous formulation of important provisions in the constitutions was a significant 
source of conflict. Especially the role and competencies of presidents constituted a 
recurring topic of conflict. In that context, presidents and prime ministers clashed 
regularly over the interpretation of the range of their executive competencies. Vague-
ness of constitutional provisions alone cannot, however, explain high levels of conflict 
as the relative absence of contestation in Estonia and Hungary during the five years 
ensuing constitutional replacement illustrated. Rather, conflict over ambiguous con-
stitutional rules was triggered in a number of cases by political circumstances that 
motivated politicians to challenge the constitutional status quo. Major electoral turn-
overs and periods of economic hardship provided such triggers in four cases, includ-
ing the most conflict ridden ones – Slovakia and Bulgaria. The return to power of left 
wing and nationalist parties ignited intense periods of political and constitutional 
turmoil. It was therefore argued that the contentiousness of the issue of economic 
reform, deep-rooted differences between left wing and right-wing parties, and an-
tagonism between cabinets and presidents put constitutional legitimacy under pres-
sure.  
These findings indicate that the acceptance of constitutional provisions by po-
litical elites is not dependent upon the openness of the constitution-making process. 
Accordingly, the literature on constitution making tends to place too much emphasis 
on procedural aspects. Instead, the quality of the constitution in terms of its clarity 
contributes at least as much to a durable and acceptable constitution. Constitutional 
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ambiguity constitutes a potential risk that constitution-makers should take into ac-
count more. Such ambiguity may be rooted in difficult compromises reached during 
constitutional bargaining, and should therefore also be added to analyses of constitu-
tion-making processes. It is furthermore important to look beyond the constitution-
making process, and to recognise that the effects of ‘constitutional engineering’ are 
rarely predictable. Uncertainty and political compromise during the constitution-
making process may lead to sub-optimal results in the form of ambiguities. The 
analyses of constitutional development in ECE indicate that politicians are ready to 
utilise these ambiguities for political purposes. It may be right to stimulate politicians 
to neglect their short-term political interests during constitutional drafting process, 
but it should not be assumed that these interests do not resurface at a later stage.  
 The next chapter will continue this thesis’ investigation into the sources and 
consequences of constitutional conflict, and digs deeper into the effects of constitu-
tional ambiguity. A comparison of president-cabinet relations in post-communist 
Hungary and Poland will provide in-depth information on how ambiguities have led 
to the emergence of constitutional conflict, and shows how different types of recon-
ciliation and constitutional change resulted from these conflicts.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Ambiguity, conflict, and change in East Central European 
dual executive systems * 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Among the most important, and consequently most contentious, constitutional issues 
that had to be settled during the ECE constitution-making processes were relations 
between the executive and legislative branches of government (Stepan and Skach, 
1993; Lijphart, 1994; Lijphart and Waisman, 1996; Frye, 1997). Discussions especially 
focused on whether to introduce a presidential office, the presidential election proce-
dure, and the scope of his powers vis-à-vis government and parliament. Remarkably, 
all ECE states opted for parliamentary constitutional designs with dual executives – 
providing for a directly or indirectly elected president as well as a prime minister who 
is responsible to parliament (Baylis, 2007: 89, see also Stepan and Skach, 1993; 
Blondel, 1992; Lewis-Beck, 1997). The countries in post-communist Europe share 
this particular constitutional trait, but actual relations between presidents and prime 
ministers have varied across time and space. While some cabinet periods were char-
acterised by peaceful cooperation between presidents and prime ministers, others 
have become known as outright conflictive (Baylis, 1996; Protsyk, 1996; 2005). A key 
characteristic of dual executive constitutional design is that a certain amount of au-
thority is granted to both the head of state and the council of ministers. Dual execu-
tive constitutions introduce countersignature procedures, demand coordination be-
tween both institutions in, for example, cabinet formation and nominations of minis-
ters and other state officials, and often leave the scope and exercise of various other 
presidential dependent upon interpretation by the incumbent. Chapter 4 demon-
strated that such constitutional vagueness is a potential breeding ground for conflicts 
                                                 
*  This chapter is a minor revision of ‘Contestable constitutions: Ambiguity, conflict, and change in 
east central European dual executive systems’, Communist and Post-communist Studies, 42 (1): 83-
101. © 2009 Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California. The definitive 
version is available at www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud.   
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between presidents and governments over the distribution of executive authority (see 
also: Baylis, 2007: 89).  
This chapter elaborates on the circumstances under which ambiguities on in-
tra-executive relations provoked constitutional conflict and constitutional change in 
post-communist Hungary and Poland. Both countries introduced dual executive con-
stitutional designs that left room for different interpretations of the role and powers 
of the president. In Poland, a directly elected presidency with considerable power was 
introduced in September 1990; an indirectly elected and largely ceremonial head of 
state has been in place in Hungary since late 1989. Notwithstanding this variation in 
presidential election procedures and powers, conflicts related to the position of the 
president occurred frequently in both countries. President Wałęsa of Poland and 
Göncz of Hungary both attempted to increase the scope of their powers in the so-
called presidential portfolios – defence, national security and international relations 
– as well as in other policy areas. Their broad interpretation of presidential preroga-
tives produced clashes with cabinets and prime ministers, who accused the presidents 
of transgressing their constitutional authority. In the end, however, neither Wałęsa 
nor Göncz succeeded in expanding their powers. By the mid-1990s the intra-
executive struggle was settled largely in favour of the cabinet in Hungary and Poland. 
Interestingly, this consolidation process did not develop along similar pathways in 
both cases.  
In Poland, conflicts over executive authority led to modifications of the 1992 
interim constitution, and eventually the adoption of a new Basic Law in 1997. These 
formal changes were preceded by informal agreements that, however, did not develop 
into durable conventions and which could not prevent constitutional conflict from 
resurfacing. In Hungary, the constitutional court was a crucial actor in the settlement 
of conflicts, especially by means of its rulings on the prerogatives of the Hungarian 
president in 1991 and 1992. The prevalence of constitutional review in Hungary con-
tributed to a more rapid stabilisation of the constitutional framework. The findings 
illustrate that conflict and conflict settlement were instrumental in the development 
of constitutional president-cabinet relations in Poland and Hungary. They moreover 
indicate that informal agreements about the interpretation of constitutional rules 
tend to be less durable than constitutional review or formal constitutional change.   
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, it will be argued that consti-
tutions can be perceived as incomplete contracts, containing uncertainties and ambi-
AMBIGUITY, CONFLICT AND CHANGE 
 91 
guities about rights and competencies. The discussion draws on Elinor Ostrom’s work 
(1983; 1986; 2005) on rule configurations, which articulates the importance of com-
pleteness and consistency of rules for successful co-operation and political decision-
making. Section 3 discusses the importance of constitutional ambiguity and interpre-
tation conflicts for democratic consolidation. Reaching consensus about the interpre-
tation of ambiguous constitutional provisions is argued to be crucial for the develop-
ment of a durable distribution of powers between state institutions. Referring to con-
stitutional developments in the US and France, it is suggested that such agreements 
may either be formal, through constitutional change or constitutional review, or in-
formal, through the development of conventions or standard operating procedures. 
Section 4 turns to developments in Poland and Hungary, and shows how ambiguities 
in constitutional arrangements have been a recurring source of conflict between 
presidents and prime ministers. The case studies indicate that the settlement of con-
flicts through constitutional change or constitutional review may set durable prece-
dents, while informal arrangements served as temporary solutions that were easily 
breached by political actors. Section 5 discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
5.2 Constitutions in practice: interpreting the rules of the game   
 
In chapter 4 it was argued that a constitution ideally provides a durable allocation of 
powers among state institutions and a more or less predictable framework of rules 
and rights political actors and citizens can commit to (Pasquino, 1998; Elgie and 
Zielonka, 2001). The stability and predictability associated with constitutions cannot, 
however, be taken for granted. As with any type of rules, constitutional rules are sub-
ject to interpretation, through constitutional review, but even more so by politicians 
in their day-to-day conduct (Tribe and Dorf, 1991: 7-9). Constitutions can be per-
ceived of as ‘incomplete contracts’ (Frye, 1997; Stone Sweet, 2008: 226-227). They 
provide a general framework of rules, rights and principles, the precise meaning of 
which will depend on agreements between political actors or interpretations by con-
stitutional review bodies. If we conceive of rules as (potentially) linguistic units that 
are created by human beings, the meaning that is attached to them is crucial for their 
application and functioning. Rules, as Vincent Ostrom (1980: 312) puts it, ‘are not 
self-formulating, self-determining, or self-enforcing’. What is more, rules, especially 
of the distributive kinds that regulate intra-executive relations, determine the bal-
CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONS 
 92 
ance of power between politicians and state organs. Therefore, when actors are not 
satisfied with the distributional outcomes of rules, they will be encouraged ‘to chal-
lenge the dominant application of rules by employing an alternative interpretation or 
by not “obeying” the dominant one’ (Lindner and Rittberger, 2003: 451). The func-
tioning of rules, as well as their evolution over time can therefore not be seen sepa-
rately from how actors interpret them, and from conflicts and agreements about what 
constitutes the meaning of a rule.  
In her work on rule configurations, Elinor Ostrom (1986; 2005) stresses how 
the interpretation of rules affects co-ordination and decision making among collective 
actors. For rules to work properly, actors need to share the same interpretation of 
(the words used to formulate) rules; ‘if no shared meaning exists when a rule is for-
mulated, confusion will exist about what actions are required, permitted, or forbid-
den’ (E. Ostrom, 2005: 20). Ostrom distinguishes two important features of rules in 
this context. First, the completeness of rules matters. In the ideal-typical situation of 
a complete set of rules the required, permitted, or forbidden status of any possible 
action is specified. In reality, however, this is often unfeasible since all possible situa-
tions to which a rule might apply cannot be known (see also Stone Sweet, 2008: 226). 
A result of incomplete rules is that ‘logically possible actions exist at nodes that are 
not [explicitly] covered by a rule’ (E. Ostrom, 1983: 23). For example, a president 
may be granted the right to dissolve parliament and call elections when three at-
tempts to form a cabinet have been unsuccessful (e.g. Polish constitution 1997, art. 
62). Under this rule, the conditions under which the president has to dissolve the as-
sembly are quite clearly specified. If, however, the president must ‘safeguard the sov-
ereignty and security of the State’, as article 28 of the 1992 Constitutional Act of Po-
land stipulates, the conditions under which he or she is required or permitted to take 
action are not explicitly mentioned. This latter provision represents an incomplete 
rule, the meaning of which may be subject to discussion each time it is applied.  
The second feature that affects the interpretation of rules is their consistency. 
Under a consistent set of rules, no alternative action can simultaneously be consid-
ered permitted under one rule and forbidden under another (E. Ostrom, 1983: 27). 
An inconsistent set of rules, then, permits and simultaneously forbids behaviour, or 
assigns different actors the same prerogatives, therewith creating ambiguity as to 
with who lays authority. Again, the 1992 Polish interim constitution provides illustra-
tions. While article 28.2 stipulates that the president shall ‘safeguard the sovereignty 
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and security of the State, [and] the inviolability and integrity of its territory’, the 
council of ministers, through article 52.8, is expected to ‘ensure the external and in-
ternal security of the State’. Clearly, these provisions grant largely the same duties to 
different institutions, and constitute a potential source of conflict over the role of the 
president and the council of ministers in internal affairs and national security.  
 
5.3 Constitutional ambiguity and democratic consolidation  
 
To what extent is it problematic when constitutions contain ambiguities in the form 
of incomplete or inconsistent rules? Is ambiguous constitutional design bad constitu-
tional design, and does it impede the development of a stable democratic polity? In-
deed, in consolidated democracies ‘the rules [...] according to which political and dis-
tributive conflicts are carried out are relatively immune from becoming themselves 
the object of such conflict’ (Elster et al., 1998: 28). Following this condition, constant 
struggles about the interpretation of constitutional provisions would obstruct the 
consolidation of a democracy as it makes commitment to the rules by political actors 
difficult. But that is not to say that incomplete or inconsistent constitutional rules 
necessarily lead to conflict, or that such conflicts are always harmful to democracy. 
Some observations from established democracies can illustrate this. 
The issue of constitutional ambiguity has received ample attention in studies 
of the constitutional prerogatives of the American presidency, his powers vis-à-vis the 
Congress, and the development of presidential competencies not mentioned explicitly 
in the US constitution (Moe and Howell, 1989; Mansfield, 1989; Dodds, 2003). Espe-
cially the meaning of the “vesting clause” in the American constitution has long been 
(and to some extent still is) controversial.17 Throughout two centuries of American 
democratic history, presidents have interpreted this clause in different ways, leading 
to very diverse leadership styles under what has remained largely the same constitu-
tion (Skowronek, 1993). At the same time, constitutional court cases such as Youngs-
town Sweet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) have significantly contributed to the inter-
pretation of the vesting clause, notably by allowing presidents to increase executive 
                                                 
17  The first sentence of article II, section 1 of the American constitution reads: ‘The executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America’. In the limited view of the American 
presidency this clause just confers the title ‘president’ to the government’s chief executive officer, 
while others perceive it as an important source of authority for the president (Dodds, 2003: 2).    
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powers and play an important role in military decision-making (Dodds, 2003; see 
also Sanders, 2008).  
The French constitution of 1958/1962, which introduced the then novel semi-
presidential system, also contains important ambiguities with regard to the position 
of the president. These are particularly visible in the distribution of executive pre-
rogatives related to defence and foreign policy, but also more generally with regard to 
the president’s position in the French executive (Hoffman, 1959). While at first sight 
the French constitution grants mainly emergency powers to the president, the broad 
interpretation by General De Gaulle of the powers vested in the presidential office has 
served as a precedent for the influence subsequent presidents could exert in French 
politics (Duverger, 1992: 145). At the same time, it is still crucial in the French politi-
cal system that the president and the prime minister reach a compromise about their 
work division, as three periods of ‘cohabitation’ between 1986 and 2003 have shown 
(Elgie, 2002: 304).  
These examples indicate that constitutional interpretation, political agree-
ments, and formal constitutional review may play a role in specifying the uncertain-
ties that constitutions often contain. In both France and the US, these “solutions” 
have to a large extent developed into stable conventions about the role of the presi-
dent, yet it is by no means certain that the current interpretation will last. In ECE, 
consensus about the meaning of rules has had little time to develop. As Thomas Bay-
lis (1996: 301) put it halfway the 1990s, ‘there are no precedents and established con-
ventions and understandings that define the boundaries between key institutions 
more precisely’. Consequently, ‘leading political actors can be expected to try to de-
fine their own prerogatives broadly and in doing so are likely to collide with the ex-
pectations and ambitions of one another’ (ibid). By now, almost two decades have 
passed since the first constitutional replacements in the ECE region. Although this 
still is a comparatively brief period, we can now pose the question: how have politi-
cians dealt with constitutional ambiguity, and what types of conventions and under-
standings have emerged in the ECE region?  
We may think of three basic strategies to deal with constitutional ambiguity: 
constitutional modification, constitutional court rulings, and informal agreements. 
Amending the constitution in reaction to constitutional conflict probably represents 
the most durable solution, as its aim is to actually take away textual ambiguity by 
specifying incomplete constitutional provisions, or removing inconsistencies from the 
AMBIGUITY, CONFLICT AND CHANGE 
 95  
text. The chances that conflict about the same provisions will resurface are then sub-
sequently reduced. However, the complexity of amending a constitution given the 
special majorities it often requires makes it also a difficult solution to apply. To ask 
for an interpretation by a constitutional court is less intricate, and it may result in 
clear and legitimate rulings that serve as a precedent for the future. The US court 
cases illustrated the significance of this resolution type. Yet, as the empirical section 
of this chapter will show, indecisive court rulings can also invigorate uncertainty 
about how to interpret constitutional provisions. Informal ‘solutions’ to interpreta-
tion conflicts are the least durable as they may be reversed once the political tide 
changes, potentially resulting in the re-emergence of conflicts.       
In the next section patterns of conflict and conflict resolution in the field of in-
tra-executive relations in Poland and Hungary will be described in-depth in order to 
grasp the dynamics of intra-executive relations from the start of the transition. The 
case studies show how dual executive systems create uncertainty about which deci-
sion-making procedures to follow, and about the distribution of competencies be-
tween political actors. The ambiguity it creates provides an opportunity structure for 
presidents and prime ministers who seek executive control. The focus on conflict and 
different types of conflict resolution sheds light on the consequences of constitutional 
ambiguity in young democracies, and on potential similarities with constitutional 
development in established democracies.  
 
5.4 Constitutional ambiguity and conflict in East Central Europe 
 
The case studies of Poland and Hungary will set off with a description of constitu-
tional executive-legislative arrangements, and how they came about in the early 
1990s. They were largely the product of difficult negotiations between communist 
elites and opposition groups during roundtable talks and constitution-making proc-
esses. The constitutional compromises that resulted from these negotiations were 
ambiguous about the relations between different state institutions (Elster, Offe and 
Preuss, 1998: 28; Elster 1996a; Elster 1996b).  
 
5.4.1 Case study of Poland 
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Faced with increasing economic and political problems and a growing opposition, the 
Polish communist regime initiated exploratory talks with the Solidarity movement in 
the summer of 1988 (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 265). During the roundtable talks, the 
Communist Party and Solidarity agreed on partially free elections to the Sejm, the 
introduction of a democratically elected senate, and a presidential office. The 1952 
Polish constitution was amended accordingly, most significantly in April 1989, and 
again in December of that year. The amendments clearly signified a compromise be-
tween the two parties, who were making sure not to be ‘outmanoeuvred during the 
transitional power-sharing period’ (Jasiewicz, 1997: 131). As for the president, he 
would be elected indirectly by parliament for six-year term, and was made com-
mander-in-chief of the armed forces as well as chairman of the Committee of Na-
tional Defence. Making prime ministerial nominations, dismissing the prime minister 
under special circumstances and representing Poland in international affairs were 
other important presidential prerogatives. For most presidential acts countersigna-
ture by the prime minister was required, except if they concerned foreign policy, de-
fence and national security. Especially these exemptions from governmental influ-
ence proved difficult to define, and would turn into a recurring source of conflict 
about the intra-executive power division.    
The next fundamental constitutional change was adopted in September 1990, 
introducing direct presidential elections. Tapping into discontent among the popula-
tion about economic reforms, Solidarity chairman Lech Wałęsa aimed at assuming a 
more active role in Polish politics and informally announced his presidential ambi-
tions in April 1990 (Garton Ash, cited in Linz and Stepan, 1996: 274). Although the 
Solidarity camp in the Sejm was not in favour of introducing direct presidential elec-
tions, Solidarity Prime Minister Mazowiecki decided to run against Wałęsa. The in-
cumbent president, communist general Jaruzelski, submitted a draft for amending 
the constitution and the first direct presidential elections were organised in Novem-
ber and December 1990. They were won by Wałęsa. Notwithstanding these signifi-
cant constitutional changes, Polish politicians still intended to replace the 1952 con-
stitution. A constitutional committee in the Sejm was created, and the deadline for 
adopting a new constitution was set on 3 May 1991.     
Although various constitutional drafts were discussed in the early 1990s, a 
heavily fragmented parliament and animosities between the two legislative chambers 
prevented the adoption of a new basic law (Wyrzykowski, 2001: 438-439). In Decem-
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ber 1992 the so-called Little Constitution was adopted – an interim document that 
was designed to clarify relations between parliament, government, and the president. 
The previous constitution contained ambiguities about ‘the conditions under which 
the president could exercise his authority and directly or indirectly influence the 
processes of legislation and cabinet formation’ (Jasiewicz, 1997: 142). Consequently, 
interactions between the main state organs ‘tended to be conflictive rather than coop-
erative’ (Van der Meer-Krok Paszkowska, 2000: 38), and ‘the constitutional “rights” 
of the president acquired a life of their own’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 238). The consti-
tution was especially vague with respect to the powers of the president in the areas of 
internal and external security, and the circumstances under which presidential legal 
acts required (prime) ministerial countersignature. Determining the limits to presi-
dential involvement in executive matters proved to be a thorny matter, leading to fre-
quent interpretation conflicts. In April 1992 for example, shortly before the Little 
Constitution took effect, the new defence minister Jan Parys and President Wałęsa 
were involved in a conflict over personnel policies in the ministry of defence. Parys 
had not consulted with Wałęsa before forcing out two vice-ministers and sending sev-
eral military commanders into early retirement. Wałęsa emphasised his constitu-
tional status as commander-in-chief, and claimed that Parys should have consulted 
with him. When Parys reacted by accusing Wałęsa of staging a military coup d’état, 
Prime Minister Olszewski could do nothing else than fire the defence minister (Con-
stitution Watch, 1992: 2).  
This and other disputes stimulated the Sejm to overcome its internal divisions 
and to adopt the ‘Constitutional act on the mutual relations between the legislative 
and executive institutions and on local self-government’ (the Little Constitution). Al-
though this interim constitution was no dramatic departure from the previous sys-
tem, it did specify a number of presidential prerogatives in greater detail (Van der 
Meer-Krok Paszkowska, 2000: 38). Presidential involvement in the creation of new 
governments, and conditions for dissolving parliament were made subject to complex 
procedures, illustrating the drafters’ awareness of the need to remove ambiguity in 
these areas.18 The president’s powers vis-à-vis government were however much less 
clearly specified, which resulted in a number of serious caveats and contradictions in 
the constitution. The Little Constitution remained unclear on the presidential portfo-
                                                 
18  The president could only dissolve parliament when it failed to pass the budget, to create or approve 
a new cabinet, or in case of a non-constructive vote of confidence.   
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lios of national security, foreign policy and defence (Jasiewicz, 1997: 147). Conse-
quently, the president’s influence in the appointment process of ministers relevant to 
these policy fields remained a potential issue of contention. On this matter, article 61 
of the interim constitution stated that ‘the prime minister shall lay a motion to ap-
point the ministers of foreign affairs, national defence, and internal affairs after con-
sultation with the president’ (Ludwikowski, 1996: 219). Various other articles stipu-
lated the president’s role in these matters, for example through his status as com-
mander-in-chief (art. 35.1), his role as ‘general coordinator and leader’ in foreign af-
fairs, defence and state security (art. 32.1 and 34), and his duty to ‘safeguard the sov-
ereignty and security of the state’ (art. 28.2). At the same time, the cabinet of minis-
ters was given an equally important task in ‘ensuring national and international secu-
rity of the state’ (art. 52.8), and maintaining relations with foreign governments (art. 
52.2). On various occasions, discussion emerged about the limits to the president’s 
involvement in political affairs. In October 1994 for example, Wałęsa attempted to 
expand his influence in the ministry of defence in what became known as the 
Drawsko affair, named after the military exercise ground where he staged a coup 
against the minister of defence, Piotr Kolodzojczyk (Latawski, 2002; Epstein, 2006: 
269-270). During a lunch with high-ranking military officers, the president instigated 
a non-constitutional vote of no confidence against Kolodzojczyk and claimed the au-
thority to appoint the new defence minister. Prime Minister Pawlak fired Kolod-
zojczyk but did not accept the president’s candidate. Pawlak’s move was criticised 
both by opposition parties and coalition partner SLD (Democratic Left Alliance), but 
disapproval of the role Wałęsa had played was even fiercer. In late October, the Sejm 
passed a resolution by 305 against 18 (22 abstentions) in which the president was 
accused of ‘destabilising the constitutional order’, but there were no further actions 
taken (Van der Meer-Krok Paszkowska, 2000: 151). Several constitutional amend-
ments aimed at curtailing the president’s influence over presidential portfolios did 
not acquire enough support in parliament, and it would take until 1997 before mat-
ters were defined more clearly. One last attempt was initiated in August 1995, when 
the Sejm approved a bill that stipulated that the Chief of Staff of the army would re-
port directly to the minister of defence, who would be subordinate exclusively to the 
council of ministers (Keesings, 1995: 40696). This effectively meant that the presi-
dent would be deprived of a direct connection into the higher ranks of the army, ex-
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cept in case of war. Wałęsa however vetoed the bill and the two-thirds majority 
needed to overrule the veto could, again, not be organised in parliament.  
Another example shows how ambiguities in the interim constitution sparked 
off conflicts about presidential power. At the same time it illustrates that constitu-
tional adaptation can be an effective solution to such opacity. In January 1995 Wałęsa 
threatened not to sign the new budget, which would give him the constitutional right 
to dissolve parliament. The Sejm had approved the budget on 30 December 1994, 
well within the constitutionally required three months since the cabinet proposed it. 
Wałęsa however interpreted article 21.4 of the constitution in such a way that the 
budget had to be approved and come into force within three months after submis-
sion.19 Arguing that he would need another 30 days to consider the budget, Wałęsa 
claimed that the Sejm had exceeded the official time limit. Not surprising, parliament 
disagreed with this reading of the constitution. In response, it rushed through two 
constitutional amendments, one that would allow the Sejm to continue working until 
the next parliament would be sworn in (in case of dismissal), and another limiting the 
30-day period available to the president to consider ‘urgent’ legislation to 7 days (Van 
der Meer-Krok Paszkowska, 2000: 152-153). Moreover, the Sejm issued a statement 
saying that the 1995 budget was adopted in accordance with constitutional require-
ments, and that ‘a dissolution of parliament by the president […] will be considered 
illegal by the Sejm and lead to the president being held constitutionally accountable’ 
(Van der Meer-Krok Paszkowska, 2000: 153-154). One step short of impeachment, 
Wałęsa could but accept the 1995 budget, but not unconditionally. Wałęsa instigated 
a vote of no confidence against Prime Minister Pawlak, which was accepted. He 
moreover agreed with the new premier Oleksy that Wałęsa could unilaterally appoint 
the ministers for the three presidential portfolios (Van der Meer-Krok Paszkowska, 
1999: 185). Although losing some of his powers vis-à-vis parliament, Wałęsa thus 
managed to safeguard his influence in the areas of defence, national security, and for-
eign affairs. 
With the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, the role of the president was fur-
ther limited, and some serious constitutional gaps were filled. The changes intro-
duced in the new constitution were clearly motivated by the past conflicts between 
president Wałęsa, the council of ministers, and parliament. As Jasiewicz (1997: 165) 
                                                 
19  The article reads: “If the budget has not been passed within a period of three months following the 
submission of a draft fulfilling the requirements of budgetary law, the president may dissolve the 
Sejm” (Ludwikowski, 1996: 513). 
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concluded not long before the new constitution was adopted: ‘if the new constitution 
adopts a strong parliamentary system and a weak presidency, Wałęsa will be respon-
sible for it more than anyone else’. Although the Polish president maintained some 
competencies ‘traditionally belonging to a head of state’ (Garlicki, 1997), in an in-
creasing number of policy areas he became dependent upon the Sejm or prime minis-
ter. The 1997 constitution no longer grants the Polish president ‘general supervision’ 
over security, defence, and foreign affairs and for most appointments in these areas, 
countersignature by the prime minister or appropriate minister is required. As com-
pared to the Little Constitution, the president’s duty to ‘safeguard the implementa-
tion of international treaties’ (art. 28.2 of the Little Constitution) was omitted, and 
the requirement for countersignature has been broadened to all acts of the president, 
except for a list of some thirty well defined exceptions (art. 144.3). Moreover, only the 
prime minister can countersign presidential acts, increasing his powers vis-à-vis the 
president.  
It may be tempting to conclude that the transfer of power from President 
Wałęsa to Aleksander Kwaśniewski in November 1995 was the main reason why in-
tra-executive relations during the late 1990s and early 2000s have been much less 
problematic. Lech Wałęsa was an extremely active president with a conception of his 
executive responsibilities that frequently clashed with that of his prime ministers, 
and as one observer concluded, ‘there will be no […] Wałęsism after Wałęsa’ 
(Jasiewicz, 1997: 165). This, however, probably is an exaggeration of Wałęsa’s role 
and an underestimation of the constitutional changes of 1997. Wałęsa was primarily 
interested in realising his political agenda, and he stepped into the window of oppor-
tunity represented by the ambiguities in the pre-1997 constitutions. The new consti-
tution effectively solved these uncertainties, and while Kwaśniewski did not cease to 
challenge his prime ministers, he did so by other means. Thus, Aleksander Kwaś-
niewski refrained from challenging his constitutional limits, and frequently used his 
veto power instead (Protsyk, 2005: 150-151). Intra-executive competition over politi-
cal issues has certainly not ceased to occur in post-1997 Poland, but now takes place 
within a consolidated constitutional framework.   
 
5.4.2 Case study of Hungary 
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Hungary is the only country in ECE where no new constitution has been adopted af-
ter the breakdown of communism. The 1949 Basic Law was substantially amended in 
1989 by the incumbent communist parliament, and evolved further during the 1990s. 
The 1988 roundtable talks between the MSZHP (Hungarian Communist Party) and 
various opposition movements produced a number of important proposals for consti-
tutional change, which were adopted in their entirety by the majority of the commu-
nist parliament (Szikinger, 2001: 405-406; Sajó, 1996). The 1989 amendments intro-
duced human rights protection, an indirectly elected president, a democratically 
elected parliament, and an independent judiciary. Hungary changed its name from 
the Hungarian People’s Republic into the Republic of Hungary, and effectively devel-
oped into ‘a constitutional state implementing a multi-party system, parliamentary 
democracy and social market economy’ (Szikinger, 2001: 412).  
On the basis of the indirect election of the president and his limited veto and 
parliamentary dissolution powers, the Hungarian constitutional framework has been 
defined by Stepan and Skach (1993: 4) as one of the few ‘pure parliamentary’ systems 
in post-communist Europe. Patrick O’Neill (1997: 201) however notes that a form of 
dual executive has emerged in Hungary, mainly due to the ‘lack of clarity regarding 
the presidential powers’, and this observation is emphasised by others as well (cf. 
Paczolay, 1993; Baylis, 1996: 303; Schwartz, 1998: 104). Similar to the Polish situa-
tion, the scope of the president’s executive authority was ill defined in the Hungarian 
constitution and could be traced back to the compromises made during constitutional 
negotiations. O’Neill stipulates that neither the communist party, nor the opposition 
could impose their preferred constitutional design during the roundtable talks. The 
discussions on the powers of the president pitted both parties against one another, 
and fragmented the opposition. The office that resulted was ‘built by piecemeal ar-
rangements rather than clear institutional crafting, […] increasing parliamentary and 
intra-executive conflict in the post-authoritarian period’ (O’Neill, 1997: 201-202). The 
constitutional discussions focused mainly on the method of election of the president, 
which was perceived as the most important matter to be decided, while the presi-
dent’s actual constitutional powers and his relation vis-à-vis the government was of 
little concern to the constitution drafters.   
Ambiguities in constitutional design were most prominent in the president’s 
powers vis-à-vis the council of ministers, especially in the areas of defence and for-
eign affairs. Almost all of the president’s measures require countersignature by a 
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minister (art. 30/A), and his appointment and dismissal powers refer to state secre-
taries, vice presidents of the national bank, and university professors. At the same 
time, however, articles 29 and 30/A of the constitution assign the president the status 
of commander in chief of the armed forces, and a role in ‘expressing the unity of the 
nation’ as well as ‘watching over the democratic functioning of the state structure’ 
(Ludwikowski, 1996: 421-422). The first post-communist president in Hungary, Ar-
pád Göncz, saw especially in these latter stipulations an incentive to test the limits of 
his powers. He repeatedly argued that he was ‘part of the executive power, and 
claimed the right to decide, in consensus with the prime minister, all matters that are 
beyond administrative tasks in the narrow sense’ (Sólyom, 2003: 143).  
The first serious standoff between the president and the council of ministers 
took place in October 1990, following Prime Minister Antall’s announcement to in-
crease the gasoline prices by 65 per cent. This decision triggered massive street pro-
tests, strikes by taxi and truck drivers, and blockades of streets and border crossings 
(Keesing’s, 1990: 37790). As Prime Minister Antall was ill, minister of the interior 
Horvád took responsibility of the situation and threatened with military intervention. 
Göncz interfered in the crisis by ordering that the military remain in their barracks, 
and stated that the army would not intervene. He referred to his status as com-
mander-in-chief of the army, and also made use of his constitutional right to call an 
extraordinary session of parliament in which he called upon the government to annul 
the price increase and start negotiating with the drivers. In the end, the government 
and the drivers reached a compromise, but not before coalition members in parlia-
ment had accused Göncz of having transgressed his authority. Göncz, however, had 
clearly shown his willingness and capacity to interfere in executive matters, and this 
conflict would be the first of several clashes with the governments of Prime Minister 
Antall.  
January 1991, in preparation of the first summit of the Visegrád Group (then 
consisting of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary), saw another conflict over presi-
dential involvement in what the government perceived to be its private turf. Referring 
to his constitutional power to conclude international treaties (as mentioned in article 
30/A-b), president Göncz argued that he should be present at the summit. He felt 
supported in his claim by Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel’s declaration that he 
would meet only with Arpád Göncz (Engelmayer, 2006). For weeks, the cabinet and 
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the ministry of foreign affairs tried to keep Göncz from going to the summit, but in 
the end the government 'grudgingly acquiesced' (O’Neill, 1997: 210).   
The Hungarian constitutional court had an ambiguous role in the settlement of 
conflict over presidential authority. The battle between the president and government 
intensified in April 1991 when the cabinet tried to reshuffle the army command struc-
ture. Göncz showed his discontent with this reform by refusing the resignation of a 
lieutenant general who had accused the defence minister of weakening the president's 
position as commander in chief. The deadlock resulted in a constitutional court deci-
sion stipulating that the president is 'overseer' (and not leader) of the armed forces, 
and that he cannot refuse to countersign government appointments and dismissals, 
unless ‘they disturb the democratic functioning of the state’ (Solyóm, 2003: 143; 
O’Neill, 1997: 211-212). While this decision specified presidential powers in the area 
of defence, Göncz took the latter part of the ruling as a confirmation of his right to 
interfere in executive politics. This was directly noticeable in late 1991 and 1992 when 
the governing coalition tried to increase its influence on what it perceived an increas-
ingly biased state media (Szoboszlai, 1996: 128; Szalai, 1994: 132). Prime minister 
Antall wanted to replace the director of the state-run radio with a pro-government 
candidate, but Göncz interfered. He refused to countersign the dismissal, claiming 
that it endangered the democratic functioning of the system. Again, the government 
turned to the constitutional court, asking for an interpretation of the president’s au-
thority vis-à-vis the government. The court stipulated that the president cannot re-
fuse a nomination or dismissal that is proposed by the prime minister but, again, it 
upheld the president’s right to refuse in case the ‘executive action would seriously 
endanger the democratic operation of the state’ (Szoboszlai, 1996: 129). Both the 
president and the governing coalition interpreted the court ruling as a victory. When 
the cabinet subsequently resubmitted the proposal to dismiss the radio-director, 
Göncz again refused to countersign, referring to its undemocratic character and his 
right to do so according to the new court ruling. In the spring of 1993 the radio and 
television directors eventually stepped down, in spite of Göncz’s continuing refusal to 
countersign their resignations. Herewith, the media conflict disappeared from the 
agenda temporarily, but without a proper settlement of the intra-executive standoff 
(O’Neill, 1997: 213). The issue reappeared in Hungarian politics in late 1994, but now 
with Göncz in an entirely different role. The parliamentary elections earlier that year 
had resulted in a victory for the MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party), while the liberal 
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MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) of former Prime Minister Antall was swept 
away at the polls. Relations between president Göncz and the new Prime Minister 
Gyula Horn were clearly more friendly, not in the least because Horn formed a coali-
tion with Göncz’s original party SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats). As one of its 
first executive acts, the new government proposed directors to national radio and 
television. The opposition suggested that Göncz refuse to countersign the appoint-
ments again, as the new media law aimed at reducing state influence on the media 
was still pending. Göncz however countersigned the appointments, this time appar-
ently less concerned about the democratic functioning of the system.     
Arpád Göncz was re-elected by parliament in 1995 for a new four-year term, 
and Lázló Sólyom succeeded him in 2000. Relations between Hungarian presidents 
and prime ministers never reached the same conflict level as in the early 1990s, indi-
cating a consolidation of intra-executive relations. Although the rulings by the consti-
tutional court did not preclude intra-executive conflicts from occurring, in the long 
run the court’s role in Hungary’s democratic consolidation has been significant 
(Schiemann, 2001: 357; Solyóm, 2003: 142-143). The 1991 ruling on the president’s 
status as commander in chief of the armed forces clearly defined the president’s pow-
ers, and the president never contested this part of the ruling. The confirmation of the 
president’s role in upholding the democratic order in the 1991 and 1992 rulings how-
ever was seized by Göncz to try and maintain influence in the executive. This proved 
to be a final convulsion of a constitutionally weakened president though, and neither 
Göncz nor his successor made use of the right to block executive decisions with refer-
ence to these court rulings.  
 
5.4.3 Consolidation of intra-executive relations 
 
Although different modes of conflict resolution prevailed in Poland and Hungary, the 
stabilisation of constitutional intra-executive relations is undeniable. The levels of 
conflict between presidents and prime ministers of the early 1990s have up till now 
remained unmatched and constitutional provisions related to the executive power 
distribution are no longer openly challenged. The ambiguities of dual executive de-
sign that produced frequent conflicts during the first half of the 1990s have been ef-
fectively removed from the Polish and Hungarian constitutions. Notwithstanding the 
variation in settlement patterns, it can be argued that constitutional development 
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followed a comparable path in Hungary and Poland, namely that of formal constitu-
tional change. Solutions for constitutional ambiguity were sought in changing or 
clarifying the letter of the law. Neither in Poland, nor in Hungary informal solutions 
evolved into durable conventions about the division of power between presidents and 
cabinets as happened, for example, in the French dual executive system. While Lech 
Wałęsa managed several times to expand his competencies in the presidential portfo-
lios, he only briefly maintained that prerogative. In Hungary, every conflict stemming 
from constitutional imprecision was referred to the constitution court for interpreta-
tion. 
Why did formal constitutional change rather than informal settlements of con-
stitutional conflict evolve in both cases? The adoption of a new constitution remained 
on the political agenda in Poland throughout the first half of the 1990s, notwithstand-
ing the difficulties that a fragmented parliament and inter-institutional animosities 
posed for constitutional change (Wyrzykowski, 2001: 435). In light of these inten-
tions, it may not come as a surprise that solutions to perceived defects in the 
amended communist constitution and the Little Constitution were sought in constitu-
tional adaptation and eventually replacement, rather than in informal settlements. 
The strong position of the Hungarian constitutional court vis-à-vis other institutions 
has been mentioned as an explanation for its activist role in Hungarian politics (see 
Schiemann, 2001; Sólyom, 2003). Referring to the court’s authority to rule on the 
constitutionality of practically every law or legal act, and to the absence of a possibil-
ity to appeal or override, Herman Schwartz (1998: 104) even poses that the Hungar-
ian constitutional court ‘appears less like a court and more like a legislative chamber’. 
Hence, the court’s central position in the political system may explain why constitu-
tional review prevailed in the Hungarian case.   
 
5.5 Conclusion and discussion 
            
This chapter investigated the effects of constitutional ambiguity in the area of intra-
executive relations in post-communist Poland and Hungary. Both countries intro-
duced dual executive constitutional designs during the transition period, as did the 
other countries in the ECE region. Such dual executive systems are prone to constitu-
tional conflict, given the difficulty of clearly defining the distribution of authority be-
tween presidents and cabinets. During the first half of the 1990s this constitutional 
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ambiguity triggered frequent conflicts between presidents and prime ministers over 
control of the executive in the two cases under investigation, and similar intra-
executive competition occurred in other countries of ECE (cf. Baylis, 1996, 2007; 
Protsyk, 2005). The most contentious battlefields were defence, national security, 
and foreign affairs, while presidential involvement in the nomination of state officials 
and ministers also proved to be a recurring topic. Even though constitutional stability 
and predictability is important for the functioning of a democratic polity, it was ar-
gued that constitutional contestation not necessarily obstructs democratic consolida-
tion. Experiences with constitutional ambiguity in established democracies such as 
the US and France illustrated that constitutional discussion and settlement through 
court rulings, constitutional change, and the evolution of political conventions may 
contribute to an acceptable interpretation of the constitution.  
Conflict and conflict resolution were also crucial in the interpretation of am-
biguous constitutional arrangements in post-communist Poland and Hungary. The 
consolidation process in both polities proceeded along a formal constitutional path, 
but there were important differences. In the Hungarian case, constitutional court rul-
ings assured a rapid and durable interpretation of ambiguous constitutional provi-
sions. By 1993, intra-executive relations had largely consolidated. In Poland, the con-
solidation process was lengthier and characterised by more intense power struggles. 
Constitutional conflicts initially generated political outcomes and informal settle-
ments, but these did not provide durable solutions to constitutional ambiguity. Con-
stitutional amendments and the eventual adoption of a new constitution in 1997 were 
necessary to stabilise president-prime minister relations in Poland. It remains to be 
seen whether the dynamic first half of the 1990s has settled the discussion over presi-
dential involvement in executive affairs definitively. If that is the case, the ambiguity 
present in these and many other ECE constitutions may have been a child’s disease 
typical of democratic transition that was effectively cured through careful constitu-
tional modification and court rulings. On the other hand, only a brief period has 
passed since constitutional replacement in ECE, especially compared with the experi-
ences of established democracies such as France and the US. Considering that some 
of the ambiguities have not been removed from the ECE constitutions, it is very well 
conceivable that ambitious presidents are stimulated to challenge the now dominant 
interpretation of the rules of the game again.    
AMBIGUITY, CONFLICT AND CHANGE 
 107  
The next chapter will investigate another potential source of constitutional con-
flict that relates to constitutional design in the ECE region. It will analyse the extent 
to which the distributional consequences of constitutions have stimulated politicians 
to engage in constitutional conflict. Specifically, the chapter will examine the power-
concentrating and power-sharing effects of constitutional design related to presiden-
tial powers, executive-legislative relations, as well as legislative electoral systems and 
parliamentary procedures. In addition, the impact of constitutional protection by 
means of constitutional amendment procedures and constitutional review will be in-
vestigated.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Constitutional design and constitutional conflict in post-
communist East Central Europe 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish whether the product of constitution making – 
constitutional design20 – has had an impact on constitutional contestation in the poli-
ties of ECE. The assumption that guides this chapter is that even though conscious 
political actors interpret, apply, contest and modify constitutional rules, actors are 
also bound by these rules. Political actors may be willing to engage in attempts to 
modify the rules of the game, or to alter the way they are interpreted, but their moti-
vations and opportunities to do so successfully are in part shaped by existing rules 
and interpretations thereof. While chapter 5 indicated that constitutional ambiguities 
represent one such opportunity, this chapter turns to the distributional consequences 
of institutions that may trigger political actors to try and alter the institutional status 
quo (cf. Knight, 1992; Lindner and Rittberger, 2003). Constitutional design pro-
foundly affects the extent to which political groups and actors have access to, and can 
realise their goals and preferences in the political arena. It moreover determines the 
balance of power between what were labelled in chapter 1 the pillars of a democratic 
polity – a country’s executive, legislative and judiciary institutions. Therefore, consti-
tutional design is expected to affect politicians’ constitutional acceptance and to con-
stitute a possible incentive for actors to challenge the constitutional status quo.  
Constitutional designs across the ECE region display many parallels, but there 
is also significant cross-national variation. The major similarities lie in the region-
wide adoption of dual executive systems with relatively strong parliaments, presiden-
tial offices, ‘European style’ constitutional review, and primarily PR legislative elec-
toral systems (Zielonka, 1994; Malová and Haughton, 2002; Stone Sweet, 2008). Yet, 
                                                 
20  Constitutional design concerns the overall framework of formal political institutions. It refers to the 
sum of specific institutions related to the functioning of the executive, legislative, and judiciary 
branches of government, as established by the constitution. This conception of constitutional de-
sign is drawn from Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds (2002: 4), who see ‘constitutional design as 
a matrix of institutions’ that ‘interact in complex ways’.      
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the specific distribution of competencies among state institutions varies, and in some 
of the polities under review important shifts in formal inter-institutional relations 
have occurred. This chapter seeks to establish whether this institutional variation and 
change has affected patterns of constitutional conflict across the region. Cross-
national and cross-temporal analyses of constitutional design and conflict will be 
conducted in order to analyse the “conflict-proneness” of particular constitutional 
arrangements. Based on the work by Arend Lijphart and others, power-concentrating 
designs are expected to generate more conflict than constitutions that stimulate 
power sharing among relevant political actors (Lijphart, 1994, 2002; see also Ne-
gretto, 2000). Constitutional protection mechanisms, especially medium stringent 
amendment procedures and constitutional review, are also considered to be condu-
cive to constitutional legitimacy (Negretto, 2008; Rasch and Congleton, 2006). With 
its focus on constitutional design, this chapter aims to contribute not only to our un-
derstanding of the cross-time and cross-national variation in constitutional conflict in 
ECE, but also to theoretical development on the consequences of constitutional de-
sign.  
The chapter focuses on five elements of constitutional design. First, it will as-
sess whether the degree of constitutional rigidity matters for the occurrence and level 
of constitutional conflict. Constitutional rigidity is often associated with ‘previous 
commitments by political forces to entrench […] legislation’, but a too rigid constitu-
tion may also ignite ‘change by other means’ (Rasch, 2008: 6-7, see also Rasch and 
Congleton, 2006; Lorenz, 2008; Negretto, 2008). Based on this presumption, strin-
gent amendment procedures are expected to ignite constitutional conflict as they 
limit the potential to change the constitution through regular amendment proce-
dures. Instead, political actors are stimulated to bicker about competing interpreta-
tions of constitutional competencies and relations in the political arena. Very flexible 
constitutions, on the other hand, are also believed to be conflict prone as they may 
enable constitutional changes that lack widespread support. The analysis finds evi-
dence for these hypotheses; high levels of constitutional conflict surrounded both the 
most flexible and the most rigid constitutions of the polities under review. The sec-
ond dimension that will be analysed is constitutional adjudication, as represented by 
the strength and activism of constitutional review bodies. Constitutional adjudication 
is hypothesised to contribute to constitutional stability, as it allows for adapting the 
constitutional order without changing the actual text of the Basic Law (Voigt, 1999; 
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Rasch, 2008; Stone Sweet, 2002). Yet, cross-national comparison indicates that 
strong and active constitutional review bodies also run the risk of being perceived as 
a threat by other institutional actors, notably executives.  
The chapter subsequently turns to the power-sharing or power-concentrating 
character of constitutional design related to presidential powers, institutionalisation 
of parliaments, and executive-legislative relations. There is considerable cross-
national variation on each constitutional dimension, and some important modifica-
tions in the institutional frameworks of ECE have occurred. The evidence that differ-
ences and developments in constitutional design can be linked to constitutional con-
flict is, however, mixed. Most presidents in the ECE region were granted compara-
tively limited constitutional powers, and – with the exception of Slovakia – nowhere 
were presidential powers expanded. This is taken as an indicator of power-sharing 
constitutional design. The pattern of contestation indicates that many ECE presidents 
have attempted to broaden their constitutional power base, most frequently in areas 
of foreign policy and defence, and appointment powers. This reflects the findings of 
chapters 4 and 5, which showed that constitutional ambiguity in these areas provided 
an important source of intra-executive struggles. Parliamentary fragmentation and 
disproportionality of electoral systems are taken as possibly undermining parliamen-
tary institutionalisation, or the degree of consensus among political elites about the 
institutional rules regulating parliaments (cf. Kopecký, 2001a). Low degrees of par-
liamentary fragmentation and high electoral system disproportionality are considered 
indicative of power-concentrating institutional design, and therefore expected to con-
tribute to constitutional conflict. However, the analysis shows that the occurrence of 
constitutional conflicts related to the internal organisation of parliaments and to 
rules regulating access to parliaments cannot be linked to these institutional vari-
ables. The final constitutional dimension that will be investigated is the constitutional 
balance between legislature and executive. Executive-legislative relations in the ECE 
region developed from legislative dominance in the early post-communist period to a 
more balanced situation towards the end of the 1990s (Kopecký, 2004; Zubek, 2001). 
Although constitutionally, parliaments are still dominant in the ECE polities, execu-
tives are now far better organised and have become more efficient in gaining parlia-
mentary support for legislation and policies. This evolution from power-
concentration in the legislature to a diffusion of power has not been uncontested, as 
the patterns of constitutional conflict indicate. Yet, the evidence is again mixed. Both 
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in countries where executives were constitutionally weak vis-à-vis parliaments and 
where they initially had a stronger position, executive-legislative relations proved to 
be a contentious issue.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 1 discusses important theories on 
constitutional design and its implications for political stability and democratisation. 
This brief discussion constitutes the theoretical starting point of the chapter, and 
formulates general hypotheses on the effects of constitutional design on constitu-
tional conflict. Section 2 investigates constitutional amendment procedures in the 
post-communist ECE region, and analyses the relation between a newly developed 
index of constitutional rigidity and levels of conflict. Section 3 focuses on constitu-
tional adjudication. Section 4 continues with the presidential power dimension, and 
investigates contestation over 9 presidential powers and changes therein. Section 5 
turns to the parliamentary dimension and assesses whether constitutional design has 
affected conflicts over electoral systems and internal parliamentary procedures. Sec-
tion 6 focuses on conflict over constitutional executive-legislative relations in the ECE 
region. Section 7 concludes and discusses the findings of this chapter in light of their 
implications for existing theories on constitutional design.   
 
6.2 Constitutional design, stability and conflict 
 
The conviction that the institutions may determine the stability of a democratic po-
litical system can be traced back as far as Montesquieu’s ideas on the separation of 
powers and Madison’s contributions to the Constitutional Convention. More recently, 
the notion that “institutions matter” has regained its position at the centre of political 
science and democratisation studies since the Third Wave of democratisation set off 
in the early 1970s. Stimulated by a near democratic revolution and a multitude of 
constitution-making processes, yet puzzled by the varying historical and regional con-
texts in which these new democratic regimes emerged as well as their varying success, 
scholars have turned to constitutional design in order to explain democratisation. 
Constitutional issues that have received particularly much scholarly attention are the 
choice between presidential and parliamentary regimes, the type of electoral systems, 
and federalism versus unitarism (Lijphart, 1991, 1994; Linz, 1991, 1994; Shugart and 
Carey, 1992; Reynolds, 1995, 2002). Among the multitude of studies that emphasise 
the importance of constitutional design, many recognise that it is in particular the 
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distributional consequences of institutions that may crucially influence democratic 
survival (Knight, 1992; Przeworski, 1991).   
Perhaps the best-known scholar who urges the significance of constitutional 
design for democratic stability is Arend Lijphart. In numerous articles and books he 
has investigated which institutions are most conducive to consensual political conflict 
management. Referring especially to culturally diverse and otherwise ‘divided socie-
ties’, Lijphart argues in favour of power-sharing constitutional designs and group 
autonomy (Lijphart, 1994, 1999, 2002). Power-sharing rather than power-
concentrating institutions are believed to generate more legitimacy among elites and 
citizens, primarily because they enable more groups and actors to exert influence on 
political processes and decision-making. In particular, proportional representation 
rather than majoritarian electoral systems, parliamentarism instead of presidential-
ism or semi-presidentialism, and federalism rather than unitarism are considered 
optimal ‘power-sharing rules and institutions’ for divided societies (1994: 96).  
The power-sharing nature of particular institutions is also recognised by con-
stitutional theorists more directly concerned with the issues of constitutional stability 
and legitimacy. They, too, are interested in how carefully crafted constitutional design 
can contribute to democratisation, and their work offers specific insights into the 
mechanisms that link institutions and actor behaviour. These studies may therefore 
provide clues as to how and which constitutional designs may bring about constitu-
tional change and conflict. Gabriel Negretto, for example, states that ‘institutions that 
diffuse power, such as separate elections, bicameralism, executive veto, or federalism, 
may have a positive effect on the survival of constitutions because they deprive rele-
vant political actors of the motives to change existing arrangements’ (2008: 9). Two 
mechanisms are underlying this relation between institutional power sharing and 
constitutional durability. In the first place, there is the importance of a constitution’s 
distributive consequences and legitimacy. Political actors who perceive the existing 
institutional framework as conducive to their interests, or at least not overly biased 
towards their political rivals, will be less inclined to contest the constitutional status 
quo and to strife for changes therein. Highly disproportional electoral systems may, 
for example, induce the idea among political parties or groups in society that they are 
excluded from the polity as a result of the institutional framework. Therefore, power-
sharing institutions ‘should obtain relatively high endogenous support and, as a con-
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sequence, they should have greater longevity than exclusive or simple institutions 
favouring the concentration of power’ (Colomer, cited in Negretto, 2008: 9-10).  
The second mechanism that connects constitutional design and constitutional 
stability is related to the opportunities that particular institutions provide for chang-
ing the constitution. In particular, strict constitutional amendment procedures and 
constitutional adjudication are considered conducive to constitutional stability as 
they introduce hurdles, or take away incentives, for changing the constitution (Ne-
gretto, 2008: 9; Rasch, 2008; Pasquino, 1998, see also Lijphart, 1999: 216-231). Con-
stitutional rigidity is often preferred over flexible amendment procedures as it pro-
tects the constitution as a “higher order law” against short-term interests of political 
actors. Judicial review by a constitutional review body, by contrast, is intended to fa-
cilitate the translation of changes in society or politics into the constitutional order 
without actually changing the wording of the constitution. Yet, there are also limits to 
the extent to which these forms of constitutional protection contribute to the stability 
and legitimacy of the Basic Law. Negretto points out that ‘stringent amendment rule 
may provide incentives for bypassing the procedure and simply replacing the consti-
tution’ (2008: 11). In other words, if widespread support exists for amending the con-
stitution but the necessary majority cannot be mobilised, political actors may con-
sider constitutional adaptation by non-constitutional means, such as transgression of 
constitutional norms or even violence. Amendment procedures may therefore have a 
profound effect on constitutional legitimacy and stability, and hence on democratic 
consolidation. The impact of constitutional interpretation by a constitutional review 
body is dependent upon its competencies and activity. If its power is restricted, be-
cause its decisions do not have general effects or can be reversed by other institu-
tions, this body’s impact on constitutional stability is limited (Negretto, 2008: 12). On 
the other hand, constitutional adjudication may also become a political tool, to the 
extent that it is being used to block policy initiatives (Stone Sweet, 2008: 237-238). 
Therefore, there is a risk that strong and active courts may become subject to criti-
cism for being politically biased.    
How do these constitutional recommendations relate to constitutional conflict, 
and to what extent can their assumed effects be corroborated by the developments in 
post-communist ECE? Lijphart’s assumptions about the consequences of constitu-
tional design for democratic stability and legitimacy can almost directly be translated 
into expectations about the occurrence of constitutional conflict as a result of particu-
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lar constitutional designs. As was argued in chapters 2 and 5, constitutional conflict 
originates from a lack of legitimacy of the constitution and the institutional frame-
work it establishes. Therefore, power-sharing institutions are expected to generate 
higher levels of constitutional legitimacy, which in turn reduces the likelihood of con-
stitutional conflict. Power-concentrating designs, on the other hand, are believed to 
run a greater risk of being challenged by political actors, due to (perceived) unequal 
distributional effects. Specifically, power-concentration in the presidential office, 
constitutional imbalance in executive-legislative relations, disproportionality of elec-
toral systems and low parliamentary fragmentation are expected to ignite constitu-
tional conflict. Constitutional protection – through strict amendment procedures and 
constitutional adjudication – is expected to contribute to constitutional legitimacy, 
but only in case the amendment procedures are not too strict and if the constitutional 
review body is invested with sufficient powers.  
The following sections investigate whether these expectations hold in the ECE 
region. First, the impact of constitutional amendment procedures and constitutional 
review on the occurrence of constitutional conflict in general, and conflicts pertaining 
to the role of constitutional review bodies in particular, will be analysed. Then, the 
analysis turns to three concrete institutional areas that have been subject to constitu-
tional conflict in ECE: presidential powers, executive-legislative relations, and par-
liamentary institutionalisation.  
 
6.3 Constitutional amendment procedures  
 
Constitutional amendment procedures represent an important element of a country’s 
legal-institutional set-up, potentially influencing political stability and prospects for 
constitutional change (Anckar and Karvonen 2002; Lorenz 2005). The ease with 
which a constitution can be changed as well as by whom and how tells much about 
the balance of power among political actors and the influence of citizens in a particu-
lar polity. Three key determinants of constitutional rigidity can be distinguished: the 
distribution of the right to initiate amendments, the type of majority needed for 
amendments to be approved, and involvement of citizens in approving amendments 
before enactment.  
Although most measures of constitutional rigidity do not explicitly take the al-
location of initiative rights into account (see Lijphart, 1999; Lorenz, 2005; but Lutz, 
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1994 and Rasch, 2008), the amount and type of actors that may propose constitu-
tional amendments matters for the potential for change. Proposal rights constitute a 
form of positive agenda-setting power, which refers to ‘the authority to propose 
changes to the status quo and to ensure that these proposals are brought onto the 
agenda for consideration’ (Rasch, 2008: 15). The more dispersed this agenda-setting 
power, the lower the threshold for constitutional change. Stipulations regarding the 
initiation of changes to the constitution vary little among the ten ECE cases. Accord-
ing to most constitutions, only deputies and the president may propose constitutional 
law. In some of the countries under review citizens also possesses the right to initiate 
constitutional amendments. In Latvia, for example, 10 percent of the electorate may 
submit draft amendments to the president, who then presents them for consideration 
to the Saeima (Latvian parliament) (art. 78 of the constitution of Latvia). Such citi-
zens’ initiatives are also available in Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slo-
venia. In these cases a valid citizens’ initiative requires between 4 and 8 percent of 
the electorate (Ludwikowski, 1996).  
The next dimension of constitutional rigidity refers to the majority in parlia-
ment needed for passing changes in the constitution, and possible additional re-
quirements to the voting procedure. This dimension of constitutional rigidity is the 
most visible and in some existing indices the only criterion that scholars take into 
account (cf. Lijphart, 1999: 218-223). Within the set of possible majorities, a distinc-
tion can be made between simple majorities, qualified majorities and supermajorities 
(Lijphart, 1999: 219). Simple majorities are 50 percent plus one vote, supermajorities 
are majorities higher than two-thirds, and qualified majorities consist of majorities 
higher than a simple majority but lower than or equal to two-thirds. Secondly, it is 
possible to distinguish between approval procedures where the attendance of all 
members of parliament is required and those where a lower quorum suffices. A third 
element of this dimension consists of additional procedural requirements, such as 
consecutive rounds of voting, dissolution of parliament between two ballots, and ap-
proval by a second chamber. Majority requirements and additional criteria for par-
liamentary approval differ substantially in the ten countries under review. The strict-
est requirements can be found in Bulgaria, where three-quarters of all members of 
the assembly must confirm changes to the constitution in three different votes, held 
on different days (art. 155 of the Bulgarian constitution). The 1992 Polish Little Con-
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stitution21 established the least stringent voting procedures: approval by two-thirds of 
half of the members of the Polish Sejm was required for passing constitutional law 
(art. 106 of the Polish Constitutional Act of 1992). In most ECE countries approval of 
constitutional amendments require a qualified majority and one additional require-
ment such as full attendance or endorsement in a consecutive voting round.  
The third dimension of constitutional rigidity relates to popular involvement in 
constitutional reform processes, as represented by the availability and impact of ref-
erendums. If initiative rights constitute the first hurdle for constitutional amend-
ment, referendums are a final threshold for change. The organisation of referendums 
is a possible way to enhance the legitimacy of proposed constitutional changes, while 
plebiscites also represent ‘additional barriers to constitutional change’ (Lorenz, 2005: 
344). There is a complex variation of provisions related to the organisation of consti-
tutional referendums in the ECE polities. Yet, where referendums are available, they 
are always confirmative. Romania is the only country where a confirmative referen-
dum is compulsory for every amendment to the constitution, which represents the 
highest hurdle for constitutional change. According to the constitution of Slovenia, a 
referendum is optional in all cases of constitutional change and can be requested for 
by a share of deputies. The Estonian constitution requires that proposals for changing 
the General Provisions and the amendment procedures be confirmed by a referen-
dum, while for amendments to other provisions confirmation by the citizenry is op-
tional. In Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland after 1997, referendums are compul-
sory for changing chapters of the constitution that relate to national sovereignty, fun-
damental rights and freedoms and constitutional amendment procedures. Cases 
where referendums are optional (i.e., Estonia and Slovenia) can be considered equally 
rigid as where referendums are required for some articles. The constitutions of Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1992) do not provide for referen-
dums, but this is compensated for by the possibility of popular involvement in the 
initiation stage.  
Table 6.1 provides an overview of the dimensions of constitutional rigidity in 
the ECE countries and presents an index of constitutional rigidity. The rigidity index 
                                                 
21  The 1992 Little Constitution is included in this chapter as a separate constitution, as it differed 
substantially from the 1997 new constitution. Similarly, the analysis of presidential powers (section 
6.5) involves two Slovak and two Czech constitutions, even if no new documents were adopted. Yet, 
the introduction of direct presidential elections in Slovakia (in 1999) and the removal of appoint-
ment powers in the Czech Republic (in 2000) changed the constitutional design on the presidential 
dimension.    
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was constructed by adding the scores attributed to each country on the basis of its 
amendment procedures as found in the constitutions. The possible scores on each 
dimension are laid out in the note below Table 6.1, and the constitutional articles on 
the basis of which scoring decisions were made can be found in appendix A3. The in-
dex considers the three dimensions as equally important for the potential for consti-
tutional change in a particular country, and also takes into account possible addi-
tional requirements to the amendment procedure, such as a minimal turnout in ref-
erendums or full attendance of parliament in constitutional votes. Theoretically, 8.5 
is the highest possible score, representing the most rigid constitution. This score 
would be attributed in case initiative is restricted to the legislature and/or president, 
a supermajority with full attendance, approval by a second chamber, consecutive 
votes and intermediate elections is required, and a referendum for any type of 
amendment is obligatory. The most flexible constitution possible would score 1.5, but 
is also unlikely to exist in reality. In that case the assembly, the executive and citizens 
share the right of initiative, amendments require a simple majority without additional 
requirements to the legislative vote, and no referendum is needed.   
The constitutional rigidity scores of the 11 constitutions included in this analy-
sis range from 3 for the 1992 Constitutional Act of Poland to 5 for the constitutions of 
Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania. Five constitutions lean towards the higher end of 
the rigidity index, namely Estonia, Latvia, Poland 1997, Slovakia and Slovenia (all 
score 4.5). Those of the Czech Republic and Hungary end up in the middle category 
with scores of respectively 4 and 3.5. A correlational validity test (Pennings, Keman, 
Kleinnijenhuis, 1999: 86) of the rigidity index developed here against the Lijphart-
based index of constitutional flexibility of the Comparative Political Dataset II (CPDS 
II, Armingeon and Careja, 2004) confirmed correspondence between these indices.22  
                                                 
22  The Spearman’s Rho correlation between the Rigidity Index developed here, and the CPDS II Index 
of Constitutional Flexibility (which actually measures the difficulty of amendment) is 0.743, and is 
significant at the 0.01 level. The CPDS II index is based on Lijphart’s measure of constitutional ri-
gidity (1999: 218-221), but also considers additional requirements to the parliamentary vote. There 
are some cases of disagreement, but the overall ranking is sufficiently corresponding. The dis-
agreement can largely be attributed to the fact that the rigidity index developed here contains a 
separate dimension related to referendums. This explains why a number of countries score rela-
tively high in comparison with the CPDS II index. Appendix D contains a comparison of the rank-
ings of the ten ECE countries according to the CPDS II index and the index of constitutional rigidity 
developed here. 
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To what extent can the level of constitutional rigidity be linked to the occurrence of 
constitutional conflict in the ECE countries? As was argued in section 6.2, constitu-
tional rigidity is commonly associated with constitutional stability, but too stringent 
amendment procedures may provoke attempts to change the constitution by non-
constitutional means. A very flexible constitution was also expected to be more likely 
to generate conflict, as amendments supported by a small majority may reduce the 
legitimacy of the constitution. Hence, the expectation was formulated that both in 
systems with rigid and in systems with flexible constitutions, the likelihood of consti-
tutional conflict would be highest. In cases where it is not too easy, nor too difficult to 
amend the constitution, the Basic Law was expected to carry most legitimacy, and the 
levels of conflict to be low.  
Table 6.1: Constitutional rigidity and constitutional conflict  
Country Year Initiative Majority Referendum Rigidity Index 
Score 
Conflicts 
Bulgaria  1991 2 3 0 5 25 
Czech Rep. 1993 2 2 0 4 10 
Estonia  1992 2 1.5 1 4.5 9 
Hungary  1949 2 1.5 0 3.5 13 
Latvia  1922 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 13 
Lithuania  1992 1.5 2 1.5 5 15 
Poland 1992 2 1 0 3 16 
Poland  1997 2 1.5 1 4.5 4 
Romania  1991 1.5 1.5 2 5 8 
Slovakia  1992 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 29 
Slovenia  1991 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 10 
Notes: The rigidity index is the sum of scores on three dimensions. The scores are based 
on the following coding rules.  
Initiative: With whom lies the right to initiate constitutional amendments? 2 if right to 
initiate amendments lies with assembly (parliament and/or senate) and/or executive 
(president and/or government), 1.5 if next to the assembly and/or the executive, citizens 
may initiate constitutional amendments.  
Majority: Required majority for approvals of constitutional changes. 2 in case of a su-
permajority (>.66); 1 in case of a qualified majority (≤ 0.66 ≥ 0.51), and 0 in case of a 
simple majority (0.51). 0.5 is added if attendance of all parliamentarians is required, and 
for each additional barrier (intermediate elections, approval by second chamber, con-
secutive rounds of voting). 
Referendum: What role do referendums play? 2 if compulsory for all chapters, 1 if 
compulsory for some chapters, or optional (on initiative of assembly), 0.5 is added in 
case the required majority is ≥ 66% or in case the required turnout is ≥ 51%.  
See appendix A3 for the constitutional articles on which the coding is based.   
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The relation of constitutional rigidity with the level of conflict in the ECE coun-
tries was analysed by means of curve estimation. Figure 6.1 indicates that a linear 
relation between constitutional rigidity and the level of constitutional conflict is ab-
sent. The cubic R curve, however, indicates that both flexible and rigid constitutions 
tend to be subject to constitutional conflict more than constitutions with levels of ri-
gidity in between. Thus, the flexible constitution of Poland (1992) was frequently 
challenged, but the rigid constitutions of Bulgaria, Slovakia and Lithuania were also 
often subject to debate. Although the u-curve is relatively flat, it provides some sup-
port for the hypothesis that medium levels of rigidity present a better guarantee for 
constitutional legitimacy. This is most clearly represented by the Czech constitution, 
which given its position on the u-curve cannot be amended too easily, but allows for 
modifications if they carry widespread support. Under these circumstances, illegiti-
mate constitutional changes by small majorities are impossible, and political actors 
do not have to resort to unconstitutional means to challenge the constitutional status 
quo. Further investigation of these findings is needed, for example by taking into ac-
count actual amendment rates, but they do suggest that medium rigid constitutions 
are best capable of providing a balance between legitimacy and stability.    
 
Figure 6.1: Curve estimation constitutional rigidity/constitutional conflict 
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6.4 Structures and patterns of constitutional review 
 
With the “constitutional revolution” of the early 1990s, independent constitutional 
review bodies were established almost region-wide to enforce the new basic laws. The 
Estonian constitutional review system is the exception to the otherwise uniform in-
troduction of ‘European constitutional review’ (Stone Sweet, 2008: 222) in the re-
gion. Estonia adopted the American model of judicial review, in which the judiciary 
itself performs constitutional review, although it is centralised into the Constitutional 
Review Chamber of the Supreme Court (Pettai, 2000). In all other countries central-
ised constitutional courts are endowed with constitutional review authority, and they 
are ‘formally detached from the judiciary’ (Schwartz, 1998: 224). Most of the consti-
tutional courts in ECE possess considerable powers. This is reflected in their author-
ity to rule on constitutional challenges to existing laws brought before the court by a 
wide variety of private and political actors, and the authority to rule on constitutional 
disputes between state institutions. This latter task is especially relevant for the cur-
rent analysis, as constitutional courts have frequently been asked to rule on inter-
institutional disputes related to constitutional interpretation and application.            
ECE constitutional review bodies have been involved in constitutional conflict 
in two different, but related, ways. In the first place, courts in all countries have pro-
vided interpretations and rulings in cases regarding conflict between state institu-
tions. As outlined in chapter 6, several decisions by the Hungarian constitutional 
court contributed to the resolution of ambiguities on the intra-executive distribution 
of power. Across the region, constitutional courts have frequently been asked to rule 
on similar cases of inter-institutional conflict. In their comparative analysis of judicial 
activism in post-communist Europe, Smithey and Ishiyama indeed find that ‘cases 
regarding the structure and operation of the political system were most prevalent for 
most of the countries’ (2002: 723). In the second place, courts have also been en-
gaged in constitutional conflict when their own role and powers became a subject of 
discussion. Chapter 3 pointed out that although such challenges to the judiciary were 
rare in comparison to other types of constitutional conflict, they occurred in half of 
the countries included in this study and represent a significant conflict category in 
terms of impact on inter-institutional relations. This type of constitutional conflicts 
can therefore be interpreted as a serious challenge to the independence of constitu-
tional review bodies.  
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To what extent can these challenges to ECE constitutional courts be explained 
by their strength and their engagement in constitutional conflicts? Besides the formal 
competencies as established by the constitution, analysts of constitutional review of-
ten point to the importance of court activism in terms of the number of cases in a 
given period and the significance of these cases (see Lijphart, 1999; Smithey and Ishi-
yama, 2003). As Smithey and Ishiyama state, ‘a court that seldom makes decisions 
has fewer opportunities to influence the course of public policy than does a more ac-
tive bench’ (2002: 720). To establish the role of constitutional review bodies in ECE, 
it is therefore important to focus both on their constitutional powers and on constitu-
tional review activity, which is reflected in the share of constitutional conflicts that 
was referred to a constitutional review body. Table 6.2 presents an overview of the 
formal powers of constitutional courts in ECE based on an index of constitutional 
court veto powers in ECE developed by Müller-Rommel, Harfst and Schultze (2008: 
679-682)23, and the percentage of constitutional conflicts that was referred for review 
in each of the countries. In addition, the table presents the number of constitutional 
conflicts in which the c the powers and position of constitutional review bodies were 
challenged.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23  Müller-Rommel, Harfst and Schultze distinguish between lower order and higher order competen-
cies of constitutional courts. The main powers they take into account in their index are the power to 
rule on individual and popular constitutional complaints, the right to interpret the constitution, 
and the right of own initiatives.  
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Table 6.2: Constitutional review bodies and conflict  
Country Constitutional review body  
CRB power 
index 
CRB 
involve-
ment 
CRB 
chal-
lenges 
Bulgaria Constitutional Court 0.5 .44 4 
Czech Republic Constitutional Court 0.4 .10 - 
Estonia 
Constitutional Review Chamber 
of the Supreme Court  0.2 .22 - 
Hungary Constitutional Court 1.0 .54 1 
Latvia Constitutional Court 0.1 .15 2 
Lithuania Constitutional Court 0.3 .33 1 
Poland 1993 – 1997 Constitutional Tribunal 0.3 .31 - 
Poland 1997 – 2005  Constitutional Tribunal 0.7 .00 - 
Romania Constitutional Court 0.4 .25 - 
Slovakia Constitutional Court 0.7 .34 2 
Slovenia Constitutional Court 0.6 .40 - 
All cases (mean) - 0.47 .28 0.91 
Note: CRB = Constitutional review body. CRB body index is based on Müller-Rommel, Harfst 
and Schultze (2008), CRB involvement represents the percentage of constitutional conflicts in 
which CRB’s have been asked to rule, CRB challenges indicates whether there have been con-
stitutional conflicts in which the powers of the CRB itself were challenged, and between 
brackets the number of such conflicts.   
 
In line with Smithey and Ishiyama’s assertion, a relationship seems to exist between 
the formal powers of ECE courts and their activism in terms of involvement in consti-
tutional conflicts. The Hungarian court is the most powerful review body in the re-
gion, and it has been involved in no less than 54 percent of all conflicts reported for 
the Hungarian case. The characterisation of the Hungarian court as an important ac-
tor in post-communist politics and democratic consolidation is reflected in this pat-
tern (cf. Solyóm, 2003: 142; Schiemann, 2001: 357). The relatively powerful Slovak, 
Slovenian and Bulgarian courts display similar levels of engagement; each was in-
volved in at least one-third of the constitutional conflicts. Medium-strong courts – 
such as those in Lithuania, Poland 1993, and Romania – have been asked to rule in 
one-fourth to one-third of the conflicts, and only around 10 percent of conflicts were 
referred to the weaker bodies of Estonia and Latvia. The Polish Constitutional Tribu-
nal was granted considerable veto powers in the new 1997 constitution, and its deci-
sions were henceforth universally binding and final (Schwartz, 1998: 103). The Tri-
bunal has, however, not been involved in any constitutional conflict in the period 
1997-2005. This may be attributed mainly to the time frame, as following the adop-
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tion of the 1997 constitution, only four constitutional conflicts occurred. The relation-
ship between the strength and activity of constitutional review bodies that follows 
from these figures may seem obvious, but it is interesting as it indicates a commit-
ment in the ECE region to seek formal solutions to constitutional conflict. Around 30 
percent of all constitutional conflicts were settled through interpretation by constitu-
tional review bodies, which was characterised in chapter 5 as a form of formal consti-
tutional change. The central position of the Hungarian constitutional court is thus 
reflected in the role review bodies played in most other countries in the region.  
 In section 6.1, the expectation was formulated that powerful and active consti-
tutional courts may be perceived as a threat to other institutional actors, providing 
them with an incentive to challenge the review bodies. This can be partly corrobo-
rated by the data on conflicts involving the position of constitutional review bodies in 
ECE. Among the most influential courts in the region – combining strength and ac-
tivism – those of Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia were, indeed, challenged. As out-
lined in chapter 3, these confrontations concerned attempts to curtail the formal 
competencies of courts as well as more indirect ways to hinder court activities, for 
example by budget cuts or public criticism. An exception is the Slovenian constitu-
tional court. Its powers are relatively broad and it has been active in a large share of 
constitutional conflicts, but its role has never been subject to political discussion. 
This indicates not only a commitment of Slovenian elites to formal constitutional 
conflict settlement, but also to the independence of the judiciary. Courts that fall into 
the lower and mid-level categories of strength and activism (Romania, Estonia, and 
Poland 1992) have not been challenged either, which can be interpreted as a confir-
mation of the hypothesis. Inconsistent with this pattern is that the Latvian court has 
been subject to discussion twice, in spite of its weak powers and comparatively low 
level of activism. Interestingly, both conflicts concerned attempts to alter the consti-
tutional position of the court. In 1995, a new “Law on the Constitutional Court”, 
which would have made its decisions immutable, was amended during the adoption 
process in order to maintain legislative dominance.24 Four years later, the Minister of 
Justice Valdis Birkavs proposed to abolish the court as its workload was perceived too 
light, but this was successfully prevented after lobbying by court chairman Endzins.25 
This suggests that the initial uncertainty about how the Latvian constitutional court 
                                                 
24  See conflict LV6 in appendix A. 
25  See conflict LV11 in appendix A. 
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would develop inspired the legislature to curtail the court’s powers, while it was 
deemed superfluous once the role of the court had become clear.       
 
6.5 The powers and position of presidents  
 
The presidents of post-communist ECE play an important role in the dual executive 
systems of the region, as they ‘have been provided with somewhat greater powers or 
roles than in traditional parliamentary republics’ (Linz, 1997:5). The basis for this 
central position lies in both formal and informal factors. While the presidents of Bul-
garia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia (after 1999) and Slovenia can refer to their popular 
mandate provided by direct elections, many others enjoy considerable prestige on the 
basis of their personality and former dissident status (cf. Baylis, 2006; Linz, 1997). 
These various sources of power can be considered as the “toolkit” available to presi-
dents, which they have used to exert direct influence on political processes, or to 
stretch their formal competencies. As was shown in chapters 3 and 5, such attempts 
frequently provoked clashes over executive dominance between presidents and cabi-
nets in basically all countries under review. At first sight, therefore, the constitutional 
prerogatives of presidents in the region seem not to have had a decisive influence on 
the occurrence of presidential conflicts. Yet, levels of conflict varied across countries 
and time, and there is considerable cross-national and cross-time variation in terms 
of the specific competencies attributed to presidents. Therefore, this section will in-
vestigate whether the allocation and change of presidential prerogatives has affected 
constitutional conflict development in the ECE. Specifically, it will be analysed 
whether power-concentration in the presidential office has ignited conflict over con-
stitutional relations between presidents on the one hand, and governments and legis-
latures on the other.   
In order to assess whether the constitutional powers available to presidents 
can be linked to constitutional conflict, it is first necessary to compare the different 
constitutional designs in the region. Various comparative studies of presidential pow-
ers are available that enable such an analysis. The parsimonious list of 9 presidential 
powers developed by Siaroff (2003) will be applied here. Several reasons account for 
the choice of this index rather than, for example, the more encompassing overviews 
of presidential prerogatives by Frye (1997) and Hellman (1996) or a classification ap-
proach. Siaroff focuses on the absence or presence of specific constitutional powers, 
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which makes this index particularly applicable to the current analysis. It makes the 
index more attractive than both a classification into parliamentary, presidential and 
semi-presidential systems or scale measurement, on the basis of which comparison 
across different polities is often difficult and dependent upon the researcher’s as-
sessment of ‘relational aspects’ (cf. Elgie, 1999). Thereby, Siaroff’s list of competen-
cies captures presidential powers vis-à-vis other institutional actors, primarily the 
legislature and government. Specifically, the competencies AP (appointment powers), 
CM (chairing of cabinet meetings), FP (central role in foreign policy and defence) 
concern the president’s relation vis-à-vis the executive, while VT (right of veto) and 
DL (dissolution of the legislature) determine his powers in relation to parliament (Si-
aroff, 2003: 303-305). Based on these inter-institutional relations, the power-sharing 
or power-concentrating character of constitutional design related to presidential 
powers can be determined. One potential point of criticism against Siaroff’s index is 
that it treats all different competencies as equally important. Arguably, discretionary 
appointment powers or a central role in foreign policy cannot be equated with the 
more ceremonial role of chairing cabinet meetings. Therefore, the analysis will focus 
as much as possible on the different constitutional powers separately rather than in 
conjunction as an indicator of total presidential strength.     
The shaded columns in Table 6.3 indicate the strength of ECE presidents on 
the basis of the 9 components of Siaroff’s index of presidential power. A first observa-
tion that can be made is that presidential powers have changed in 3 of the countries 
under review. In Poland and the Czech Republic the position of the president weak-
ened with these changes, while with the introduction of direct elections in 1999 the 
Slovak presidency was strengthened. Furthermore, it follows from this overview that 
most presidents in the region were allotted relatively few constitutional competen-
cies. Most constitutions assign the president three or less of the available preroga-
tives, while in 3 constitutions the president is granted formal authority in 5 or more 
areas (Lithuania, Poland 1992, and Romania). Most ECE presidents possess the right 
to veto legislation, and return it for consideration to parliament (available in 10 con-
stitutions). Yet, all ECE parliaments can override a presidential veto by a simple ma-
jority (Armingeon and Careja, 2004), which reduces the impact of this prerogative to 
a large extent. In 7 countries the president is (by now) directly elected, which pro-
vides the head of state with a possibly important popular mandate. Discretionary ap-
pointment powers of key actors such as ministers or high-ranking officials within 
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ministries and other organisations are also quite common across the 13 constitutions. 
Six constitutions assign the president such powers, yet in all cases this is on the basis 
of countersignature (Ludwikowski, 1996). The same goes for the two presidents who 
are granted a central role in foreign policy and defence (Poland 1992 and Lithuania); 
co-ordination with the cabinet is required, although the Polish Little Constitution was 
notable for being unclear on the conditions for countersignature (see chapter 5). 
None of the ECE presidents possesses the right to dissolve parliament, but in a com-
parative perspective this is a power rarely granted to presidents anyway (Siaroff, 
2003: 297-303).  
The general picture that emerges from this overview is that power-sharing 
constitutional design is more common in the post-communist region than power-
concentration in the presidential office. ECE presidents are constitutionally not very 
powerful in their relations with the cabinet of ministers and the legislature, as repre-
sented by their limited veto power and executive prerogatives. In Poland and the 
Czech Republic, moreover, these competencies were even further curtailed in the 
1990s. How, then, should the frequent constitutional conflicts about presidential 
powers across the region be understood? Which specific powers have been subject to 
contestation, and to what extent does the allocation of powers in individual countries 
say anything about the level and type of conflict?   
 
Table 6.3: Presidential powers and constitutional conflict  
Country Year PE CE AP CM VT EDP FP GF DL Total 
Bulgaria 1991 1 1 0 - 1 4 0 2 1 - 0 - 0 3 0 - 0 - 3 10 
Czech R. 1992 0 3 0 - 1 1 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 2 0 - 0 - 2 6 
Czech R. 2000 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 0 
Estonia 1992 0 - 0 - 0 2 0 - 1 - 1 - 0 2 0 1 0 - 2 5 
Hungary 1990 0 3 0 - 0 1 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 3 0 - 0 - 1 7 
Latvia 1990 0 3 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 1 0 - 0 1 0 - 0 - 1 5 
Lithuania 1992 1 1 0 - 1 2 0 - 1 - 1 - 1 2 0 1 0 - 5 6 
Poland  1992 1 - 0 - 1 7 1 1 1 - 0 - 1 2 1 - 0 2 6 12 
Poland  1997 1 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 3 0 
Romania 1991 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 - 1 - 0 - 0 1 0 - 0 - 5 3 
Slovakia  1992 0 - 0 - 0 5 1 1 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 1 0 - 1 7 
Slovakia  1999 1 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 2 0 
Slovenia 1991 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 1 0 - 0 - 1 1 
Total  7 12 1 - 6 23 4 4 10 1 2 - 2 17 1 3 0 2 33 62 
Source: Siaroff (2003: 299-302). Shaded columns indicate whether presidents possess particular 
powers (1 denotes yes or present, 0 no or absent), white columns indicate whether and how many 
conflicts about particular powers have occurred. PE = popular election, CE = concurrent election of 
president and legislature, AP = discretionary appointment powers, CM = chairing of cabinet meet-
ings, VT = right of legislative veto, EDP = long-term emergency and/or decree powers, FP = central 
role in foreign (and defence) policy, GF = central role in government formation, DL = ability to dis-
solve legislature. 
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On the basis of Table 6.3, a number of interesting patterns can be discerned, both 
regionally and in individual countries. In the first place, there is no clear relation be-
tween the overall strength of ECE presidents and the extent to which their powers 
have been subject to conflict. In Poland and Bulgaria, presidential powers have been 
most frequently subject to conflict, but the total scores of both countries on the Si-
aroff-index differ substantially. Direct presidential election does not systematically 
affect the level of conflict either. Even though the Bulgarian and Polish presidents are 
popularly elected, high levels of conflict in Hungary, Slovakia (1992-1999) and the 
Czech Republic show that the method of election and levels of conflict are not linked. 
Granting presidents few powers, like in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and 
Slovakia, seems to be no guarantee for limited conflict about the role of the president 
either. Possibly, it even constitutes a stimulus for presidents to try and broaden their 
powers.  
Discretionary appointment powers have been subject to conflict most fre-
quently, followed by foreign policy and defence competencies, and the presidential 
election procedure. Interestingly, a large number of conflicts about appointment 
powers and foreign policy occurred in countries where presidents are constitutionally 
lacking such powers. In fact, 58 percent of all presidential constitutional conflicts re-
lated to “empty cells” in Table 6.3, that is, to powers not granted to presidents. This 
can be interpreted as a reflection of the frequent attempts by ECE presidents to 
broaden their constitutional power base, and to concentrate power in the presidential 
office. The presidents of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Roma-
nia tried to strengthen their role in foreign policy, while in Estonia and Slovakia such 
attempts focused primarily at discretionary appointment powers. As the table indi-
cates, these attempts did not lead to actual constitutional changes though.  
Although it is difficult to determine precisely the inter-institutional power bal-
ance on the basis of presidential prerogatives, the assumed inverse relation between 
power-sharing constitutional design and constitutional conflict does not seem to hold 
for the presidential dimension. Rather, the analysis indicates that power-
concentrating attempts on the part of presidents invoked constitutional conflict. 
Presidents with a relatively influential position to start with, e.g. in Bulgaria and Po-
land (1992-1997), as well as constitutionally less powerful presidents have tried to 
broaden their powers vis-à-vis other institutions, especially the government. These 
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attempts, rather than the initial constitutional design, may explain the pattern of con-
stitutional conflict over presidential competencies.  
 
6.6 Parliamentary institutionalisation: disproportionality and frag-
mentation  
 
The next institutional dimension relates to the internal organisation of parliaments, 
and to rules regulating access of parties and individual members into the legislature. 
Both these aspects are part of what Kopecký (2001a) labels the ‘institutionalisation of 
parliaments’. Central to the concept of parliamentary institutionalisation is ‘political 
elites’ consensus on institutional rules, roles, and procedural regulations [related to 
the organisation and functioning of parliament]’ (2001: 14). With its emphasis on 
elite consensus – and hence the potential for disagreement and conflict – the concept 
fits neatly into this thesis. Kopecký’s study focuses on external and internal dimen-
sions of parliamentary institutionalisation. The internal dimension consists of rules 
of procedure, and relations between individual members, parliamentary parties, and 
legislative committees. The external dimension, on the other hand, relates to parlia-
ment’s relations with the executive, to constitutional structures (relations with other 
institutions) and electoral systems. As the presidential and executive-legislative di-
mensions capture parliament’s relations with other institutions, the analysis of the 
external dimension of parliamentary institutionalisation will focus on constitutional 
rules related to elections.26 
 The legislative electoral system is primarily responsible for access to the legis-
lature, and indirectly also affects the internal functioning of a parliament (Lijphart, 
1999). The design of the electoral system determines the chances of entry into par-
liament, and impacts on the structure of the party system. Electoral system design 
therefore exerts substantial influence in terms of power sharing and power concen-
tration. Proportional representation is often argued to contribute to power sharing, 
but majoritarian and mixed systems can also be designed in such ways that ‘their 
tendency to overrepresent majorities and large parties and to discriminate against 
                                                 
26  As was argued in chapter 3, organisational aspects of parliamentary elections and internal proce-
dures for the legislature are often regulated in separate electoral laws and parliamentary standing 
rules. These fall out of the scope of this study. However, most constitutions – including in ECE – 
contain general as well as more specific provisions on both elections and parliamentary processes, 
e.g. related to electoral thresholds, the type of electoral system, the composition of specific parlia-
mentary committees and their position in the legislative process, etc. The parliamentary conflicts in 
the dataset relate to these constitutional provisions on elections and parliamentary organisation.         
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smaller minority parties’ is circumvented (Lijphart, 2008: 48 and 2004: 99-101; 
Horowitz, 2003: 122-123). Rather than focusing on the differences between PR and 
majoritarian systems, a straightforward indicator of the power-sharing character of 
electoral arrangements is disproportionality of election results. Various measures of 
electoral disproportionality exist, but all focus on the difference between the distribu-
tion of votes cast in the election and the subsequent distribution of seats in parlia-
ment. It thus touches upon the extent to which constitutional design facilitates or dis-
turbs a proportional translation of societal preferences into political relations. Si-
aroff’s index of disproportionality will be used here, which captures ‘the overall dif-
ference between vote shares and seat shares divided by two’ (2000: 85).27 In terms of 
its effects on constitutional conflict, the expectation is formulated that the more dis-
proportional the electoral system the higher the degree of dissatisfaction with the 
vote-seat ratio and the higher the level of conflict.  
Table 6.4 presents data on the disproportionality of legislative electoral sys-
tems in the ten ECE cases. Although there have been changes in terms of electoral 
thresholds in a number of cases, as well as relatively minor adaptations with respect 
to district magnitude, the overall character of the legislative electoral systems has re-
mained stable since the early 1990s (Bielasiak, 2002: 194). Most countries adopted 
PR systems (D’Hondt); Hungary and Lithuania opted for parallel PR-SMD systems 
and Latvia for modified PR (Saint Laguë) (Berglund, Ekman and Aarebrot, 2004; 
Bielasiak, 2002). All systems, except in Estonia, established electoral thresholds be-
tween 3 and 5 percent for individual parties, and in some cases higher percentages 
are required for coalitions and party blocs. In contrast to the clear difference between 
PR and plurality or majority systems Lijphart found (1999: 163; 2008: 134-135), 
there is no such inter-system distinction in terms of electoral disproportionality in 
ECE. The mixed and modified systems are on average only slightly more dispropor-
tional than the PR systems (respectively 16.17 versus 14.7 percent), although the dif-
ference is much clearer when Latvia’s modified system is included in the PR category 
(17.99 versus 14.54). The most proportional systems are those of Slovenia and Esto-
nia (both PR), and the highest levels of disproportionality are produced by the PR 
                                                 
27  There is much discussion about which measure captures best the degree of disproportionality 
across different types of electoral systems. The Rae index, for example, averages the absolute differ-
ence between votes and seat shares, but omits dividing the outcome by two. It is therefore criticised 
for overstating the proportionality of PR systems. Other indices, such as Loosemore-Hanby, are 
claimed to underestimate the proportionality of PR (Lijphart, 1999: 158). Siaroff’s index can be said 
to combine the parsimony of the Rae index and the accuracy of the more complex Gallagher index, 
which is used by Lijphart .  
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systems in Poland and Romania, and the parallel designs in Hungary and Lithuania. 
The average disproportionality of ECE legislative electoral systems is relatively high 
in a European perspective.28 
In terms of the conflict-proneness of electoral systems, the hypothesised effect 
of disproportionality in terms of constitutional conflict does not hold. In fact, the re-
verse seems to be true. Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia saw respectively 4, 2 and 5 elec-
toral system related conflicts, while they all score well below the average level of dis-
proportionality of 15.44. By contrast, for the most disproportional systems – Roma-
nia, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland – no or only few instances of contestation were 
reported. Looking more closely at the conflict descriptions, it can be noted that the 
discussions in Latvia and Estonia were primarily related to the introduction of lan-
guage requirements for MPs and to lustration.29 The Russian-speaking minorities in 
both countries, not surprisingly, fiercely challenged such proposals. In Bulgaria, the 
topics of conflict were more diverse, concerning, for example, the lowering of the 
electoral threshold and changes to party registration procedures.30 Compared to the 
presidential and executive-legislative dimensions, legislative electoral systems were 
only occasionally subject to constitutional conflict. The comparatively high levels of 
disproportionality in ECE electoral systems may be related to the large numbers of 
small and breakaway parties that did not pass the threshold and to high levels of vola-
tility. Yet, there are no signs that this ‘weak party institutionalisation’ in the post-
communist region (Bielasiak, 2002: 204) has put the legitimacy of legislative elec-
toral systems under pressure.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28  Alan Siaroff calculated the disproportionality of ECE systems for a slightly different time frame, but 
his data indicate that the post-communist region clearly ‘outnumbers most other European legisla-
tive electoral systems’ (Siaroff, 2000: 85-87).   
29  See, in particular, conflicts E6 and E7, and LV1, LV3, LV4 and LV12 in appendix A.  
30  See conflicts B1, B24 and B25 in appendix A. 
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Table 6.4: Disproportionality of electoral systems, and parliamentary 
access conflicts.   
Country System Mean Lowest  Highest Elections Conflicts 
Bulgaria PR 13.25 3.44 24.90 5 4 
Czech Republic PR 14.03 11.15 19.11 5 - 
Estonia PR 11.55 6.56 17.02 4 2 
Hungary PR/Maj 17.82 11.77 24.41 4 1 
Latvia Mod. PR 12.55 10.50 15.20 4 5 
Lithuania PR/Maj 18.16 9.39 26.22 4 1 
Poland PR 17.93 9.57 37.34 5 - 
Romania PR 21.14 17.80 26.23 3 1 
Slovakia PR 15.00 7.17 21.80 4 1 
Slovenia PR 10.90 4.70 17.69 4 1 
Mean - 15.44 9.21 24.90 4.2 1.6 
Note: Scores are author’s own calculation based on data in Woldendorp, Keman 
and Budge (2000); Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot (2004), and Nordsieck 
(2009). The disproportionality rate represents the overall difference of seat shares 
and votes, divided by two. The disproportionality of each election was calculated; 
the mean represents the average disproportionality across all elections since the 
adoption of the post-communist constitution until December 2005. The measure 
is based on Siaroff (2000: 85). PR = proportional representation, Mod. PR =  
modified PR, PR/Maj = mixed.  
 
In order to grasp the development of party systems in ECE, the effective number of 
parliamentary parties constitutes a useful indicator. The effective number of parlia-
mentary parties takes into account both the number of parties and their relative size 
in terms of seat share (Lijphart, 1999: 65-69). If we accept Lijphart’s proposition that 
a strong relationship exists between the number of parties in parliament and the 
number of relevant issue dimensions (1999: 88), a high number of parties indicates 
that a high number of salient cleavages exists. Yet, the effective number of parties 
also captures fragmentation within parliamentary groups of similar political colour 
and ‘the splits and mergers of individual parliamentary parties’ (Kopecky, 2001: 171-
172). There have been numerous party splits in the region, which has contributed to 
the image of ECE parliaments as chaotic and unpredictable, especially in the first half 
of the 1990s (Ágh, 1995). While a low number of effective parties may indicate power-
concentrating constitutional design, high levels of parliamentary fragmentation may 
impede legislative and other internal parliamentary processes. Therefore, extremely 
fragmented party systems may affect the legitimacy of the parliamentary process, and 
are expected to lead to constitutional conflict on internal parliamentary procedures. 
As outlined in chapter four, 27 conflicts of this type occurred across the region – per-
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taining to voting procedures, rules on seat allocation in parliamentary committees, 
the rights of break away MPs, and parliamentary standing rules. 
 Table 6.5 presents data on parliamentary fragmentation and constitutional 
conflict on the internal organisation of parliaments. The mean effective number of 
parliamentary parties across all ten systems is 4.56, which is relatively high compared 
to Lijphart’s findings in Patterns of Democracy (1999: 76-77). This may be taken as a 
reflection of the many party splits, but should also be read in light of the dominance 
of PR electoral systems, which allow for easier access to parliament than majoritarian 
designs. The variation in terms of conflict levels and average party system fragmenta-
tion seems not to reflect a systematic pattern. The more fragmented party systems of 
Slovenia and Poland, and to a lesser extent Slovakia, have seen above average levels 
of conflict about parliamentary procedures. However, high fragmentation did not ig-
nite conflicts in Latvia and Estonia. In the least fragmented party systems of Bulgaria 
and Hungary conflict about parliamentary procedures erupted, yet the level of con-
testation was higher in Lithuania’s medium fragmented party system.  
Possibly more interesting is that some of the party systems with high degrees 
of fluctuation in their effective numbers of parties were also characterised by com-
paratively high levels of constitutional contestation. Especially the Lithuanian, Polish, 
and Slovak party systems display substantial differences between the highest and 
lowest effective numbers of parties, and these party systems also saw many instances 
of constitutional conflict. These fluctuations may be taken to indicate party system 
instability due to, for example, party splits and high levels of electoral volatility, while 
it may also reflect the introduction or modification of electoral thresholds. Some of 
the conflicts on this dimension in Slovakia indeed were rooted in attempts to reduce 
party system instability. Between 1994 and 1998, several MPs dissented from the rul-
ing HZDS, which stimulated its leader Vladimir Mečiar to try and push through legis-
lation that would allow the original party to reclaim the seats.31 These attempts were 
initially accepted by the HZDS dominated parliament, but later reversed by the Slo-
vak constitutional court (see Malová and Rybář, 2000: 106).  
  Overall, the hypothesised effect of party system fragmentation on constitu-
tional conflict related to the internal organisation of parliaments cannot be substanti-
ated. It may be questioned whether party system fragmentation actually affects elites’ 
                                                 
31  This concerned especially the ‘Gaulieder case’ of 1994. The constitutional court later ruled that 
Frantisek Galieder’s constitutional rights as an individual MP were infringed (see conflict no. 
SK9703).    
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consensus on internal parliamentary procedures. While extreme fragmentation may 
put the effectiveness of legislative decision-making under pressure, it need not neces-
sarily imply that the constitutional rules regulating that process are delegitimised. 
Parliamentary party fragmentation or ‘party factionalism’ (Kopecky, 2001: 171-172) 
possibly would have been a better explanation of intra-legislative conflict, especially 
where these conflicts related to party splits and cohesion.  This was substantiated to 
some extent by the relation between fluctuations of party system fragmentation and 
conflict patterns in the region.     
 
Table 6.5: Effective number of legislative parties and intra-legislative conflicts  
Country Mean Lowest Highest 
Highest 
– Lowest 
Elections Conflicts 
Bulgaria  3.00 2.40 4.81 2.41 5 2 
Czech Republic 4.08 3.67 4.80 1.13 4 2 
Estonia 5.07 4.15 5.97 1.82 4 - 
Hungary 3.39 2.49 4.41 1.92 4 2 
Latvia 5.60 4.74 7.59 2.85 4 - 
Lithuania 4.58 3.03 6.42 3.39 4 3 
Poland 5.53 2.94 12.56 9.62 5 4 
Romania 4.24 3.70 4.75 1.05 3 1 
Slovakia 4.61 3.19 6.12 2.93 4 10 
Slovenia 5.46 4.85 6.59 1.74 4 3 
Mean 4.56 3.52 6.4 2.89 4.1 2.7 
Note: Scores are author’s own calculation based on data in Woldendorp, Keman and 
Budge (2000); Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot (2004), and Nordsieck (2009). The effec-
tive number of parties represents the effective number of legislative parties, and is based 
on the seat share of parties in parliament. The measure is computed on the basis of the 
Laakso and Taagepera index: N = 1/∑si2 , in which si is the proportion of seats of the i-th 
party (see Taagepera, 1997, and Lijphart, 1999: 68). 
 
6.7 Executive-legislative relations  
 
The final constitutional dimension concerns formal executive-legislative relations in 
the ECE region.32 To capture the executive-legislative power balance two measures of 
                                                 
32  For a proper understanding of the working of the entire executive-legislative balance, the position 
of the head of state should obviously also be included in the analysis. Here, however, I am princi-
pally interested in understanding the possible institutional sources of conflicts related to the checks 
and balances of parliament on the cabinet, and the parliament’s position in the formation process 
and continuation of governments. The position of the president in the executive-legislative balance 
will therefore be omitted. It was moreover already discussed separately in the presidential powers 
dimension, which also captures the formal position of the head of state vis-à-vis the legislature.    
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inter-institutional relations will be used, both of which were developed by Wolden-
dorp, Keman and Budge (2000: 50-58). The first concerns the relative power of par-
liament over government (Parl->Gov), and the second government’s power over par-
liament (Gov->Parl). The authors stress that ‘the interrelationship between institu-
tions is crucial for understanding the extent to which (parliamentary) government is 
capable of governing and – vice versa – the extent to which parliament is able to in-
fluence affairs’ (ibid: 52, emphasis in original). The constitutional conflicts that were 
reported in chapter 3 within the executive-legislative category relate to exactly this 
interrelationship, and the occurrence of such conflicts can be understood as conflicts 
about constitutional checks and balances in the parliament-government nexus.  
 The “Parl->Gov” dimension of executive-legislative relations can be deter-
mined on the basis of two questions: whether a vote of investiture is necessary for a 
government to govern and whether a vote of confidence is needed to continue to gov-
ern. Votes of investiture and votes of confidence constitute potentially powerful tools 
for parliaments to ‘make or break governments’ (ibid, 52). The “Gov->Parl” dimen-
sion, on the other hand, determines the extent to which governments can resist the 
powers granted to parliament. It is based on a government’s right to ignore losing a 
vote of confidence and a government’s power to dissolve parliament. By combining 
the two dimensions, the constitutional balance of power between parliament and 
government can be assessed. One possible problem of an imbalance of executive-
legislative relations in favour of the legislature is ‘cabinet instability – and, as a result, 
regime instability’ (Lijphart, 2008: 82). A cabinet’s right to ignore losing a vote of 
confidence or to dissolve parliament (if parliament cannot agree on a new cabinet) 
are constitutional mechanisms that strengthen the government’s position vis-à-vis 
parliament and may generate more cabinet stability.  
Table 6.6 presents the scores of ten ECE polities under review on the “Parl-
>Gov” and “Gov->Parl” dimensions, as well as an indicator of the executive-
legislative balance (“ExLegBal”). It follows from these scores that in all ten countries 
parliament is constitutionally dominant as represented by the necessity of a vote of 
investiture to govern and a vote of confidence to continue govern. Governments in 
half of the countries under review possess the right to ignore losing a vote of confi-
dence and the power to dissolve parliament, yet in most cases government has to 
share this power with the head of state. The Lithuanian constitution grants party gov-
ernment the largest leeway, as it can both ignore losing a vote of confidence and can 
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unilaterally dissolve parliament. The legislative powers in the ECE region are quite 
unique in an international perspective. Among the 48 democracies included in Party 
Government only 9 other countries display such a high degree of legislative domi-
nance, primarily because the vote of investiture is relatively rare. This pattern reflects 
what is often cited as the legislative dominance that was established during the con-
stitution-making process (see Ágh, 1994; Kopecký, 2004; Elster, 1993; 1996; Malovà 
and Haughton, 2002: 110).  
Various authors point out that the legislative dominance in ECE has gradually 
decreased throughout the 1990s (Kopecký, 2004; Zubek, 2001, 2008). There has 
been a region-wide tendency towards a situation where ‘institutional resources now 
at the disposal of executives tend to outweigh the resources of the legislatures’ (Ko-
pecký, 2004: 149). This executive “emancipation” in the region has been ignited by 
the professionalization of core executives better capable of coordinating policy-
making, by increased party discipline making governments less vulnerable to break-
down, and by European integration demanding bureaucratic reforms and ‘fast-track 
legislative procedures’ for the adoption of the aqcuis communautaire (ibid: 150). Al-
though these developments have not led to an erosion of parliamentary powers per 
se, they did strengthen the position of governments across the region. These devel-
opments did not come about uncontested, though, as was illustrated in chapter 3 by 
the occurrence of executive-legislative conflicts in almost every ECE polity. ECE par-
liaments have been reluctant, to say the least, to grant governments more power and 
this has ignited intense discussions on executive-legislative relations. If this strength-
ening of executives has been a region-wide development, what was the effect of initial 
executive-legislative relations on the level of constitutional conflict?  
The right column of Table 6.6 presents the amount of conflicts related to ex-
ecutive-legislative relations in each of the ten countries. The “ExLegBal” indicator 
indicates the degree of initial legislative dominance. This dominance was particularly 
present in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia, while the situa-
tion was more balanced in the other countries. Interestingly, the average amount of 
executive-legislative conflicts among cases where power was initially concentrated in 
the legislature was lower than where constitutional executive-legislative relations 
were more balanced to start with. Concretely, among cases with 1.5 or higher on “Ex-
LegBal” the average amount of conflicts was 2.06, while 3.2 conflicts on average oc-
curred in the other cases. This indicates that the gradual empowerment of executives 
CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONS 
 138
in the post-communist region was especially challenged in systems where govern-
ments were already relatively strong. By contrast, legislatures that were constitution-
ally dominant in the early 1990s seem to have defended their position less fiercely 
against such developments.  
 
Table 6.6: Executive-legislative balance and executive-legislative conflicts.  
Country Parl -> Gov Gov -> Parl ExLegBal Conflicts 
Bulgaria 2 0 2 4 
Czech Republic 2 1 1 2 
Estonia 2 0 2 - 
Hungary 2 0 2 2 
Latvia 2 0 2 1 
Lithuania 2 1.5 0.5 4 
Poland 1992 2 0.5 1.5 - 
Poland 1997 2 1 1 3 
Romania 2 1 1 2 
Slovakia  2 0 2 6 
Slovenia 2 1 1 5 
Source: Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000: 56-57), own calculations for Poland 
1992, based on Ludwikowski (1996). ExLegBal indicates the balance of power between 
government and parliament and is determined by subtracting Gov->Parl from Parl-
>Gov: a score of 2 constitutes legislative dominance; lower scores indicate more power-
ful governments.  Parl->Gov is constructed by adding up the scores of: Vote of investi-
ture is necessary to govern (1.0) and Vote of confidence is necessary to continue to gov-
ern (1.0). Gov-> Parl is constructed by adding up the scores of: Government can ignore 
losing a vote of confidence (1.0) and Government (or PM) can dissolve parliament (1.0; 
0.5 if shared with head of state). 
 
6.8 Conclusions and discussion 
 
This chapter has sketched patterns of constitutional design in post-communist ECE, 
and analysed whether differences in the adopted constitutional frameworks have af-
fected levels and types of constitutional conflict. In particular, power-sharing consti-
tutional design and constitutional protection through medium levels of constitutional 
rigidity and adjudication were hypothesised to contribute to constitutional legiti-
macy. 
The analyses found mixed evidence for an effect of constitutional protection 
and power-sharing designs on the occurrence and type of constitutional conflict. High 
conflict levels in countries with comparatively rigid constitutions confirmed the ex-
pectation that difficult amendment procedures may stimulate political actors to fight 
over constitutional issues in the political arena, rather by proposing amendments. 
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The more flexible constitutions, however, also displayed high levels of constitutional 
conflict, while medium rigid constitutions were comparatively less frequently chal-
lenged. This suggests that flexible constitutions could not guarantee commitment to 
the constitutional framework, while a too rigid constitution may run the risk of be-
coming unrepresentative and illegitimate for its inability to translate societal and po-
litical change. Therefore, a medium level of constitutional rigidity seems most condu-
cive to constitutional legitimacy, for it combines the virtues of flexibility and rigidity 
yet excludes their respective disadvantages. 
The strongest constitutional courts were also most actively engaged in consti-
tutional conflict, which was interpreted as a confirmation of their role in democrati-
sation processes in ECE (cf. Solyóm, 2003; Schwartz, 1998). There is also some evi-
dence for a relation between the strength cum activity of constitutional review bodies 
and the extent to which they were challenged by other institutions. The courts of 
Hungary and Bulgaria, for example, were involved in a large share of constitutional 
disputes and other institutional actors did not always appreciate their active role. 
Subsequent attempts to limit the influence of constitutional review were failed, but 
they indicate that strong and active constitutional courts can be perceived as politi-
cally threatening by governments.  
The overall strength of presidents in the ECE region did not systematically af-
fect patterns of constitutional conflict, and direct elections provided no additional 
incentive for presidents to challenge the constitution. Interestingly, most conflicts 
were rooted in attempts by presidents to broaden their power base in areas where 
they possessed little or no constitutional prerogatives. This was especially observable 
in the areas of foreign policy, appointment and dismissal powers, as well as the presi-
dential election method, which were topics of contention throughout the region. 
None of the ECE presidents managed to strengthen their position, though, and in the 
end power-sharing constitutional design prevailed.  
 Parliamentary institutionalisation was analysed on the basis of conflict over 
legislative electoral systems and internal parliamentary procedures. Relatively few 
conflicts over electoral systems occurred, which might come as a surprise given the 
high levels of disproportionality in the region. In addition, there was no evidence for 
a relation between disproportionality and levels of constitutional conflict. Similarly, 
party system fragmentation seemed not to be linked directly to levels of constitu-
tional conflict either. It was interesting to note, though, that changes in party system 
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fragmentation were accompanied by intense contestation. The highest levels of con-
flict over parliamentary procedures were found in countries with the largest fluctua-
tions in party system fragmentation, such as Poland, Slovakia, and Lithuania. 
 The analysis of constitutional conflict on the executive-legislative dimension 
did produce some evidence in favour of power-sharing constitutional design. While 
parliaments were initially dominant in the region, executives have gradually accumu-
lated more influence due to professionalization and increased party discipline. This 
shift towards more balanced executive-legislative relations was especially character-
ised by conflict in countries where the legislature was initially clearly dominant. In 
countries that set off the transformation with a more balanced executive-legislative 
relation, executive emancipation provoked less constitutional conflicts. This indicates 
that power-concentrating constitutions were less well capable of incorporating the 
shift in executive-legislative relations.   
These are interesting findings in light of existing theories of constitutional de-
sign, which tend to emphasise the positive consequences of constitutional protection 
and power sharing. While the findings with regard to constitutional protection seem 
to confirm the assumptions that are formulated in the literature, the evidence in fa-
vour of power sharing is much more indirect. On the one hand, attempts by presi-
dents to modify power-sharing designs in favour of power-concentration in the presi-
dential office ignited high levels of conflict. Conflicts about executive-legislative rela-
tions, on the other hand, could primarily be associated with a development from 
power-concentration in the legislature towards executive-legislative power sharing. 
In the end, however, power sharing prevailed on both dimensions. The constitutional 
recommendations by Arend Lijphart, and for that part of his critic Horowitz, are 
based on the idea that institutional arrangements can be designed consciously and 
purposely by constitution-makers. Yet, the patterns of constitutional design, conflict 
and change analysed in this chapter indicate that – even though the end product may 
reflect some of Lijphart’s recommendations – constitutional engineering is a lengthy 
and unpredictable process. Each constitutional design carries the risk of producing 
unintended or unforeseen consequences once in practice. That need not be problem-
atic, as long as political actors find democratic ways to deal with these effects, for ex-
ample through constitutional amendment procedures and adjudication. That such 
constitutional “trial and error” is often accompanied by constitutional conflict can 
hardly be called surprising, given the distributional consequences of constitutional 
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design. Moreover, if constitutional conflict leads to the development of moderate and 
legitimate constitutional designs, there can be no doubt about its significance for the 
democratisation process in post-communist ECE.  
Up until now, the analyses of constitutional conflict have primarily focused on 
the institutional opportunities and incentives for politicians to engage in challenges 
of the constitution. Yet, it was shown that constitutional design and other institu-
tional factors do not always provide a complete and consistent picture of the circum-
stances under which constitutional conflict occurs. It is this thesis’ assumption that in 
order to fully comprehend the patterns of constitutional conflict in post-communist 
ECE, strategic and political motives should be taken into account as well. The next 
and final analytical chapter will therefore investigate the political conditions of con-
stitutional conflict during 100 ECE cabinet periods. Its aim is to establish the extent 
to which party-political relations and political strength and support have motivated 
politicians to engage in constitutional conflict.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Strategic and party-political motivations for constitutional conflict  
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter constitutes the final step in our investigation of the sources and effects 
of constitutional conflict in post-communist ECE. It will analyse under which political 
circumstances politicians in the region were engaged in constitutional contestation. 
As shown in previous chapters, the character of the constitution-making process, am-
biguously formulated constitutional provisions, and characteristics of constitutional 
design have affected the consolidation of intra- and inter-institutional relations dur-
ing the 1990s and early 2000s. But these factors cannot explain by themselves the 
occurrence of constitutional conflict or the different patterns of conflict across time 
and space. As was shown in chapters 4 and 5 especially, constitutional ambiguity may 
provide political actors with an opportunity to challenge the constitutional status quo, 
but short-term political motivations will often determine whether they will actually 
go ahead with this. In other words, politicians will rarely initiate constitutional modi-
fication or re-interpretation attempts without some electoral or policy-related goals 
in mind. Institutions will be primarily perceived of as means to achieve what democ-
ratic political actors desire most: influencing policy and winning elections (cf. Pettit, 
1996; Laver, 1997). This can even be said of the bargaining processes preceding the 
adoption of the new, post-communist constitutions. Although long-term visions 
probably never played a larger role in structuring politicians’ constitutional prefer-
ences, altruism was certainly not the main driving force behind the strategies of those 
involved in constitution-making and institutional design (see Geddes, 1996). When 
the politics of constitution-making made way for ‘day-to-day politics’ this premise 
only become stronger, with politicians being principally interested in seeking votes, 
offices and policies. Based on these assumptions, it is indispensable in the context of 
this dissertation and its main research question to investigate the extent to which 
strategic motivations (both electoral and policy related) have stimulated political ac-
tors to engage in constitutional conflict. By answering this question it will be possible 
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to understand more fully the dynamics of constitutional conflict in post-communist 
ECE, including the strategic incentives for actors to contest the constitutional status 
quo and to engage in attempts to modify or re-interpret the ground rules of the politi-
cal game.  
In order to properly investigate constitutional conflict at the ‘actor level’, this 
chapter’s analytical focus shifts to cabinet periods in the post-communist era. Two 
reasons account for doing so. First, making party governments the object of analysis 
allows for a better understanding of the evolution of constitutional conflict in post-
communist ECE. The empirical sections of this chapter indicate that there has been 
considerable variation between cabinet periods within countries both in terms of the 
levels of constitutional conflict and the dominant types of constitutional discussions. 
Mapping this variation goes beyond the annual conflict levels that were presented in 
chapter 3 and provides a more fine-grained picture of the timing and sequence of 
constitutional conflict within countries. Second, the focus on cabinet periods makes 
the analysis sensitive to changes in political circumstances that may trigger constitu-
tional conflict. In particular, party-political orientations among different institutions, 
degrees of electoral support, and subsequent inter-institutional relations may vary 
between cabinet periods. Their effects on constitutional conflict may therefore also 
fluctuate, making the cabinet period an obvious unit of analysis in this chapter. 
This chapter integrates and applies insights from the literatures on executive-
legislative relations in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems in an attempt to 
explain levels of intra-executive and executive-legislative conflict in 100 ECE cabinet 
periods. Specifically, it will explore whether party-political relations between presi-
dents and cabinets, cabinets’ degree of legislative support, and internal cabinet com-
position matter for the occurrence and level of constitutional conflict. All countries in 
the ECE region introduced ‘dual executive systems’ (Blondel, 1992; Lewis-Beck, 1997; 
Baylis, 1996), in which presidents, cabinets and parliamentary parties are politically 
linked through mechanisms of accountability, control and interdependence. The 
cabinet is a central actor in this institutional triad, as it may have to compete for po-
litical and institutional leverage with both the president and the legislature. Presi-
dents and cabinets may be engaged in struggles over executive competencies in par-
ticular policy areas (see chapter 5), while the cabinet can be involved in competition 
with parliament about executive autonomy and parliamentary control. In this chapter 
the extent of such institutional competition between cabinets and presidents, and 
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between cabinets and parliaments, is assumed to depend on party-political relations 
and political support. The president and the parliamentary majority are expected to 
challenge the institutional position of the cabinet if the government’s political posi-
tion vis-à-vis the other institutions is weak. Based on studies of institutional relations 
in (semi) presidential and parliamentary systems, a three-dimensional scale of a gov-
ernment’s relative strength will be developed that takes into account the cabinet’s 
position vis-à-vis both the president and the legislature. Governments are “double 
divided”, and therefore considered most prone to challenges by the president and 
parliament, if they do not contain the president’s political party or bloc, if they lack 
majority support in the legislature, and consist of a coalition. Governments that be-
long to the same party or bloc as the president, hold a majority of the seats in parlia-
ment, and consist of a single party are “double unified”, and therefore expected to be 
least involved in constitutional contestation.      
Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin 2000, 2008; Rihoux and 
Ragin, 2008) will be applied to analyse whether and to what extent political circum-
stances matter for the level of constitutional conflict during 100 cabinet periods in 
post-communist ECE. FS/QCA is helpful as it allows for systematic investigation of 
different possible “paths” toward a particular outcome, or its absence, in medium-
sized N studies. Moreover, it makes it possible to establish whether particular condi-
tions were necessary or sufficient for the outcome. In this chapter, the combination of 
political circumstances that was dubbed “double divided government” is assumed 
necessary and sufficient for a high level of intra-executive and executive-legislative 
conflict, while the three components of “double unified governments” are believed to 
be sufficient for remaining devoid of intense constitutional conflict. The FS/QCA 
analysis finds that the combination of majority legislative support and shared politi-
cal orientation between the president and the cabinet was sufficient for a low level of 
intra-executive conflict. Contrary to what was expected, however, coalition govern-
ment constituted a sufficient condition for low levels of intra-executive conflict as 
well. Coalition status was necessary but not sufficient to remain devoid of high levels 
of executive-legislative conflict. In addition of being a coalition, cabinets had to have 
majority legislative support and contain the president’s party or bloc. To a large ex-
tent these findings subscribe to established explanations for political conflict and co-
operation in semi-presidential and parliamentary systems. Specifically, they support 
the assumptions that majority cabinets are less susceptible to challenges by both the 
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president and parliament, and that shared political orientation of the president and 
cabinet contribute to intra-executive cooperation. Yet, the finding that coalition gov-
ernment is a sufficient condition for peaceful coexistence between heads of state and 
cabinets and necessary for executive-legislative cooperation is remarkable, and feeds 
into the larger debate on the effects of coalition government.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces party government in 
post-communist ECE. After discussing how to determine the founding governments 
in the post-communist era, 100 cabinets that were in office in the region will be in-
troduced empirically, focusing on their duration, number of prime ministers, and 
level and dominant type of constitutional conflict. Section 3 continues with a discus-
sion on the effects of divided government in (semi-) presidential and parliamentary 
systems, and argues that combining insights on both systems offers a fruitful way to 
investigate the political sources of constitutional conflict in ECE dual executive sys-
tems. Section 4 builds upon this argument and develops an indicator of divided gov-
ernment that can be used to determine cabinets’ expected proneness to constitutional 
contestation. In section 5 FS/CQA is applied to analyse whether party-political rela-
tions and political strength affected ECE cabinets’ involvement in intra-executive and 
executive-legislative conflict. Based on a truth table showing the distribution of cabi-
nets across different combinations of conditions and two outcomes (absence of high 
levels of executive-legislative and intra-executive conflict), the sufficient and neces-
sary conditions for constitutional conflict in post-communist ECE are established. 
This is followed by a discussion of cabinets that do not meet the results of the 
FS/QCA. It is suggested that the timing of constitutional conflicts during the political 
transformation may in part explain these deviant cases. Section 6 concludes.  
 
7.2 Cabinets and constitutional conflict in post-communist East Central 
Europe 
  
In order to define what constitutes a cabinet period, a rich literature on party gov-
ernment in Western Europe and ECE is available (Budge and Keman, 1990; Laver 
and Schofield, 1990; Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 2000; Müller-Rommel, Fettel-
schoss and Harfst 2004). Accordingly, a cabinet can be defined by three main charac-
teristics: the same prime minister in office, the same party or parties in government, 
and the same legislative period. From this follows quite unequivocally that if the 
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prime minister or the party composition of the cabinet changes, or if elections are 
held, a new cabinet is counted.33 Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss and Harfst (2004: 
870) argue that it is less obvious, however, to determine the first party governments 
in the post-communist region. Should one consider cabinets that were founded be-
fore the first democratic elections, or take the elections as a starting point? And if one 
opts for the latter strategy, when were the first democratic elections held? While 
Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss and Harfst emphasise the importance of free and fair 
elections to determine founding governments (Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss and 
Harfst, 2004: 870-871), a slightly different approach will be applied here. The adop-
tion of the first post-communist constitution, or the first major amendments to the 
communist basic law in each of the countries under review, constitutes the starting 
point of our analysis of constitutional conflict. From the moment that a new, or sig-
nificantly modified, constitution was put in place, the constitutional set-up could po-
tentially be contested. Governments that were in office at the time of adoption or 
amendment of the constitution in each country will therefore be considered as found-
ing governments in this analysis. However, the following factors relevant to the 
analysis of political circumstances of constitutional conflict should also be determin-
able: party-political relations between cabinet and president, level of cabinet support 
in the legislature, and internal composition of the cabinet. These two conditions im-
ply that 10 additional cabinet periods will be analysed that were not included in the 
dataset by Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss and Harfst.34 Popov (Bulgaria), Abišala 
(Lithuania), and Stolojan (Romania) will be added as they were in office at the time of 
constitutional adoption, even though they did not stem from fully democratic parlia-
ments. Furthermore, there were 7 cabinet periods during the tenure of which a new 
president was elected, which constituted a potential change in intra-executive rela-
                                                 
33  In contrast to Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000: 10), ‘resignation in an inter-election period 
followed by re-formation of the government with the same Prime Minister and party composition’ 
was not included as a defining element of a new cabinet. Given that party-political relations and 
changes therein are assumed to constitute the main motivation for constitutional conflict in this 
chapter, continuation of a cabinet with the same party-political composition after resignation is not 
expected to generate different results.      
34 In fact, the total set of cabinets in this chapter contains 27 additional cases. There are 13 more cabi-
nets included in the analysis as this chapter covers the period until December 2005, while the data-
set of Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss and Harfst captures cabinets until 2003. Four cabinets that 
were in office during constitutional replacement were omitted from the list: Vähi I (Estonia), Né-
meth (Hungary), Mazowiecki (Poland), and Peterle (Slovenia. Given the absence at that time of an 
elected president, it is impossible to determine the partisan relation between cabinet and head of 
state. The interim cabinet of Indzhova (Bulgaria) was also dropped as its relation vis-à-vis the 
president and internal composition could not be determined.   
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tions. The following instances of such ‘coexistence of an incumbent prime minister 
with a newly elected president’ (Protsyk, 2003: 241) are therefore also considered as 
cabinet periods: Saksoburgotski-Parvanov, Špidla-Klaus, Laar II- Rüütel, 
Brazauskas-Paksas, Brazauskas-Adamkus, Dzurinda I-Schuster, and Dzurinda II- 
Gašparovič. The full set of party governments in post-communist ECE is listed in Ta-
ble E.1 in the appendix. 
This brings the total number of party governments across the ten countries to 
100. Table 7.1 summarises a number of key empirical cabinet characteristics, as well 
as the name of the founding cabinet and the constitutional replacement date in each 
of the ten polities under review. The number of cabinets in each country varies con-
siderably, which can only partly be attributed to the variation in constitutional re-
placement dates across the region. In Poland, for example, twice as many cabinets 
were in office as in Hungary between 1989 and 2005. The variation across the region 
becomes more fully apparent when the average cabinet duration in the ten ECE coun-
tries is compared. The mean government duration across all countries was 564 days. 
The mean cabinet in Latvia lasted only 350 days, while Hungarian prime ministers 
stayed in office for 1,062 days on average. In the literature on party government and 
executive-legislative relations, cabinet duration is argued to be an indicator of cabinet 
stability and effectiveness (cf. Lijphart 1999: 129-131; Woldendorp, Budge and Ke-
man, 2000; Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss and Harfst, 2004:875). Yet, as is clear from 
Table 7.1, cabinets that stayed long in office were no less prone to constitutional con-
flict than short-lived cabinets. Hungarian cabinets, for example, were subject to 2 
constitutional conflicts on average, while Latvian cabinets saw less than 0.9 conflicts 
on average during their time in office. Overall, there seems to be no significant rela-
tion between time in office and the number of constitutional conflicts in which a 
cabinet was engaged.     
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Table 7.1: Party governments in post-communist ECE 
Country 
Constitution 
adopted/amended 
Founding government 
(period in office) 
N of cabi-
nets 
Mean dura-
tion in days 
N of con-
flicts/cabinet 
Bulgaria 12 July 1991 Popov (12/90 – 11/91) 9 591 2.33 
Czech R. 16 December 1992 Klaus I (7/92 – 7/96)  8 601 1.25 
Estonia 28 June 1992 Laar I (10/92 – 11/94)   11 424 0.73 
Hungary 18 October 1989 Antall (5/90 – 12/93)  6 1062 2.00 
Latvia 6 July 1993 Birkavs (7/93 – 9/94) 13 625 0.85 
Lithuania 25 October 1992 Abišala (7/92 – 12/92) 12 456 1.17 
Poland 4 April 1989 Bielecki (1/91 – 12/91)   13 526 1.54 
Romania 8 December 1991 Stolojan (10/91 – 11/92)  11 465 0.73 
Slovakia 1 September 1992 Mečiar I (6/92 – 3/93)  9 541 3.00 
Slovenia 23 December 1991 Drnovšek I (5/92 – 3/94) 8 622 1.25 
Total  - - 10 564 1.41 
Note: the number of cabinets, as well as the calculation of the mean duration in days, includes the 7 in-
stances of coexistence between an incumbent prime minister and newly elected president. The numbers of 
conflict per cabinet period represent averages, and exclude conflicts related to the powers and position of 
constitutional review bodies.    
 
 As Table E.1 in the appendix indicates, levels of constitutional conflict during these 
100 cabinet periods varied substantially. Constitutional conflict occurred during 52 
cabinet periods, while 48 remained devoid of conflict during their tenure. This alloca-
tion of conflicts across cabinets is not confirmed across all of the countries included 
though. In Bulgaria and Slovakia, respectively 75 and 87 percent of cabinets have 
seen at least one instance of constitutional contestation. In Poland, this percentage is 
61, while only 36 per cent of the Estonian cabinets have been involved in constitu-
tional conflict. Among cabinets with constitutional contestation, the average amount 
of conflicts was close to 3, while across all 100 cases the average was 1.4. In absolute 
terms, the cabinet Mečiar IV in Slovakia (94-98) has had the highest amount of con-
flicts during a single cabinet period (14), followed by Pawlak in Poland (7), Videnov in 
Bulgaria and Šleževičius in Lithuania (6 conflicts). All other cabinets for which con-
stitutional conflict was found had fewer than 6 conflicts, with 30 cabinets having 
fewer than 2. Although absolute conflict levels illustrate the extensive variation in 
constitutional contestation during cabinets across ECE, they do not provide the most 
appropriate indicator for a cross-cabinet comparison. Two additional factors will 
therefore be taken into account in the analysis of constitutional conflict in ECE cabi-
net periods.    
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First, given the variation in cabinet duration that was outlined above, the time 
governments spent in office will also be part of the analysis. By weighting the conflict 
level for cabinet duration, a better comparison of conflict intensity during cabinets 
can be realised. Arguably, the conflict intensity of a cabinet that lasted 1 year and saw 
3 instances of constitutional conflict is higher than that of a 4-year cabinet with the 
same amount of conflicts. Second, in order to capture what constitutional issues were 
subject to conflict during cabinet periods it is helpful to distinguish between the 
dominant topics of conflict. This chapter takes into account two of the four constitu-
tional dimensions that were distinguished in chapter 3. On the one hand, conflicts 
between cabinets and presidents about executive dominance are captured by the 
category of intra-executive conflict. Such conflicts relate to the constitutional distri-
bution of powers between presidents and cabinets, for example as regulated by provi-
sions on countersignature, appointment and dismissal powers, and the president’s 
competencies in particular policy areas such as defence and foreign affairs (Baylis, 
1996, 2007; Taras, 1997).35 Executive-legislative conflicts, on the other hand, relate to 
both contestation about institutional relations between the cabinet and the legisla-
ture, and to formal relations among political parties and MPs within the legislature. 
These latter two types of conflict were introduced as separate constitutional dimen-
sions in chapter 4 and analysed as different aspects of constitutional design in chap-
ter 6. Here, however, they are considered part of an overarching category of conflict 
among ruling and opposition parties that either involves the cabinet versus the oppo-
sition in parliament, or governing versus opposition parties within the legislature. 
Since both these types of constitutional conflict involve the cabinet’s constitutional 
position in some way, it is assumed that they are affected by similar political circum-
stances.  
Table E.2 in the appendix presents the levels of intra-executive and executive-
legislative conflict across all 100 cabinets, as represented by the ‘duration-sensitive’ 
indicators INEX (level of intra-legislative conflict) and EXLEG (level of executive-
legislative conflict).36 The cabinet rankings change somewhat as compared to their 
ranking based on absolute levels of conflict, but the variation in terms of conflict lev-
els and the dominant types of conflict remains unabated. Conflict levels vary between 
3 and 62 within the executive-legislative conflict category and between 3 and 52 on 
                                                 
35  Hence, conflicts related to the presidential election procedure will not be included in the analysis.  
36  The calculation of both indices is explained in Table E.2 in the appendix.  
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the intra-executive index. The cabinet Mečiar III (93-94) has now the highest score 
on the EXLEG index (62), while the cabinet Pawlak (93-95) ranks first on the INEX 
index (52). Eleven cabinets were involved in intra-executive conflict only, 18 uniquely 
in executive-legislative struggles and during 20 cabinet periods both institutional ar-
eas were topics of discussion.  
To what extent can this variation in levels and dominant type of constitutional 
contestation be explained by the political circumstances during a cabinet period? Can 
the occurrence and intensity of struggles among institutional actors in post-
communist ECE be linked to the political strength of, and ideological differences be-
tween these actors? In the following section existing studies on conflict and coopera-
tion between cabinets, presidents and parliaments in semi-presidential and parlia-
mentary systems will be discussed. Although they refer to specific constitutional “re-
gime types”, these literatures enable generating hypotheses on the political circum-
stances that contribute to the occurrence of constitutional conflict, and the absence 
thereof, in the dual executive systems of ECE.  
 
7.3 Divided government in dual executive systems  
 
An extensive literature exists on constitutional regime types that discusses and inves-
tigates the alleged advantages and disadvantages of particular constitutional designs, 
specifically that of presidential versus parliamentary systems (see for instance Linz, 
1990; 1992; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Lijphart, 2004). This literature not only focuses 
on the constitutional differences between parliamentary, presidential and semi-
presidential systems, but also empirically investigates the political conditions that 
affect the relationship between heads of state, governments, and legislatures. In this 
context, scholars of the presidential and semi-presidential regime types have pointed 
to the effects of “divided government” on cabinet stability and intra-executive coop-
eration. The situation of the president and the cabinet being of opposing or different 
parties is assumed to constitute a challenge to the political relationship and the po-
tential for cooperation between the different members of the executive (Shugart and 
Carey, 1992: 55, see also Elgie 2001, Protsyk, 2003; 2005; 2006). Especially if the 
president possesses considerable executive and legislative powers, and the cabinet is 
dependent upon the president’s support for policy making, intra-executive coopera-
tion and coordination may become difficult if the executive is politically divided. De-
STRATEGIC AND PARTY-POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS 
 151  
spite the mostly limited constitutional powers of ECE presidents, the situation of ex-
ecutives divided along partisan lines is assumed to affect relations between presidents 
and cabinets in the ECE region as well. As was argued in chapter 5, the constitutional 
frameworks in ECE are young of age, and experience with the functioning of dual ex-
ecutive systems is nascent. In addition, the distribution of competencies between 
cabinets and presidents suffers from considerable constitutional ambiguity, so that it 
is unlikely ‘that the system[s] will provide for a clear division of presidential from 
prime-ministerial responsibilities’ (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 56). Chapters 4 and 5 
already indicated that several ECE presidents have used such constitutional fuzziness 
in order to stretch their constitutional power base, especially during periods of politi-
cal polarisation.   
A number of recent studies have applied the general propositions from the re-
gime- type literature in comparative analyses of modes of competition and coopera-
tion between executive actors in democratising political systems (see Baylis, 1996, 
2007; Sedelius, 2006; Protsyk, 2006). In his analyses of intra-executive conflict and 
cooperation in post-Soviet premier-presidential and president-parliamentary sys-
tems, Oleh Protsyk (2003, 2005, 2006) forwards lucid and concrete hypotheses on 
the political circumstances that may affect the nature of intra-executive relations. 
With regard to possible ideological motivations that may stimulate heads of state and 
cabinets to contest the executive power balance, Protsyk expects that ‘shared ideo-
logical orientation of a governing coalition and the president should diminish (but 
not eradicate) the incentives for intra-executive competition’ (2006, 223). In addition 
to the ideological orientation of the president and cabinet, the extent and character of 
parliamentary support as translated into the type of government is assumed to be a 
key factor in intra-executive relations (2006, 223). While ideological differences be-
tween the president and cabinet may pit the two institutions against one another, 
presidents will be less inclined to challenge a cabinet that has majority support in 
parliament. Hence, Protsyk formulates the hypothesis that ‘[i]ntra-executive conflict 
is more likely when a president co-exists with minority rather than majority […] cabi-
nets’ (2006, 224). Consequently, the combined circumstances of different political 
orientations of the president and the cabinet, and a cabinet without majority support 
in parliament are most likely to lead to intra-executive conflict.  
A third factor that can be expected to affect inter-institutional relations in 
post-communist ECE is the composition of the cabinet, or more specifically whether 
CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONS 
 152 
it is composed of a coalition or a single party. While scholarly debate regarding the 
effects of government composition on stability and breakdown currently fails to draw 
much attention in analyses of Western Europe37, single party government has oc-
curred in 8 ECE countries and concerns 20 per cent of the cabinets included in the 
analysis in this chapter. Although Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss and Harfst 
(2004:876-877) conclude that ECE party governments are similar to West European 
governments in a variety of ways, single party-government occurred in comparatively 
many ECE countries and across different constitutional systems. There is thus ample 
reason to investigate whether cabinet composition, in combination with party-
political relations between presidents and cabinets and parliamentary support, mat-
ters for the proneness to constitutional conflict of post-communist ECE cabinets. 
Budge and Keman (1990), Laver and Schofield (1990) and Laver and Shepsle (1991) 
found that coalition cabinets in established democracies were less durable and stable 
than single party governments. This confirmed the ‘received wisdom’ (Laver and 
Schofield, 1990: 152) that ideological differences among coalition partners and the 
need to bargain about policies make coalitions more vulnerable to internal divisions 
than single party cabinets. In the ECE dual executive systems government composi-
tion is also expected to affect the cabinet’s position vis-à-vis the other institutional 
actors. Ideological differences among coalition partners may influence the cabinet’s 
political strength, especially if other institutional actors perceive these differences as 
an impediment to its political unity, stability, and determination. It is therefore likely 
that the higher risk of internal divisions that is carried by coalitions will make them 
more vulnerable to constitutional contestation by the president and the legislature.   
 
7.4 A combined measure of divided government   
 
Oleh Protsyk (2006: 221) characterises semi-presidential constitutional design as a 
principal-agent relationship in which the cabinet faces 2 principals: the cabinet and 
the president. Given a cabinet’s dependence on legislative support, parliament consti-
tutes a clear principal that can send governments home. The president’s position vis-
à-vis the cabinet can also be understood as that of a principal as presidents may send 
                                                 
37  The debate seems to have disappeared from the scene mainly for empirical reasons, as differences 
in cabinet composition proved to matter less for stability than the particular institutional or societal 
characteristics of the countries where single party cabinets regularly occur (i.e. Ireland, FPTP sys-
tems, Scandinavia), or where coalition governments suffered from particularly high levels of break-
down (Italy, France IV) (See Budge and Keman, 1990: 170-171, Laver and Schofield, 1990: 144). 
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legislation back for consideration or may be involved in countersignature procedures. 
This principal-agent connection is theoretically relevant for the dual executive sys-
tems of post-communist ECE. Even in countries where the president is constitution-
ally weak or indirectly elected, the cabinet’s political relations with the president can 
be a potential source of intra-executive conflict. Both the president and parliament 
may utilise constitutional ambiguities and the fact that the inter-institutional power 
balance has not yet fully developed to challenge the application or interpretation of 
provisions on intra-executive and executive-legislative relations with the aim of influ-
encing particular policies, appointments and other political issues. In this context, the 
cabinet’s position as an agent is thus strongest in case it can count on political sup-
port from its principals, the president and the parliamentary majority. In addition, 
the cabinet’s position is assumed to depend not only on its direct relations with the 
president and the parliamentary majority. Presidents are expected to take into ac-
count not only their own position vis-à-vis the cabinet, but also to include the cabi-
net’s position vis-à-vis parliament in their assessment of the cabinet’s strength. Simi-
larly, parliament will principally look at the level of support among parliamentary 
parties and the cabinet’s internal composition in its relations with the cabinet, but 
will not be blind to the president’s relation with the cabinet. 
Based on these assumptions, a cabinet’s position vis-à-vis the president and 
the legislature is expected to be weakest if the president and cabinet are of different 
party-political orientations, if the cabinet has no majority support in parliament, and 
consists of a coalition of parties. This situation can be labelled “double divided gov-
ernment” as both based on its relation with the president and due to possible internal 
division the cabinet is prone constitutional conflict. In case of the reversed situation – 
the cabinet has majority support in parliament, consists of a single party and contains 
the president’s party or bloc – the cabinet’s position vis-à-vis the president and par-
liament is stronger. Under these circumstances, the president and parliamentary op-
position will be less inclined to challenge the cabinet’s authority because they will 
agree on more policy issues. This situation is dubbed “double unified government”, as 
both internally and in terms of the partisan relation with the president the cabinet’s 
position is least susceptible to conflict. Given the possible variation on the three po-
litical conditions, there are eight logical combinations of political circumstances, of 
which double unified and double divided constitute the extreme ends. These eight 
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possible cabinet types, and their expected levels of intra-executive and executive-
legislative conflict, are presented in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2: Cabinet types and expected conflict levels   
Type  
President/cabinet 
orientation 
Cabinet’s legislative 
support 
Internal composi-
tion cabinet 
Expected 
conflict level 
1 (‘Double Uni-
fied’) Shared Majority Single Party 
2 Shared Majority Coalition 
3 Shared Minority Single Party 
4 Shared Minority Coalition 
5 Different Majority Single Party 
6 Different Majority Coalition 
7 Different Minority Single Party 
8 (‘Double Di-
vided’) Different Minority Coalition 
Lowest 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
Highest 
 
In the following section, FS/QCA will be applied to investigate the hypothesis that 
double unified government precludes high levels of intra-executive and executive-
legislative conflict in post-communist ECE.38 FS/QCA is particularly suitable for this 
analysis, as it allows for a systematic investigation of sufficient and necessary condi-
tions for particular outcomes in a small to medium sized N study (Ragin, 2000; 2007, 
see also Vis, 2008, Schneider and Wagemann, 2003, Rihoux and Ragin, 2008). In the 
current analysis, this technique enables investigating whether the three political cir-
cumstances that establish double unified government (shared party political orienta-
tion of president and cabinet, majority cabinet, single party government) are suffi-
cient and necessary to preclude high levels of intra-executive and executive-legislative 
conflict. Given the centrality of the logic of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
FS/QCA makes it possible to not only “test” theoretically relevant hypotheses, but 
also to generate knowledge on particular combinations of conditions that are more 
relevant than others.  
 
 
                                                 
38  This is one of two possible ways to construct the hypothesis, and theoretically it is possible to con-
duct analyses of the hypothesis that double divided governments have a higher probability of being 
engaged in high levels of intra-executive and executive-legislative conflict. However, given the lim-
ited amount of cabinets with a high level of intra-executive and executive-legislative conflict, 
fs/QCA analysis of the negated outcomes provides more reliable results.       
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7.4 Assessing the political dimensions of constitutional conflict  
 
Based on the duration sensitive INEX and EXLEG values that were assigned to each 
cabinet, the membership of all 100 cabinets in the fuzzy set outcomes of high intra-
executive conflict and high executive-legislative conflict can be established. A four-
value fuzzy set scheme was used to capture the different degrees of membership in 
both of these outcomes. In such a four-value fuzzy set scheme, 1 represents full mem-
bership in the outcome variable and 0 full non-membership.39 The intermediate val-
ues 0.33 and 0.67 denote respectively more out than in the set and more in than out 
of the set of a high level of constitutional conflict. This four-value scheme was chosen, 
as it is ‘useful in situations where researchers have a substantial amount of informa-
tion about cases, but the evidence is not systematic or strictly comparable from case 
to case’ (Ragin, 2008: 31). Table E.2 in the appendix shows levels of conflict between 
0 and 62 in the executive-legislative category (EXLEG) and between 0 and 52 for in-
tra-executive conflicts (INEX). There are substantial gaps in the scores, which were 
used to determine the cut-off points between the different degrees of set membership. 
For both categories these cut-off points are around the same value, which can be 
taken as a confirmation that the measures– albeit referring to different constitutional 
dimensions – are comparable. The three political conditions – party-political orienta-
tion of president and cabinet, extent of support in parliament, and cabinet composi-
tion – can take two values each. Ideological orientation of the president and the cabi-
net in office is either shared or different, the cabinet has either majority or minority 
support in parliament, and the cabinet is either composed of a single party or of a 
coalition of parties. The three conditions were therefore attributed binary or crisp-set 
values; where 1 represents full membership and 0 full non-membership in the three 
conditions for unified government. Table E.3 in the appendix presents the coding 
scheme that was used to determine the degree of set membership for the outcomes, 
as well as for the conditions.  
In the previous section it was hypothesised that governments that share the 
same party-political orientation as the president, have majority support in parlia-
ment, and consist of a single party will be least prone to institutional clashes with 
                                                 
39  The QCA concept of set membership can be understood as the extent to which cases meet the theo-
retically or empirically determined conditions for a particular outcome or dependent variable 
(Ragin, 2000; 2008). In this analysis, cabinets that are fully in the set of a high level of intra-
executive or executive-legislative conflict scored higher than 22 and 25 on the duration sensitive 
indices INEX and EXLEG.   
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both the president and parliament. Following this line of reasoning, an FS/QCA 
analysis was conducted of cabinet scores on the three conditions for unified govern-
ment and negations of both outcome variables. Concretely, it was investigated 
whether the combination of shared party-political orientation (SHARE), majority 
support in parliament (MAJ) and single party composition (SINGLE) leads to the 
absence of high levels of intra-executive (~INEX) and executive-legislative (~EXLEG) 
conflict. This analysis resulted in a truth table, which displays the distribution of the 
100 ECE cabinets across different combinations of political conditions as well as the 
outcomes. The truth table is displayed as Table 7.3 below.  
 
 
Based on the first and sixth column of the table, it can be determined how often the 
different types of cabinets have occurred in post-communist ECE. Each of the 8 pos-
sible combinations of conditions can be found among the ECE cabinets, and there are 
no logical remainders or contradictory assumptions.40 Double divided governments 
(type 8) occurred 14 times, and double unified cabinets (type 1) 4 times. Type 2 
(shared party-political orientation, majority support, coalition) and type 6 cabinets 
(different party-political orientation, majority cabinet, and coalition government) 
were the most recurrent cabinet types, with respectively 28 and 37 appearances. The 
                                                 
40  Logical remainders are logically possible combinations of conditions that do not occur among the 
cases. The maximum possible number of causal combinations equals 23 (3 conditions with 2 possi-
ble values each) = 8. All 8 cabinet types occur across the 100 cabinets. Contradictory assumptions 
are combinations of conditions that are present among cases both with and without the outcome.   
Table 7.3: Truth table for the outcomes ~ INEX and ~ EXLEG 
Cabinet 
type 
SHARE MAJ SINGLE ~ INEX N Con. ~ EXLEG N Con. 
4 1 0 0 1 2 1.00 1 2 1.00 
1 1 1 1 1 4 0.91 0 4 0.58 
8 0 0 0 1 14 0.85 0 14 0.66 
2 1 1 0 1 28 0.82 1 28 0.80 
6 0 1 0 1 37 0.78 1 37 0.85 
7 0 0 1 0 6 0.68 1 6 0.89 
3 1 0 1 0 7 0.61 0 7 0.58 
5 0 1 1 0 2 0.33 0 2 0.67 
Note: “Con.” denotes consistency level of a particular combination of conditions and out-
comes. In bold are consistency scores of the combinations of conditions that lead to the out-
comes ~INEX and ~EXLEG.  
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truth table also shows the consistency levels for both outcomes. Consistency scores 
represent ‘the proportion of cases with a given cause or combination of causes that 
also display the outcome’ (Ragin, 2008: 46). Based on these consistency scores, it was 
decided where to place the cut-off point that delineates the cases with the outcome 
from those without. In general, consistency levels lower than .75 should be avoided 
among cases with the outcome present as it becomes difficult to maintain that a set-
theoretic relationship exists (ibid). Given the substantial drop in consistency levels 
between .78 and .68, the cut-off point for the outcome ~INEX was set at .78. For the 
outcome ~EXLEG the drop between .80 and .67 is the clearly significant, which al-
lows for placing the cut-off point for this outcome at .80. These cut-off points result 
in 5 combinations of conditions leading to the outcome ~INEX, and four leading to 
the outcome ~ EXLEG. Interestingly, the paths that lead to ~INEX are not the same 
as the ones leading to ~EXLEG. While cabinet types 2, 4 and 6 lead to low levels of 
both executive-legislative and intra-executive conflict, types 1 and 8 lead to low levels 
of intra-executive conflict only, and cabinet type 7 leads to low levels of executive-
legislative conflict. Analysis of this truth table by FS/QCA indicates that the outcome 
~INEX is the product of the absence of single party government, OR the presence of 
shared party-political orientation between the president and the cabinet AND major-
ity support for the cabinet in the legislature. This solution’s fuzzy-set notation, where 
capitals refer to the presence and lowercases to the absence of a condition and a + 
denotes a logical OR and * a logical AND, is: 
 
single + SHARE * MAJ -> inex (coverage .88, consistency .81) 
 
The coverage of this solution is .88, which means that of all cabinets where a high 
level of intra-executive conflict was absent, 88 percent displayed this combination of 
conditions. The solution’s consistency indicates that among 81 percent of the cabinets 
with this particular combination of conditions, high levels of intra-executive conflict 
were absent. The outcome ~EXLEG is the result of a different and slightly more com-
plex combination of conditions. High levels of executive-legislative conflict were ab-
sent during cabinet periods where the president and the cabinet belong to the same 
party or bloc AND the cabinet consists of a coalition, OR when the cabinet had major-
ity support in parliament AND consisted of a coalition of parties. In fuzzy-set nota-
tion the solution for this outcome is:   
CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONS 
 158
 
SHARE * single + MAJ * single -> exleg (coverage .78, consistency .84) 41 
 
The effects of the conditions of shared party-political orientation and majority sup-
port in parliament are largely in line with the hypothesis. First, the combination of 
participation of the president’s party or bloc in the cabinet and majority legislative 
support is sufficient (but not necessary) for a cabinet to remain devoid of a high level 
of intra-executive conflict.42 The presence of shared party-political orientation of the 
president and the cabinet or of majority support in parliament is a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for low levels of executive-legislative conflict.43 Not in line with 
what was hypothesised in section 7.3 is that coalitions are a necessary condition for 
the absence of high levels of executive-legislative conflict, and a sufficient condition 
for a low level of intra-executive conflict. These findings contradict the assumption 
that single party governments will be less susceptible to constitutional conflict than 
coalitions for their lack of intrinsic risk of internal divisions that may be interpreted 
as a sign of weakness by other institutional actors. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that two-thirds of the coalition governments in post-communist ECE were 
also majority governments. Even though coalitions might theoretically be more insta-
ble and prone to conflict, the political practice of ECE indicates that both parliaments 
and presidents have refrained from contesting their constitutional position. In their 
assessment of the cabinet’s political position they seemed to have weighed majority 
support in parliament as a more important factor than potential internal divisions in 
a coalition.     
A final step in FS/QCA may help determine possible alternative or additional 
explanations. To this end, the cabinets that confirm to the results of the FS/QCA were 
set apart from those cases where the results do not hold in order to check whether the 
latter share any characteristics that may provide additional explanatory information. 
Table E.4 in the appendix presents an overview of each cabinet’s membership scores 
in the two outcomes and the different paths leading to the outcomes. From this table 
can be concluded that in 81 cabinet periods a high level of intra-executive conflict was 
                                                 
41  The truth table analysis also produces a third solution, namely share * maj * SINGLE (different 
ideological orientation of the president and the cabinet, minority support in parliament, and single 
party status), but the unique coverage of this solution – meaning the number of cabinets to which it 
refers – is so low (6) that it was not taken into account.  
42  The consistency of this part of the solution for ~ INEX was .83. Hence, 83 percent of the cabinets 
that display this combination of conditions also display the outcome.  
43  The consistency scores of the two parts of the solution for ~ EXLEG are respectively .82 and .83.   
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absent (~INEX .67 or 1). In 71 of these cabinets, at least one of the two sufficient 
paths for low intra-executive conflict was present (a score of 1). There were thus 10 
cabinet periods with a low level of intra-executive conflict, but without the political 
characteristics that were found to be sufficient for that outcome.44 In 12 cabinet peri-
ods, moreover, at least one of the two sufficient paths was present but the outcome 
was not. Hence, these cabinets displayed a high level of intra-executive conflict de-
spite being a coalition government or sharing ideological orientation with the presi-
dent and having majority support in parliament.45 During 80 cabinet periods a high 
level of executive-legislative conflict was absent (~EXLEG .67 or 1). In 58 of these 
cabinets, at least one of the two sufficient paths was present, and in an additional 5 
cabinets the outcome can be attributed to the omitted part of the solution was (see 
footnote 7). If we exclude these 5 cases, 17 cabinets remain where the outcome 
~EXLEG was present, but neither of the two sufficient conditions was.46 In 9 cabi-
nets, moreover, one of the sufficient conditions was present, but the outcome was not 
(hence, a high level of conflict in spite of the membership in one of the two sufficient 
paths).47  
A closer look at these cabinets may help uncover additional political circum-
stances that have provoked the occurrence of constitutional conflict in spite of the 
presence of the sufficient conditions, or that have precluded the occurrence of high 
levels of conflict despite the absence of the sufficient causal conditions (cf. Vis, 2008: 
132). A crude analysis of the 22 cabinet periods that do not confirm to the results for 
the outcome ~INEX indicates that timing and sequence may have played a role in the 
development of constitutional conflict across the region. Out of 10 cabinets with a low 
level of intra-executive conflict, but with neither of the sufficient conditions, all but 2 
were in office after 1997. Conversely, all but 3 of the 12 cabinets that displayed the 
sufficient conditions but also a high level of intra-executive conflict, were in office 
before 1997. This indicates that in the early 1990s even cabinets that were a coalition 
or that contained the president’s party in combination with majority legislative sup-
port were subject to high levels of intra-executive conflict. On the other hand, these 
                                                 
44  Sofiyanski, Kostov, Zeman, Vähi III, Siiman, Birkavs, Buzek II, Miller II, Marcinkiewicz and Va-
cariou. 
45  Laar I, Tarand, Krasts I, Kristopans II, Vagnorius, Olszewski, Pawlak, Oleksy, Stolojan, Vasile, Mo-
ravcik and Meciar IV. 
46  Dimitrov, Videnov, Kostov, Klaus II, Kallas, Gailis, Kristopans, Emsis, Abišala, Lubys, Paksas II, 
Bielecki, Buzek II, Miller II, Vacariou II, Bajuk, and Jansa.     
47  Popov, Berov, Krasts I, Mečiar I, Mečiar III, Mečiar IV, Dzurinda 98-99, Dzurinda 99-02 and 
Drnovsek I.  
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conditions were not required to preclude such conflicts from occurring in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Apparently, the first presidents in the region were much more 
willing to contest the constitutional position of cabinets, notwithstanding the political 
circumstances. This may be taken as an indicator of a gradual stabilisation of intra-
executive relations, which can increasingly withstand different types of political cir-
cumstances.  
With regard to cabinets that do not confirm to the outcomes of the analysis of 
executive-legislative conflict, here is no clear cross-time pattern observable. One 
other feature that catches the eye is that out of 12 cabinets with high levels of execu-
tive-legislative conflict, and with the sufficient conditions for a low level of conflict, 5 
were Slovak. Slovakia’s executive-legislative relations have been notable for being 
problematic, especially during the terms of Prime Minister Mečiar (see Haughton, 
2003). However, it goes too far to attribute this pattern to the conduct of a single 
politician, and further analyses are needed to grasp these developments both in Slo-
vakia and in the other cabinets more fully.   
 
7.6 Conclusion and implications 
 
This chapter has investigated the variation of levels and dominant types of constitu-
tional conflict during 100 cabinet periods in ten post-communist ECE countries. In 
order to explain this cross-cabinet variation, the chapter analysed whether political 
circumstances provided incentives for politicians to challenge the constitutional 
status quo. Drawing on the literatures on inter-institutional cooperation and conflict 
in (semi) presidential and parliamentary systems, it was hypothesised that the per-
ceived political strength of cabinets matters for the likelihood that parliaments and 
presidents challenge their constitutional position. Specifically, it was expected that 
inclusion of the president’s party or bloc in the cabinet, majority support in parlia-
ment and single party status may ensure that a cabinet remains devoid of high levels 
of executive-legislative and intra-executive conflict.    
Through FS/QCA it was shown that this hypothesis could partially be con-
firmed by the patterns of conflict and political circumstances in post-communist 
ECE. Majority support in parliament, in combination with shared party-political ori-
entation of the president and cabinet, was found to be a sufficient condition for low 
levels of intra-executive competition. Shared ideological orientation between presi-
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dents and cabinets and majority support also led to low levels of executive-legislative 
conflict, but only in combination with coalition government. Coalition government, 
moreover, proved to be a sufficient condition for low levels of intra-executive conflict. 
These findings contradict the hypothesis that single party governments would be less 
frequently involved in intra-executive and executive-legislative conflicts due to their 
limited risk of internal divisions. This is an interesting finding against the backdrop 
of existing analyses of coalition government in established democracies, which – al-
though finding some evidence for greater durability of single party governments – 
were left with a great deal of unexplained variation (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 153). 
This was partly due to the limited degree of variation within systems in the frequency 
of cabinet types. The most stable political systems had a preponderance of stable 
cabinet types, and unstable systems had mostly unstable cabinet types (Laver and 
Schofield, 1990: 154). The current analysis might suffer from an empirical trait of a 
similar nature, which has also been labelled ‘limited diversity’ (see Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2006). The overall number of single party cabinets is relatively low, but 
more importantly the proportion of cabinets with high levels of constitutional conflict 
among coalition governments is limited. This might be a specific attribute of coali-
tions in the ECE region, but it is more likely that this outcome of the analysis is a 
product of the limited variation among cabinets of this particular type.    
What can be concluded on the basis of these findings about the underlying as-
sumption that political considerations provide motives for politicians to challenge the 
constitutional status quo? The findings for the intra-executive conflict category are 
quite clear in this respect, as they indicated that presidents and majority cabinets 
with similar party origin were better able to cooperate than presidents and cabinets 
from different parties or party blocs. Generally speaking, therefore, shared party-
political identity and the political strength of cabinets were sufficient to prevent high 
levels of constitutional conflict in a majority of ECE cabinets. The analysis of addi-
tional explanatory factors, however, indicated that this was not true for the entire 
post-communist period. Presidents in the early 1990s proved to be willing to chal-
lenge the intra-executive balance of power under various circumstances, even in case 
the cabinets in question contained their own party or had majority support in parlia-
ment. This suggests that constitutional challenges in the early 1990s were aimed at 
modifying the constitutional design, while later intra-executive conflicts were primar-
ily rooted in party-political differences.        
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The analyses of executive-legislative conflict produced less clear results, but 
can nevertheless be interpreted as largely confirmative of the hypotheses. Both 
shared party-political orientation between presidents and cabinets and majority legis-
lative support precluded high levels of executive-legislative conflict, but only in com-
bination with coalition government. This confirms the assumption that a cabinet’s 
position vis-à-vis the legislature is conditioned by the direct interrelation between the 
two institutions, but also by relations between the president and cabinet. Party-
political relations between institutional actors thus constituted an important motiva-
tion for politicians to engage in, or to refrain from, constitutional conflict. Consider-
ing the findings of the previous chapters, this implies that the occurrence and pat-
terns of constitutional conflict in post-communist ECE can best be understood as an 
interaction of institutional opportunities and incentives, as well as political motiva-
tions.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The negotiation and adoption of new constitutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
concluded over fifty years of authoritarian rule in ECE, and paved the way for its ‘re-
turn to Europe’ (Batt, 2007: 15). What followed was a concurrent social, economic 
and political transformation that was unprecedented in its scale and impact. Yet, the 
replacement of the communist legal system with democratic constitutions did not 
denote the end of constitutional debate, engineering, and change. The roles and pre-
rogatives of parliaments, governments, presidents and constitutional review bodies 
remained subject to political conflict, re-interpretation, and modification until the 
early 2000s in practically all countries in this region. Rather than providing a stable 
and legitimate framework of rules for political conflict and decision-making, the con-
stitutions of post-communist ECE were themselves frequent subjects of discussion 
and change. This study’s aim has been to investigate the sources of constitutional 
conflict, as well as to assess its consequences for constitutional development and de-
mocratic consolidation in 10 ECE countries. The following research question has 
guided the dissertation.  
 
How, when, and why were political actors in post-communist East Central 
Europe engaged in political conflicts about constitutional provisions on the 
competencies of, and relations between, state institutions, and to what extent 
did these conflicts affect constitutional change and democratic consolidation? 
 
The aim of this final chapter is to discuss the study’s findings in light of the central 
research question and to reflect on its contribution to our understanding of the trans-
formation of post-communist ECE, as well as to the broader body of knowledge of 
democratisation and constitutional stability and change. This thesis has investigated 
the phenomenon of constitutional conflict, both in terms of its sources and effects, 
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from a variety of analytical perspectives. By combining regional outlooks with cross-
national and cross-time comparisons, a patterned variation of constitutional conflict, 
reconciliation and change in 10 ECE polities has emerged. Although interesting re-
gional trends and cross-national similarities could be distinguished, there has been 
no regionally uniform process of constitutional development and consolidation. Un-
derstanding the historical, institutional and political sources of variation in this 
multi-dimensional map of constitutional conflict has been this thesis’ main investiga-
tive goal. The following sections will summarise the results of the analysis, and reflect 
on its broader theoretical, methodological, and practical implications. Section 2 dis-
cusses the main findings in light of three conventional beliefs about constitutional 
engineering, change, and democratisation. Section 3 reflects on theoretical and 
methodological implications of this study, and discusses possible improvements and 
additions. Section 4 concludes by placing this study’s findings in a broader perspec-
tive of past and potential future constitutional developments within and beyond ECE.        
 
8.2 Main findings of the dissertation 
 
According to Klaus von Beyme (2001: 24), constitutional development in post-
communist ECE indicates that ‘the old assumptions that institutional change must be 
completed in the initial stage have been falsified’. He notes that electoral volatility 
and weak party systems, as well as a lack of agreement on the political ground rules 
during the constitution-making stage, created room to manoeuvre for politicians in 
the region to continue making adaptations to key constitutional arrangements. In 
these developments, Von Beyme recognises a parallel with West European constitu-
tional experience in the 20th century. Referring to such countries as France, Belgium, 
Italy and Sweden, he suggests that constitutional change and institutional engineer-
ing were regularly applied to deal with problems of political instability, legitimacy 
and participation (see also Alexander, 2001). Although apart from France’s adoption 
of semi-presidentialism in 1958, no West European country has changed its constitu-
tional system that dramatically; various modifications to electoral systems, executive-
legislative relations and other constitutional arrangements in these established de-
mocracies indicate that ‘stability is the exception rather than the rule in constitutional 
history’ (Von Beyme, 2001: 3). Moreover, what can be observed is that these constitu-
tional reforms were aimed at reconciling perceived problems of legitimacy and insti-
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tutional efficiency, were preceded by competition between pro-reform forces and ad-
vocates of the constitutional status quo, and were introduced through democratic de-
cision-making procedures. These observations reflect some of this study’s main find-
ings with regard to constitutional conflict, reconciliation, and change in post-
communist ECE. In addition, they call for a reconsideration of three conventional 
beliefs about constitutional engineering and the role of constitutional stability and 
change in processes of democratisation.  
In the first place, post-adoption constitutional dynamics in both ECE and 
Western Europe suggest that it is difficult to anticipate the consequences of constitu-
tional engineering and choice. This puts into question the rationalist idea that “good” 
constitutions can be designed, and that constitutional engineers are able to foresee 
the consequences of their choices and agreements. Especially during periods of re-
gime change, time pressure and uncertainty about the future balance of power may 
undermine politicians’ capacity to assess the effects of their institutional preferences 
(Geddes, 1996). Rather than hoping that a particular institutional design will bring 
what is best for them, politicians will be inclined to opt for safer alternatives by, for 
example, leaving high-stake constitutional issues open for future discussion or consti-
tutional review (Frye, 1997). Sometimes, as Jon Elster puts it, ‘it may be better to 
dump a problem on the future […] than to try and solve it immediately’ (1993: 192). 
This study’s findings regarding ambiguous outcomes of constitution-making proc-
esses suggest that such strategic choices under uncertainty also prevailed in the ECE 
region. Another implication of the unforeseeable consequences of constitutional re-
form is that a ‘basic analytical distinction between periods of institutional creation 
and periods of institutional stasis’ (Krasner, 1984: 240) cannot be made. The political 
circumstances, institutional preferences and power relations in place during the con-
stitution-making process may change once the constitution is adopted, for example as 
a result of elections. Consequently, perceptions, interpretations and evaluations of 
initial constitutional choices may change, which in turn can stimulate politicians to 
return to the constitutional drawing table. Even though the scope of constitutional 
change during the early transition period has remained unparalleled thus far, the 
modification efforts and changes that occurred in post-communist ECE suggest that 
constitutional engineering should be understood as a continuous, dynamic process 
rather than clearly and definitively fixed in time (cf. Hart, 2003; Shapiro and Stone, 
1994).      
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Secondly, and related to the first point, is that constitutional arrangements 
and political institutions are not as resistant to change as is sometimes believed. 
Based on new institutionalist assumptions about institutional evolution and stability, 
challenges of existing institutions by political actors and modifications after institu-
tional formation are often considered atypical (cf. Hay, 2008). Similarly, recommen-
dations for constitutional design are frequently based on the presumption that insti-
tutions tend ‘to be very stable and to resist change’ (Lijphart, 1994: 52). Yet, this 
study has shown that interactions between institutional opportunities and political 
motivations have stimulated politicians in post-communist ECE to challenge the con-
stitutional status quo through re-interpretation and modification attempts after con-
stitutional replacement. The distributional consequences of constitutional design, 
constitutional ambiguity, and political motives created a context in which political 
actors were willing and able to challenge the interpretation, application, and con-
tinuation of their institutional environment. Although these challenges did not pro-
duce major constitutional shifts, the results of the ensuing constitutional conflicts 
and settlements can be understood as constitutional change. Textual modification, 
interpretations by constitutional review bodies, and informal settlement of constitu-
tional conflict represented the pallet of incremental constitutional change that 
evolved in the ECE region. The process of constitutional conflict, reconciliation, and 
change as it occurred in post-communist ECE thus shows how interactions between 
actors and their institutional environment may provoke change that would not have 
been expected exclusively based on institutionalist reasoning. 
The third, and perhaps most important, convention that may have to be recon-
sidered on the basis of this study’s findings is the idea that constitutional stability and 
legitimacy represent crucial conditions for democratic consolidation. In democratisa-
tion studies it is often argued that acceptance of democratic norms on the part of citi-
zens and elites as well as predictability and stability of democratic institutions are 
necessary for democracies to endure (cf. Schmidt, 2008: 438-439; Gunther, Diaman-
dourus and Puhle, 1995: 13; Przeworski, 1991, 2005). As was argued in chapter 1, 
constitutional conflicts therefore present an intriguing puzzle for research into de-
mocratic consolidation. On the one hand, constitutional conflict may destabilise and 
delegitimize a democratic constitution. On the other hand, however, the process of 
constitutional conflict, reconciliation and change may confirm or establish constitu-
tional legitimacy and may be compatible with a democratic political culture tolerant 
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of opposition and dissent (Dahl, 1971; O’Donnell, 1990). In Western Europe, consti-
tutional modifications have been successful in re-legitimising and stabilising existing 
institutional frameworks. The patterns of constitutional conflict and conflict resolu-
tion in post-communist ECE indicate that politicians in that region, too, were willing 
and capable of waging and reconciling their constitutional battles by democratic 
means. This suggests that even though constitutional conflict may stem from a sense 
of illegitimacy of the existing constitutional framework, constitutional conflict and 
reconciliation can be compatible with democratic political competition, and contrib-
ute to the development of a legitimate constitutional framework.  
How do the findings of this study relate to these considerations on constitu-
tional engineering, stability and change and what do they imply for our understand-
ing of democratic consolidation and constitutional change in the post-communist 
ECE region? The results of this thesis’ search for the sources and effects of constitu-
tional conflict will be discussed with this question in mind below.  
 
Constitutional conflict and democratic consolidation 
 
This thesis finds that constitutional conflict has been part and parcel of the process of 
democratic consolidation, rather than undermining it. Three findings support this 
contention. In the first place, nowhere did constitutional conflict ignite changes that 
undermined the democratic character of the adopted constitutions. Constitutional 
change in post-communist ECE has been incremental rather than dramatic, and in 
none of the countries under review has support for a ‘communist restoration’ been 
broad and continuous (Haerpfer, 2002). With the quote of March and Olsen (2008: 
13) in chapter 2 in mind, change has been ‘within fairly stable institutional frame-
works’ rather than ‘in the frameworks themselves’. Possible exceptions to this trend 
were conflicts related to the powers and position of constitutional review bodies that 
emerged in a limited number of countries (see chapters 3 and 6). These were chal-
lenges to judicial independence and the separation of powers. However, the fact that 
constitutional courts managed to maintain their independence in spite of attempts to 
curtail their powers serves as an additional confirmation of the resilience of these 
novel democracies.  
Secondly, the strategies that were applied by political actors engaged in consti-
tutional conflict were almost without exception in line with constitutionally permitted 
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norms. In none of the countries under review did disagreement among politicians 
about the interpretation or implementation of constitutional provisions provoke the 
use of violence or other severe transgressions of constitutional norms. Again, the role 
that was played by constitutional review bodies and the acceptance of court decisions 
provide important indicators. In chapter 6 it was stated that almost 30 percent of 
constitutional disputes across the region were referred to constitutional courts for 
interpretation. Constitutional review has been instrumental in the settlement of in-
tra-executive competition and in averting power concentrating attempts on the part 
of presidents. The courts of Bulgaria and Hungary have been especially successful in 
this context (see also Ganev, 2003; Solyóm, 2003). In a very limited number of cases 
were court rulings questioned or defied by politicians. Most cases brought before the 
courts resulted in settlements that were accepted by the contending parties, indicat-
ing a commitment to the rule of law and the separation of powers on the part of ECE 
politicians.  
The third indication that constitutional conflict in ECE has been compatible 
with democratisation concerns the motivations for constitutional conflict. The find-
ings of this thesis suggest that contestation of constitutional arrangements in post-
communist ECE was neither rooted in widespread discontent with the distributional 
consequences of constitutional design, nor in feelings of exclusion or injustice about 
the constitution-making process. Both of these factors were hypothesised to consti-
tute important sources of constitutional illegitimacy, and to provide potential incen-
tives for challenging the constitutional status quo. Yet, a comparison of constitution-
making procedures in 7 ECE countries (in chapter 4) indicated that the degree to 
which constitution making was open to participation by opposition groups and citi-
zens did not affect subsequent levels of constitutional conflict in the first five years 
following constitutional replacement. During this potentially critical phase in the po-
litical transformation of ECE, constitutional conflicts did not occur more frequently 
in such countries as Hungary and Poland, where constitution-making had been com-
paratively less open to deliberation and the inclusion of diverse interests. Constitu-
tional design did play a role in the occurrence and evolution of constitutional conflict, 
but not to the extent that power-concentration and exclusion of particular groups 
provoked a pervasive lack of constitutional legitimacy that might have destabilised 
the new democracies of ECE. Power-concentrating attempts by various presidents in 
the ECE region provoked intense intra-executive conflict, but these attempts were 
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averted through constitutional court rulings and constitutional amendments. In addi-
tion, there have been constitutional conflicts related to what was labelled in chapter 6 
the gradual emancipation of ECE executives. While parliaments in the region initially 
were powerful institutions, their dominance over governments waned throughout the 
1990s as a result of the professionalization of executives, increased cabinet stability, 
and European integration (Kopecký, 2004; Zubek, 2008). Although these develop-
ments were challenged on the part of legislatures, they actually contributed to a more 
balanced situation as regards executive-legislative relations in ECE. 
Rather than being rooted in illegitimate constitution-making procedures or 
power-concentrating constitutional design, constitutional conflict could often be 
linked with “regular” political competition over policies and votes. Analyses of the 
comparatively high levels of conflict during the first stage of political transformation 
have indicated that political disagreement over policy issues frequently triggered con-
stitutional competition. Especially the pace and direction of economic reforms was a 
polarising factor, causing a spill over of disagreement over ‘first-order rules’ to con-
flict over ‘second-order rules’ (Alexander, 2002a: 1161). Presidents and governments 
utilised constitutional ambiguities to stretch their competencies in attempts to push 
through political agendas. Party-political relations shaped patterns of conflict on 
other constitutional dimensions as well. In chapter 7, it was found that both intra-
executive and executive-legislative conflict occurred less frequently during cabinet 
periods in which the president’s party participated in government, and in which the 
cabinet had majority support in the legislature. This suggests that shared political 
identities and agendas take away the incentives for politicians to challenge constitu-
tional relations.  
High levels of constitutional conflict seem not to have jeopardised the process 
of democratic consolidation. While conflict levels in Bulgaria and Slovakia were high 
in a regional perspective, the stabilisation of constitutional frameworks in these coun-
tries set in earlier than in some of the other polities under review with lower conflict 
levels, like Hungary and Estonia. High conflict levels did not imply that constitutional 
illegitimacy was more widespread among political elites or concerned more constitu-
tional issues either. In Bulgaria, for example, many of the conflicts during the first 
five years following constitutional replacement were the result of attempts to consoli-
date the power of one party, the BSP. Both in its relations with President Zhelev 
(UDF), and vis-à-vis the parliamentary opposition, the BSP majority in parliament 
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tried to curb the constitutional position of its political opponents through constitu-
tional amendments and regular legislation (see chapter 3). The constitutional court of 
Bulgaria stalled most of these attempts, which stimulated the BSP to challenge the 
position of that institution as well. Poland was one of the other countries with a high 
level of constitutional conflict. Yet, 65 percent of the instances of constitutional con-
flict concerned the prerogatives and position of the president, and most of these were 
concentrated during the Pawlak-Wałęsa co-existence between 1993 and 1995. As a 
consequence, discussions about other constitutional dimensions were comparatively 
rare in Poland, while the role and powers of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal re-
mained even entirely off the political agenda.  
These findings indicate that patterns of constitutional conflict, reconciliation 
and change in post-communist ECE were anything but uniform. Yet, in spite of 
marked cross-national differences in terms of intensity, timing, and focus of constitu-
tional conflict, nowhere did constitutional disputes seriously hinder democratic con-
solidation. Rather, constitutional conflict was predominantly an extension of “regu-
lar” political competition within the boundaries of democratic constitutional norms.  
 
The unforeseeable consequences of constitutional design 
 
The idea that the effects of constitutional engineering are difficult to anticipate is es-
pecially reflected in the ambiguities in many ECE constitutions. The fuzziness of im-
portant constitutional provisions proved to be a key factor for the occurrence and 
type of constitutional conflict, and could especially be linked to conflict over intra-
executive relations. Although it was not in the scope of this thesis to analyse constitu-
tional bargaining strategies, there are indicators that uncertainty and strategic behav-
iour during the constitution-making process led to such incomplete and inconsistent 
constitutional provisions. As Barbara Geddes (1996: 21-30) notes in her analysis of 
institutional choice in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, uncertainty on the 
part of both communist parties and opposition groups regarding the strength of their 
opponents was high. This was subsequently reflected in the adoption of PR or mixed 
electoral systems and presidential offices with rather limited power (see also Lijphart, 
1992; Frye, 1997). These institutional choices guaranteed the bargaining parties some 
share of power, but they also left many constitutional issues ambiguous.  
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The position and conduct of presidents in post-communist ECE deserves par-
ticular attention in this context. As was illustrated in chapter 3, the role and powers of 
presidents have been by far the most recurring and widespread topic of constitutional 
contention. Except in Slovakia and Slovenia, it was the most frequently contested 
constitutional dimension, and with parliamentary procedures it raised discussion in 
all countries under review. Given the choice for dual executive constitutional design 
across ECE, it is not surprising that presidential powers were such a frequent topic of 
debate. In political systems where heads of state and prime ministers have to share 
powers, discussions about the distribution of executive competencies are bound to 
arise (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Taras, 1997; Baylis, 2007). Although this problem is 
commonly associated with semi-presidential constitutional design (cf. Elgie, 1999), 
this study has shown that popular election of presidents was no necessary condition 
for such conflicts. Intra-executive competition between presidents and cabinets has 
not been less common in countries where presidents are elected by legislatures. Two 
factors were of particular importance for the occurrence and evolution of these con-
flicts. In the first place, ambiguities in constitutional design were especially apparent 
with regard to the role of presidents in the political process. The presidency was 
among the most fiercely debated topics during constitutional negotiations, and the 
combination of uncertainty about future political developments and the high stakes 
involved with the presidential office led to constitutional designs in which relations 
between presidents and cabinets were often not clearly defined. Chapters 4 and 5 
showed that these ambiguities stimulated ECE presidents to try and broaden their 
constitutional power, especially in such areas as defence, foreign policy and national 
security affairs. A second factor that may account for the predominance of intra-
executive conflicts in ECE relates to the identities and past experience of presidents 
and prime ministers in the region. Although the impact of “personality” was deliber-
ately left out of this thesis’ investigation, there are indicators that especially the first 
presidents in the region were better known and more popular than prime ministers 
during that period (Baylis, 2007: 89-90). Their reputation as political dissidents dur-
ing the late communist era stimulated men such as Wałęsa, Göncz, Havel, Meri and 
Zhelev to conceive of their role as being ‘above the parties’ (Taras, 1997: 17-18). Many 
prime ministers, on the other hand, had less unblemished reputations due to past 
involvement in the Communist Party, and had to cope with unstable coalitions, un-
disciplined parties, and unpopular economic reforms. The combination of politically 
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ambitious presidents and constitutional ambiguity about their role and specific com-
petencies created a context in which presidents and prime ministers were frequently 
pitted against one another.       
Whether these conflicts were indicative of a lust for power on the part of presi-
dents or represented a true interest in the political and democratic affairs of their na-
tions remains to be seen. While the thesis found that attempts to concentrate power 
in the presidential office were successfully averted through adjudication and constitu-
tional change, the analysis also indicated that party-political relations did not always 
prevent presidents from engaging in intra-executive competition. In this context, 
chapter 7 found that presidential challenges of the constitutional powers of cabinets 
in the early 1990s occurred even when the president’s party participated in govern-
ment and the government had majority legislative support. Later, these political con-
ditions were sufficient to prevent presidents from engaging in intra-executive con-
flicts. These findings suggest that the first presidents in the ECE region were inter-
ested in enhancing their constitutional position, while later during the 1990s intra-
executive competition was primarily an extension of party-politics.        
 
Constitutional stability and change in post-communist ECE 
 
Political actors were rarely engaged in constitutional conflict with the aim of changing 
the constitution textually, but the effects of conflict and reconciliation on the stability 
and change of constitutional frameworks in ECE are evident. This study has found 
three types of constitutional modification that can be linked to constitutional conflict. 
The impact of these different types of change on the stability and legitimacy of the 
constitutional frameworks in the region varied, but they all indicate widespread ‘post-
formative change’ (Hay, 2008). Based on the analysis of constitutional conflict and 
change regarding intra-executive relations in Poland and Hungary (chapter 5), three 
general modes of conflict settlement were distinguished that also reflect develop-
ments in other countries and on other constitutional dimensions. Two of these set-
tlement modes concerned formal constitutional change through amendment or adju-
dication, while the third represented informal outcomes of constitutional conflict.     
Formal constitutional change in post-communist ECE has occurred primarily 
through interpretations and rulings by constitutional review bodies. Although this 
type of conflict settlement does not produce direct changes in the text of a constitu-
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tion, adjudication can be perceived of as ‘implicit constitutional change’ (Stone Sweet, 
2008: 224, see also Voigt, 1999; Rasch, 2008). Through its interpretations and deci-
sions, a constitutional court ‘simultaneously resolves a legislative dispute and enacts 
the constitution’ (Stone Sweet, 2002: 93, emphasis in original). The impact of adjudi-
cation on constitutional stability is not necessarily less profound as textual change 
through constitutional amendment. The rulings on presidential power by the Hun-
garian constitutional court, for example, were of major importance for the settlement 
of intra-executive competition between President Göncz and Prime Minister Horn, 
and produced an interpretation of the role of the president that would remain unchal-
lenged. In Poland, by contrast, attempts to formally curtail the president’s powers 
through amendments were in vain and did not restrain Lech Wałęsa’s ambitions to 
expand his political influence.   
Textual constitutional change through amendments occurred much less fre-
quently in the countries of ECE. One prominent example of textual change that could 
be linked directly to the occurrence of constitutional conflict was the introduction of 
the new Polish constitution in 1997. Although the intention to adopt a new constitu-
tion remained after attempts to do so in the early 1990s failed, continuing constitu-
tional turmoil stimulated Polish politicians to join forces and adopt a new document 
(Van der Meer-Krok Paszkowska, 2000: 60-61). The experiences with Wałęsa’s use of 
the ambiguities in the 1992 Little Constitution and the resulting political crises were a 
powerful incentive to limit the role of the president in the 1997 constitution 
(Jasiewicz, 1997: 165). Other examples of such conflict-based constitutional change 
were the introduction of direct presidential elections in Slovakia following Vladimir 
Mečiar’s attempts to accumulate presidential prerogatives in the prime ministerial 
office, and the adoption of the 1995 defence act in order to clarify responsibilities of 
the president and the defence minister in Slovenia. Overall, however, textual change 
as a way of settling constitutional conflict remained relatively rare across ECE.  
Informal outcomes of constitutional conflict were prominently visible in the 
analysis of constitutional ambiguity in Poland, where President Wałęsa initially en-
forced his interpretation of the constitutional balance of power between the president 
and the council of ministers (see chapter 5). To do so, he could depend on his popu-
larity and political strength, as well as the weak position of his political opponents 
(Jasiewicz, 1997: 153). In 1995, Wałęsa even managed to oust a prime minister in a 
constitutional conflict over the budget approval procedure. Comparable political out-
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comes of constitutional conflict were common across the region in the form of com-
promises between contending parties, parliamentary votes, as well as threats with 
votes of no confidence or even impeachment. In these cases, political relations be-
tween, and the strength of, contending parties seemed to be decisive for the prevail-
ing interpretation of the constitution. As was argued in chapter 5, however, the risk 
that such conflicts reappear on the political agenda was real as changing political cir-
cumstances may undermine the initial agreement. As a consequence, various conflicts 
resurfaced repeatedly throughout the period of analysis, which could be attributed 
either to the absence of a clear settlement of the conflict, or to a changed political 
context. In Bulgaria, for example, the constitution was unclear on whether constitu-
tional authority to grant international troops access to Bulgarian territory resides 
with parliament, the cabinet, or the National Security Council. In the absence of a 
clear and formal solution, the different institutions claimed jurisdiction each time 
international organisations requested access. This indicates that, without formal con-
stitutional change, ambiguities continued to ignite constitutional conflict, while the 
durability of informal settlements was highly dependent upon political circum-
stances.      
 Constitutional change in post-communist ECE has been incremental rather 
than of a radical nature. With the exception of a few textual changes, constitutions in 
the region have predominantly evolved through adjudication and political settle-
ments of constitutional conflict. What accounts for the particular pattern of constitu-
tional conflict settlement that emerged in ECE? The impact of constitutional review 
bodies in the region was profound, as has been recognised in several other studies 
(see Smithey and Ishiyama, 2002; Solyóm, 2003; Ganev, 2003; Bond, 2006). Various 
factors may explain this success, such as partisan divisions in other political institu-
tions (Smithey and Ishiyama, 2002), continuities in a country’s legal tradition (Bond, 
2006), and the courts’ constitutional mandate. The findings in this study suggest that 
the extent to which constitutional courts have been able exert influence was also de-
pendent upon politicians’ willingness to refer constitutional disputes for adjudication 
and to accept court decisions. This implies that a part of the explanation lies with po-
litical actors and their conduct (cf. Schwartz, 1998: 113-114). Respect for the rule of 
law and the separation of powers, and a determination to settle constitutional dis-
putes authoritatively on the part of politicians, may therefore explain the prevalence 
of constitutional adjudication in the region. The other dominant outcome of constitu-
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tional conflicts – political settlements – may be indicative of the development of con-
ventions or ‘standard operating procedures’ (March and Olsen, 1989). For example, 
the changed balance of power between executives and legislatures in favour of the 
former occurred largely without formal constitutional change. Rather, it was a proc-
ess of incremental expansion of executive capacities on the one hand, and growing 
party discipline and parliamentary stabilisation on the other. This may therefore rep-
resent an example of informal constitutional change. Yet, it may take long before 
conventions become legitimate and they run the risk of becoming obsolete as a result 
of changing political circumstances such as electoral shifts. Obviously, therefore, we 
should not assume that all constitutional discussions in ECE have been settled defini-
tively.    
 
8.3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 
 
In chapter 2, it was argued that new institutionalist theory and democratisation stud-
ies provide valuable insights about institutional change and stability, as well as de-
mocratic consolidation. Yet, it was also argued that they are limited when it comes to 
explaining constitutional conflict and assessing its impact in terms of change and 
democratisation. To what extent have these shortcomings been successfully con-
fronted, and has the research method applied in this thesis contributed to our knowl-
edge and understanding of constitutional change and democratisation in ECE?  
First, as regards democratisation studies, this thesis called for an approach to 
constitutional legitimacy and stability that recognises the dual nature of constitu-
tional conflict. Rather than assuming that the ground rules of the political system 
should remain exempt from political disputes, it was argued that actor preferences, 
strategies, and outcomes of conflict should be analysed in order to assess the impact 
of constitutional conflict for democratic consolidation. This thesis has shown that 
such preferences, strategies, and outcomes reflected an overall commitment to de-
mocratic norms, on the basis of which it was concluded that constitutional conflict 
was compatible with democratic consolidation in post-communist ECE. This finding 
suggests that the emphasis on the destabilising effects of constitutional conflict and 
change in democratisation studies is mistakenly one-dimensional, for it overlooks 
how constitutional conflict and reconciliation may add to the legitimacy and durabil-
ity of a democratic constitution. Yet, if constitutional conflict in ECE has been indica-
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tive of a democratic political culture, the question may be raised what the absence of 
constitutional competition would imply. Four of the polities under review displayed 
comparatively low levels of conflict, and constitutional conflict disappeared alto-
gether in ECE towards the early 2000s. While the low amounts of conflict in Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic may be a reflection of their smooth transitions and culturally 
and politically homogeneous societies, the Estonian and Romanian conflict pattern 
are more puzzling.48 Based on its violent break with communism and difficult transi-
tion, one would expect higher levels of constitutional conflict in Romania. Similarly, 
the problems of an ethnically divided society in Estonia might have been translated 
into intense constitutional conflict. Although it is conceivable that a democratic po-
litical culture and constitutional legitimacy were present right from the start in these 
countries, low conflict levels may also indicate that tolerance of opposition and dis-
sent is less well developed. Consequently, disagreement about the constitutional 
status quo may explicitly or implicitly be repressed. Although such counterfactual 
reasoning is speculative without further research, it is worthwhile bearing in mind 
that the absence of constitutional conflict might also signify problems with democ-
ratic consolidation.     
Secondly, it can be argued that a purely institutionalist approach would have 
been insufficient to capture and understand constitutional conflict, reconciliation and 
change in the ECE region. An institutionalist focus would have overlooked the incre-
mental and informal constitutional developments this thesis has found, as well as the 
political sources of constitutional conflict and modification. It has been this thesis’ 
aim neither to dismiss institutionalist theories and assumptions altogether, nor to call 
for a purely actor-centred approach to constitutional stability and change. Rather, it 
was proposed that interactions between institutional structures and opportunities on 
the one hand, and preferences and motivations of politicians on the other, would best 
explain constitutional developments in ECE. The analyses have shown that it was, 
indeed, the interplay between institutional and political factors that triggered the oc-
currence of constitutional conflicts. Hence, rationalist assumptions about intentional 
institutional design were found inapt as a result of uncertainty and strategic behav-
iour during constitution-making processes. Constitutional ambiguities provided po-
litical actors with opportunities to continue institutional engineering, while political 
                                                 
48  Recall that chapter 3 reported 8 conflicts in Romania, 9 in Estonia, and 10 each in the Czech Re-
public and Slovenia. Herewith, these countries scored well below the average of 15.2 conflicts in the 
10 countries under review.   
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motives stimulated politicians to actually do so. The logic of path dependence was 
applicable to the overall stability of constitutional frameworks in ECE and a gradually 
decreasing conflict level. However, this overlooked how politicians in the region have 
continuously engaged in modification attempts, and how incremental changes 
brought about a constitutional transformation “below the surface”. Politicians were 
clearly willing to accept uncertainties about short-term costs and long-term benefits 
of change when they engaged in challenges of the constitutional status quo. Although 
uncertainties created by the constitutions themselves may explain part of this risky 
behaviour, strategic and party-political motivations were equally important for the 
course of constitutional development in post-communist ECE. The normative institu-
tionalist tendency to downplay actor induced institutional change has been shown to 
underestimate the capacity of politicians to affect and modify their institutional envi-
ronment. This thesis has shown that there is no need for “orthogonal cultures” to 
stimulate actors to challenge existing constitutional norms. At the same time, the re-
silience of democratic norms and the reconciliation of constitutional conflict within 
democratic boundaries indicated that constitutional development in ECE was change 
within, rather than of the overarching normative framework. These findings suggest 
that even though some of the important mechanisms and forces proposed by the new 
institutionalism were present in the process of constitutional development in post-
communist ECE, they provide only a partial explanation. By taking into account the 
interaction between structural and political factors, this thesis has gone beyond an 
institutionalist perspective in order to explain constitutional stability and change.     
Chapter 1 presented three potentially relevant factors for constitutional con-
flict that were omitted from the analyses: European Integration, the “personality” 
factor, and diffusion. While the investigation found no evidence that diffusion 
mechanisms played a role in patterns of conflict, European integration and personal 
traits of ECE politicians may well have affected constitutional development. The ef-
fects of European integration were especially relevant in the context of executive-
legislative relations, which evolved from legislative dominance to a more equal bal-
ance of power. EU membership criteria or accession procedures did not provoke spe-
cific constitutional debates, but it can be assumed that executive-legislative conflicts 
were partly indicative of the resistance by ECE parliaments against the growing role 
of governments in the pre-accession stage. Although this suggests that European in-
tegration was a factor to take into account, its effects were indirect and seemed of no 
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importance for conflict patterns on other constitutional dimensions. Personal traits 
and past experience of political actors, however, have had a more direct and visible 
impact on constitutional conflict. As has been argued above, the popularity and self-
image of some of the first post-communist presidents seem to have stimulated them 
to challenge the intra-executive constitutional power balance. Yet, such challenges 
cannot be solely attributed to the characteristics of individuals. Two additional fac-
tors should be taken into account in order to understand these constitutional con-
flicts. In the first place, political relations were sufficient to withhold presidents from 
challenging the constitutional status quo for a large part of the period of analysis. 
This suggests that presidents were interested in broadening their constitutional pow-
ers, but not under all circumstances. Thereby, constitutional ambiguity provided an 
important, and possibly necessary, opportunity on the basis of which presidents tried 
to stretch their constitutional prerogatives. Without these ambiguities it would have 
been much more difficult to undertake such attempts, as these probably would have 
been interpreted as transgressions of authority. Overall, therefore, European integra-
tion and individual characteristics of politicians provide additional knowledge of con-
stitutional developments in post-communist ECE, but they constituted no decisive 
factors for the occurrence and patterns of constitutional conflict.   
This study has investigated the process of constitutional conflict, reconciliation 
and change in the ECE region at different levels of analysis, and examined its evolu-
tion by means of a multi-method research design. As a result, regional patterns and 
trends could be identified and cross-national and cross-time differences and similari-
ties have become visible. By applying a combination of case study research, cross-
national comparisons, and analyses at the cabinet-level, this thesis captured both the 
structural opportunities and political motivations for politicians to engage in consti-
tutional conflict. This particular research approach has allowed uncovering the long-
term patterns of constitutional competition and change in post-communist ECE, as 
well as its consequences for democratic consolidation. At the same time, it has pro-
vided insight into the processes surrounding constitutional conflict, including its 
structural and political sources, the strategies applied by politicians, and the different 
means of conflict settlement. It is this combination of factors that contributed to a 
better understanding of why, when and how politicians engaged in constitutional 
conflict, and what these conflicts implied for the political transformation of post-
communist ECE.  
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8.4 Lessons for the future and the past  
 
This thesis gave a comprehensive account of constitutional conflict, reconciliation 
and change in post-communist ECE, as well as of its relevance for democratic con-
solidation in the region. Its findings may also contribute to our understanding of 
past, current and future constitutional developments beyond ECE. In addition, rec-
ommendations can be formulated on the basis of the ECE experience that may benefit 
constitutional reform processes and democratic consolidation in other regions.  
 The ECE experience with constitutional conflict, reconciliation and change 
allows for two recommendations for constitutional reform processes in nascent de-
mocracies. In the first place, constitutional engineers should be aware of the possible 
consequences of constitutional ambiguity. Leaving thorny questions open for future 
debate may provide a way out of the impasse in constitutional bargaining processes, 
but there is a real chance that politicians use such constitutional fuzziness to increase 
their constitutional power base. Politicians in ECE have been alert in case of such at-
tempts, and constitutional review bodies played an important role by averting power-
concentrating tendencies. In the absence of such circumstances, however, there is a 
chance that constitutional ambiguities enable politicians or parties to redesign the 
constitutional order in ways that undermine democratisation. The development of 
‘superpresidentialism’ in Russia appears to be a case in point. A second and related 
recommendation is then to try and create the circumstances that avoided the break-
down of democracy in ECE, in spite of the many instances of constitutional conflict. 
While respect for the rule of law and the separation of powers were probably the most 
important factors in post-communist ECE, these are difficult – if not impossible – to 
create from scratch. Constitutional protection through adjudication, however, was 
shown to contribute to constitutional legitimacy in ECE and is to a large extent “de-
signable”. Therefore, the creation of independent constitutional courts with a man-
date to settle constitutional disputes as a way to contribute to constitutional devel-
opment may be a good starting point.  
This chapter started with a comparison of constitutional change in post-
communist ECE and 20th century West European democracies. While historical and 
political contexts differed substantially, it was argued that in terms of constitutional 
stability and change parallels could be drawn between the two regions. Therefore, this 
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thesis’ approach to constitutional conflict, reconciliation, and change might also be 
applicable to constitutional development in West European and other established 
democracies. This may contribute to our understanding of the institutional and po-
litical circumstances under which democracies engage in constitutional reform, and 
the democratic implications of such reforms. At the same time, we should be aware of 
the speediness with which constitutional systems in post-communist ECE have stabi-
lised. This makes the region unique in a historical and international perspective, but 
may also represent its Achilles’ heel. All in all, it took the ten countries included in 
this study no more than 12 years before the most important constitutional debates 
were resolved. Considering that some West European democracies are still struggling 
to settle issues such as the role of heads of state, electoral systems design, and decen-
tralisation, this is a major accomplishment. However, we should be cautious assum-
ing that the constitutional conflicts in ECE were settled definitively. In a democracy, 
political circumstances and constitutional preferences may change with every elec-
tion, providing new input to the continuous process of constitutional development.   
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Appendix A 
 
Overview of constitutional conflicts in post-communist East Central 
Europe 
 
 
The following overview presents the 152 constitutional conflicts that were found in 
the ten ECE countries included in this study. Besides the conflict descriptions, the 
month and year in which each conflict occurred, as well as the constitutional dimen-
sion to which it relates, are provided. The following coding is used to distinguish be-
tween the four constitutional dimensions that are analysed in this thesis. 
 
1. Powers or position of presidents 
2. Legislative electoral process or parliamentary procedures 
3. Executive-legislative relations 
4. Powers or position of constitutional review bodies 
 
Each of the constitutional conflict descriptions also mentions the specific constitu-
tional article(s) subject to discussion, as well as the title(s) of the article(s). For the 
first five Polish conflicts (P1-P5), references to constitutional articles are omitted as 
no full text of the amended 1952 constitution was available. In nine instances, con-
flicts revolved around legislation that is derived from the constitution (see footnote 2 
on page 5). In these cases, the label “derived” was added, as well as the conflict’s con-
stitutional implications. All conflict descriptions are based on “Constitution Watch” 
reports in East European Constitutional Review and the “Political Data Yearbooks” 
of the European Journal of Political Research. As has been outlined in section 4 of 
chapter 1, these data were checked against case studies and comparative analyses of 
constitutional development in post-communist ECE. In the list below, references to 
supplementary material is mentioned in case new conflicts were found in these 
sources. In addition, the data were presented to country experts for validation. The 
list of experts, as well as a model of the assessment form they were asked to fill in, is 
provided in appendix B.   
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Bulgaria [25 conflicts] 
 
B1 [09-91] 2 – Art. 11 (4) (“Prohibition of Parties on Ethnic, Racial, Religious Basis”)  
Nationalists affiliated with the BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, 
claiming that the MRF (Movement of Rights and Freedoms) was unconstitutional and not allowed to register for 
the October elections given art. 11(4) of the constitution, which forbids founding parties on ethnic grounds. The 
Court rejected the petition (Decision of 21 April, 1995, see Ganev, 2004: 66). 
 
B2 [09-92] 1 – Art. 100  (“Commander-in-Chief”) 
UDF PM Dimitrov - in the middle of a parliamentary crisis, caused by a threat of the MRF of a vote of no confi-
dence, which president Zhelev backed - was accused by the intelligence service of secret arms trade with Mace-
donia. Dimitrov reacted that the intelligence service should be removed from presidential control, to be subordi-
nated to government. The constitutional court ruled that the calling of a no confidence vote would be unconstitu-
tional, as this was the 2nd in 6 months, and that requires governmental violation of the constitution in that pe-
riod.   
 
B3 [11-92] 1 – Art. 100 (2) (“Commander-in-Chief”) 
Since August 1992, government officials had questioned the power of the president to oppose top personnel 
changes in the ministries of defence and foreign affairs. The UDF declared that the president no longer repre-
sented the governing coalition in the presidency. A constitutional court ruling was expected in December. 
 
B4 [11-93] 4 – Art. 117 (2) (“Independence of Judicial Branch”) 
MPs of BSP, MRF and NUD voted to discuss an amendment to the Act on the Supreme Judicial Council, essen-
tially introducing stricter requirements for the prosecutor general and the chairman of the supreme court (in 
terms of years served in the judiciary). The move was apparently aimed at dismissing the current PG and chair-
man, who are open supporters of UDF and do not meet the new criteria. The Supreme Judicial Council declared 
that the government (initiator of the amendment) acted unconstitutional by interfering with the judiciary. The 
resolution was passed in parliament nonetheless, and the amendment would be discussed. After a memorandum 
by the Council of Europe condemning the draft act on the judiciary and a request to do so by UDF, president 
Zhelev vetoed the act and returned it to parliament for a new hearing. The veto was overridden, but the Constitu-
tional Court declared parts of the act unconstitutional. 
 
B5 [01-94] 1 – Art. 100 (“Commander-in-Chief”) 
Presidential preparations were made public for appointing a specialized advisory body - the "military cabinet of 
the head of state" - aimed at informing the president about activities of the General Staff. It was interpreted as a 
bid by Zhelev to increase presidential powers and to create an independent channel to control the military. The 
president pointed to the lack of legislative regulations concerning the National Security Council and to his status 
as commander-in-chief. Parliament subsequently submitted a bill regulating the functioning of the NSC, headed 
by the president. 
 
B6 [03-94] 3 – Art. 108 (2) (“Prime Ministerial Responsibility”)  
Following the hospitalisation of Prime Minister Berov, it was unclear how parliamentary control of government 
would take place, since - according to the governing majority's reading of the constitution - only the Prime Minis-
ter is accountable to parliament for acts of the executive branch. The situation was further complicated due to 
parliamentary fragmentation resulting from party splits and the assembly's inability to agree on a new Prime 
Minister. 
 
B7 [04-94] 3 – Art. 84 (11) (“National Assembly Authorizes Stationing of Foreign Forces”) 
A request by the UN to allow a military convoy pass through Bulgarian territory on its way to Macedonia led to 
controversy as to under whose jurisdiction this decision fell. In case of 'foreign troops' it would be parliament, in 
case of UN envoys, the cabinet. The controversy arose after the foreign minister and deputy prime minister - both 
claiming to speak on behalf of the council of ministers - had given contradictory signals about the cabinet’s deci-
sion. In the end, the view that it was parliament's jurisdiction prevailed and the request was granted after a par-
liamentary vote.    
 
B8 [06-94] 2 – Art. 81 (“Quorum National Assembly”) 
Following a decision at its national congress, the UDF boycotted parliamentary sessions out of dissatisfaction with 
parliament’s failure to appoint a new cabinet, and claiming that only preliminary elections were acceptable. UDF 
subsequently declared that parliament was acting unconstitutional in June as it had continued working and voting 
without the necessary quorum.  
 
B9 [01-95] 2 – Art. 77 (“Chairman of National Assembly”) 
Following BSP's victory in the December elections, changes were made - and also heavily criticised by the opposi-
tion of UDF, PU and MRF - to parliamentary regulations. The rights of vice chairmen of parliament were re-
stricted, especially with regard to chairing plenary sessions. Also, the legislative committee was abolished (often 
used by the opposition to delay legislation). Finally, the quorum requirement for decision-making in parliamen-
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tary committees was set at one-third of the members, effectively giving BSP a large vote in all committees. All 
changes were adopted, as BSP and its partners had a majority on Parliament. 
 
B10 [02-95] 1 –derived (President’s powers vis-à-vis government)  
BSP proposed several laws with which it tried to strengthen its position in boards and committees, and to slow 
down the decommunisation process. The president vetoed three laws, to which the BSP government reacted by 
deciding that neither the president nor his representatives were welcome anymore at cabinet meetings.   
 
B11 [05-95] 1 – Art. 98 (6) c (“Appointment of Ambassadors”)  
The Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a provision in the new parliamentary regulations, which would 
have authorized the Foreign Relations Committee to hold hearings with prospective ambassadors and give opin-
ion before their approval by the Council of Ministers (Decision no. 4 of 17 May 1995). This would have posed lim-
its to the president's constitutionally guaranteed authority (according to art. 98.6 c of the constitution) to appoint 
ambassadors on a motion from the council of ministers. 
 
B12 [09-95] 4 – Art. 106 (“Management of State Property”) 
Prime Minister Videnov announced that the justices of the Constitutional Court would be evicted from the build-
ing they share with the council of ministers, arguing that this would lead to more effective use of state property. 
The Court publicly asked the president to file a complaint, which Zhelev did. The Court then could interpret art. 
106 of the constitution on the powers of government as manager of state property, and ruled that the eviction was 
unconstitutional and undermined the Court’s prestige (Decision no. 14 of 12 September 1995). 
 
B13 [09-95] 4 – Art. 8 and 117 (“Separation of Powers” and “Judiciary Independence”)  
Government proposed a new budget law, which was passed in the BSP dominated parliament. The law granted the 
council of ministers the right to restrict the budget of the Supreme Judicial Council, the body by which the judici-
ary governs itself. The Constitutional Court ruled that the law made the judiciary vulnerable to executive fiat by 
granting such broad budgetary discretion to the executive branch, and declared it unconstitutional (Decision no. 
17 of 3 October 1995). 
 
B14 [11-95] 1 – Art. 98 (7) (“Appointment of State Officials”)   
The Constitutional Court ruled that the president has the authority to oversee the functioning of the National 
Guard service, based on article 98.7 of the constitution, which grants the president the power to appoint and dis-
miss state officials. This stalled government’s attempts to take over this institution. 
 
B15 [11-95] 4 – Art. 41 (1) (“Right of Information”)  
Struggle between legislative majority and constitutional court continued. Now Ivan Granitski (BSP-appointed 
television director) refused justices the opportunity to publicly defend their decisions. He referred to legislation 
that guarantees access to national TV only to legislators, cabinet members and the president. The attorney general 
filed a complaint that this violated the separation of powers and the court ruled that the constitution guarantees 
access to media for all branches (Decision no. 24 of 12 December 1995). 
 
B16 [11-95] 3 – Art. 92 (“President Embodies the Unity of the Nation”)  
The BSP filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court against president Zhelev for allegedly having violated the 
constitution. The president had announced openly that he would vote for the UDF in the upcoming local elections, 
with which he violated art. 92 ('the president shall embody the unity of the nation'), according to BSP. The Court 
argued that the accusations were unfounded, stating that the Court can only rule on unconstitutional behaviour by 
the president in an impeachment procedure. More importantly, in the interpretative part of the decision, the 
Court argued that the president has the right to express his political preferences and expression (Decision no. 25 
of 21 December 1995) .     
 
B17 [09-96] 1 – Art. 93 (2) (“Bulgarian Citizens by Birth May Be Elected President”)  
BSP presidential candidate Pirinski was blocked from running in the elections due to his dual Bulgarian-American 
citizenship. The parliamentary majority (BSP) quickly reacted by amending the citizenship law, now allowing for 
Pirinski to run. Opposition deputies in response filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which in turn 
decided that the new law could not be applied retroactively, and that the citizenship of each candidate should be 
determined on the basis of legislation in effect at time of his birth. Hence, when Pirinski attempted to register at 
the Central Electoral Committee, he was refused.    
 
B18 [02-97] 1 – Art. 102 (2) and (3) (“Ukases Requiring Countersignature”)    
In an attempt to speed up the creation of a new judicial system, the president appointed (by decree) the chairmen 
of two (still non-existent) courts, nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council. BSP complained that the nomina-
tions were unconstitutional since they required countersignature by the minister of justice. It was unclear whether 
the list of exceptions in the constitution where no countersignature was required, but which did not mention ap-
pointments to the judiciary, was exhaustive. In the end the Constitutional Court ruled that the nominations were 
constitutional, as otherwise judicial independence would be imperilled by ministerial discretion.    
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B19 [03-97] 2 – derived (Parliamentary elections)  
BSP, which enjoyed an absolute majority in parliament, managed to pass several amendments to the electoral law. 
Among these was the lowering of the electoral threshold from 4 to 3%, which allegedly was intended to produce a 
fragmented parliament after the upcoming April elections (early elections), which would increase BSP's relative 
strength. Opposition parties denounced the amendment and asked president Stoyanov to veto the law. Since the 
presidential veto is weak (absolute majority for override) - and could be easily overridden by BSP parliamentari-
ans - Stoyanov announced his veto one day before the dissolution of parliament. BSP tried to call a plenary ses-
sion, but this failed, thus rendering legislative override impossible.    
 
B20 [05-97] 4 – Art. 8 (“Separation of Powers”)  
Upon the passing of the Law on Disclosure of Secret Police Files, BSP filed a complaint with the Constitutional 
Court. The Court declared unconstitutional the provision on disclosure of information in the card-index of the 
state security service on grounds of violation of personal dignity.  It also declared that the provision that the com-
mission granted with authority to disclose information about the president, vice president and Constitutional 
Court members consisted of members of the executive branch was a violation of the separation of powers (Deci-
sion no. 10 of 22 September 1997).   
 
B21 [03-98] 1 – Art. 100 (“Commander-in-Chief”)  
Discussions on whether or not the authority to coordinate national-security policy should be vested in a special 
council headed by the Prime Minister. Opposition leaders pointed out that this body might pre-empt some of the 
president's prerogatives and tip the balance of power in favour of the cabinet. President Stoyanov intervened by 
stating that the new law was in line with earlier laws aimed at restricting the president's authority as commander 
in chief. He also asserted that the president should have a permanent representative in the council though, and 
that the power of the body should be limited since parliament has the ultimate authority over decisions regarding 
national security.   
 
B22 [10-98] 3 – Art. 84 (11) (“National Assembly Authorizes Stationing of Foreign Forces”) 
Controversy following a NATO request to pass through Bulgarian airspace. A special session of the Consultative 
National Security Council, a body chaired by the president, approved. BSP questioned the decision's legitimacy 
and argued that the matter falls within parliament's jurisdiction. President Stoyanov reacted by arguing that the 
council may adopt decisions that are later submitted to parliament for ratification. The council's functions are not 
clearly specified in the constitution, but it has served as a forum for solving matters of national security in the 
past. All parliamentary deputies, except for BSP, approved the resolution. 
 
B23 [04-99] 3 – Art. 84 (11) (“National Assembly Authorizes Stationing of Foreign Forces”) 
During the Kosovo crisis, NATO requested access to Bulgarian airspace again, which sparked off a new constitu-
tional fuzz. According to one interpretation of the constitution (art 84.11) each separate entry of foreign troops 
required a parliamentary approval. It was unclear whether the assembly would grant NATO permission this time. 
The government asked the Constitutional Court whether a military pact with NATO, approved by parliament and 
containing a general permission to use Bulgaria's airspace would suffice, which the Court acknowledged. Govern-
ment concluded an agreement with NATO, which was ratified by parliament. Opposition deputies immediately 
filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the country's sovereignty was at stake. Yet, the jus-
tices ruled the agreement constitutional (Decision no. 6 of 22 April 1999).    
 
B24 [10-99] 2 – Art. 10 (“Universal and Equal Elections”)  
Amendments to the electoral law: the parliamentary majority (UDF, PU and BANU) introduced several amend-
ments that were adopted by parliament. The most heavily criticized was the replacement of coloured ballots for 
each party with a single white ballot containing all party lists.  MRF objected to the amendment, arguing that it 
discriminated against their electorate, among which there are many illiterates.   
 
B25 [05-01] 2 – Art. 10   (“Universal and Equal Elections”) 
New electoral law adopted by parliament stipulated that parties and coalitions should pay for as many ballots as 
there are Bulgarians eligible to vote (5-6 million). It was conceived as a possible barrier to parties simply running 
to qualify for state funding. A group of 61 opposition deputies filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, 
which declared the clause unconstitutional, based on the inequality it would produce (Decision no. 8 of 3 May 
2001). [Also, the Court rejected a petition filed by opposition deputies to declare unconstitutional a provision in 
the electoral law stating that the PM and cabinet continue to exercise their powers even after their registration as 
election candidates.] 
 
 
Czech Republic [10 conflicts] 
 
C1 [01-93] 1 – Art. 54 (“Presidential Election”)  
Party of one of the presidential candidates (Sladek’s SPR-RSC) protests against the procedure by which Havel is 
elected as President in parliament. 
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C2 [03-93] 1 – Art. 63 (a) (“Representation to the Outside World”)  
Havel openly criticises what he perceives to be a lack of coordination between the President's office and the for-
eign ministry, therewith claiming greater involvement of his office in foreign affairs.   
 
C3 [06-93] 1 – Art. 63 (a) (“Representation to the Outside World”)   
Conflict between Minister of Defence and President on foreign policy competencies. President Havel openly sup-
ports international military intervention in Bosnia and Serbia and also has diverging views on Czech-German 
relations. 
 
C4 [05-94] 2 – Chapter II (“Legislative Power”) 
Conflict between president Havel and prime minister Klaus over the introduction of the senate. Havel argues that 
an upper house (Senate) is a necessary check on parliament, and claims that the president cannot act as a substi-
tute for the Senate on this task. Prime Minister Klaus is against introduction of Senate 
 
C5 [09-94] 2 – Chapter II (“Legislative Power”) 
Civic Democratic Party and other parties of the ruling coalition vote against an effort by left-wing deputies to 
amend the constitution to abolish the Senate (which was yet to be established). 
 
C6 [07-96] 3 – Art. 35 (b) (“Vote of Confidence”)   
A confidence vote in the new centre-right minority coalition (following the May/June elections) was clouded by a 
dispute over postponing the confidence vote, stressed by CSSD on the grounds that the government had failed to 
make available its policy programme in advance. Klaus criticised the CSSD's position, accusing the party of cir-
cumventing the parliamentary organizing committee, a body governing parliamentary conduct.   
 
C7 [02-98] 1 – derived (President’s power vis-à-vis government) 
Havel launched an attack on Klaus's government, which had come into serious problems following a currency 
crisis. Klaus replaced several ministers; Havel reacted by calling the changes "cosmetic", and suggesting the entire 
government leave. Klaus refused to leave and ignored Havel's attacks.   
 
C8 [06-99] 3 – Art. 39 (3) and 41 (“Submission of Bills to Chamber of Deputies”)   
The legislature rejects a constitutional amendment proposed by the government on June 8, which would have 
permitted the Cabinet to issue decrees with the power of law necessary for accession to the EU without approval 
by the legislature, and to decide to send Czech troops abroad and allow foreign troops into the country without 
legislative approval 
 
C9 [11-00] 1 – Art. 62 (k) (“Appointment of Banking Council Members”) 
President Havel appoints the vice governor of the Central Bank, Zdenek Tuma, as new governor. The appointment 
was criticised by the government, as the Prime Minister had not signed the appointment. Government and presi-
dential office now clashed on whether countersigning by Prime Minister was necessary. The government asked the 
constitutional court to rule on the issue, which argued in favour of the president (Decision Pl. US 14/01 of 26 May 
2001). 
 
C10 [01-02] 1 – Art. 56 (“Presidential Election”)  
Parliament rejects constitutional amendment that would have provided for direct election of the president. The 
amendment was proposed by the coalition parties, and supported by Havel.  
 
 
Estonia [9 conflicts] 
 
E1 [05-93] 1 – Chapter V, esp. Art. 78 (“The President of the Republic”) 
President Meri fails to approve the Law on Privatization of Living Space (partially referring to decommunisation). 
According to unofficial reports, the Riigikogu (Parliament) in reaction prepared a draft law on the office of the 
president, aimed at limiting his powers. The law on privatization was adapted and subsequently adopted by Par-
liament.   
 
E2 [01-94] 1 – Art. 90 (“Changes to the Composition of Government”)  
Clash between President Meri and Prime Minister Laar over proposed government shake-up; Meri ratified only 2 
out of 4 appointments proposed by Laar. The Prime Minister and President had different interpretation of the 
President's constitutional role in the confirmation process. While Laar claims that Estonia is a parliamentary 
republic and that the President's role is ceremonial, the latter saw a more important role for himself. Art. 90 of 
constitution remains vague on this. After calls for Meri's resignation he acquiesced in remaining nominations. To 
avoid future conflict, parliament started working on a draft law on the President's powers.   
 
E3 [12-94] 1 – Art. 78, 87 and 127 (“President”, “Government”, and “Supreme Commander”) 
Debate on whether peacetime command of the army should belong to the government or the head of state. Presi-
dent Meri twice vetoed a defence law granting command to the government. Still not finding support in parlia-
ment, Meri referred the dispute to the Supreme Court, which declared the law unconstitutional. In its decision 
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however, it favoured both sides, claiming that both the head of state and the government cannot be ‘by-passed’ at 
any time in army matters (Constitutional Judgement III-4/A-11/94 of 21 December 1994) . 
 
E4 [01-95] 4 – Art. 94 (2) (“Ministerial Capacities”)  
Ruling by Estonia's Constitutional Review Chamber on the scope of ministerial authority. Interior minister Arike 
had issued a ministerial decree in order to resolve a dispute between a Tallinn resident and a lower court regard-
ing the denial of the former's residency permit. The Review Chamber declared the minister's decree null and void, 
stating that he had no legal right to issue decrees without receiving special authority by law (Constitutional 
Judgement III-4/A-12/94 of 11 January 1995). 
 
E5 [09-97] 1 – Art. 127 (“Supreme Commander”)  
Following the 'Paldiski tragedy' (11 military drowned during exercise), president Meri and Prime Minister Siiman 
got into deadlock over defence authority. A government commission linked the fact that the Army Commander 
answers to the President, and not the minister of defence, to the tragedy. President Meri disagreed with this as-
sessment and refused the Commander's resignation, blaming the defence ministry instead. Siiman in reaction 
refused the defence minister's resignation. Justice Minister stated that this constitutional contradiction needs to 
be solved.    
 
E6 [12-97] 2 – Art. 4 (“Separation of Powers”) 
Parliament widened the scope of the 1995 Law on Language, giving government the authority to test the knowl-
edge of the Estonian language among MPs. President Meri vetoed the amendment, claiming a violation of the 
separation of powers and of democracy. Parliament overrode the veto, and Meri submitted the matter to the Con-
stitutional Review Chamber, which struck down the law. It stated that language requirements for MP’s belong in 
the electoral law, not the language law, and that the law was not in conformity with the principle of separate and 
balanced powers provided for in § 4 of the Constitution (Constitutional Judgement 3-4-1-1-98 of 5 February 
1998). 
 
E7 [12-98] 2 – Art. 12 (“Equality Before the Law”) 
Amendments to the electoral law were made so that language requirements to MPs could be effected. The 6 mem-
ber Russian parliamentary faction protested against the amendments, citing their unconstitutionality and viola-
tion of international law. In spite of Max v/d Stoel's bid to President Meri to veto the law, Meri now promulgated 
it. 
 
E8 [05-00] 1 – Art. 78 (11) (“Appointment of State Officials”) 
After the resignation of new Central Bank governor Vensel, Meri rejected the new nomination by the Central Bank 
board. It was unclear whether the president actually holds the specific right to reject nominations, as the constitu-
tion only states that he has the right to appoint. Supported by legal experts, Meri did not back down, and the Cen-
tral Bank board forwarded a new candidate, who was nominated by Meri.    
 
E9 [07-00] 1 – Art. 78 (11) (“Appointment of State Officials”) 
President Meri dismissed chief of staff Kert in response to a conflict between defence minister Luik and Kert over 
the military's reorganization. Meri used a year-old resignation letter (related to another scandal) by Kert to dis-
miss him, which led to much criticism. Parliament was however more displeased about the fact that Meri had fired 
Kert unilaterally, while the constitution (art. 78,11) requires parliament's approval. Meri agreed to hold a meeting 
of the National Defence Council (mostly parliamentarians) and in the end a slim parliamentary majority dis-
missed Kert.   
 
 
Hungary [13 conflicts] 
 
H1 [05-90] 1 – Art. 29B (“Nomination, Election Procedure”) 
Debate over the method of selecting the president. The Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) - having won a small 
amount of seats in parliament earlier that year - campaigned for a referendum on the issue, which was held in 
July. HSP hoped for popular election to be approved, but turnout fell 40% short of required 50%. SzDSz member 
Arpad Göncz was subsequently elected by parliament in August.     
 
H2 [10-90] 1 – Art. 29 (2) (“Commander-in-Chief”) 
Prime Minister Antall announced 65% increase of gasoline prices, which led to strikes by taxi drivers and haulers 
+ blocking of border crossings. Deputy Prime Minister Horváth threatened to use force and stated he will stick to 
65% price rise. President Göncz interfered and orders that the military remains in their barracks, claiming the 
army will not intervene –refers to his status as commander in chief. Government and protesters reach a compro-
mise, but coalition parties accuse Göncz of unconstitutionality of his interference, as he transgressed his presiden-
tial authority.     
 
H3 [01-91] 1 – Art. 30A (1)b (“Conclusion International Treaties”) 
Referring to his constitutional power to conclude international treaties, president Göncz argued that he should be 
present at 1991 Visegrád summit. Government perceives this as its private turf. For weeks, the cabinet and minis-
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try of foreign affairs tried to keep Göncz from going to the summit, but in the end the government 'grudgingly 
acquiesced'.   
 
H4 [04-91] 1 – Art. 29 and 30A (“Role” and “Powers”) 
President Göncz refused to accept resignation of a lieutenant-general who had accused the defence minister of 
weakening the president's position as Commander-in-Chief through proposed legislation strengthening defence 
minister's control of armed forces. Constitutional court rules on presidential power; he is not accountable to par-
liament, but is 'overseer' (and not leader) of the armed forces, he cannot refuse to countersign government dis-
missals, unless "they disturb democratic functioning of the state" (see Solyóm, 2003: 143 and O’Neill, 1997: 211-
212). Göncz took this as a confirmation of his power. 
 
H5 [12-91] 1 – Art. 29 and 30A (“Role” and “Powers” of the President) 
Prime Minister Antall tried to replace president of state-run radio and TV after claims that media retained a 
communist (and anti-government) orientation. Göncz however refused to countersign dismissal, claiming that it 
endangered democracy (in accordance with the April 1991 ruling). Government turned to the Constitutional Court 
again, which again ruled that Göncz had no right to refuse government requested dismissals, but affirmed his task 
to defend democracy. Both Antall and Göncz claimed victory and when Antall resubmitted the dismissal, Göncz 
refused again. 
 
H6 [07-94] 3 – Art. 61 (“Freedom of the Press”, “Freedom of Expression”) 
Presidents of state radio and TV were dismissed and replaced by government, and countersigned by president 
Göncz, based on accusations that they favoured the former coalition party MDF. Right-wing opposition parties 
and a professional organisation of journalists claimed that the appointments were a threat to press freedom. The 
Constitutional Court ruled that government interference in the media is unlawful. 
 
H7 [03-95] 4 – Art. 32 A (“Powers, Role”)  
The Constitutional Court made 13 unfavourable decisions with regard to the government’s economic package of 
March. It ruled a number of plans to be unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court was criticised by coalition 
parties for its ‘activist’ approach in government circles, particularly in view of the fact that the CC had only 
blocked 5 decisions in the former government period. 
 
H8 [05-95] 1 – Art. 29B (“Nomination, Election Procedure”) 
The FKGP (Opposition Party) abstained from nominating a presidential candidate after the Constitutional Court 
and Parliament had rejected their initiative for holding direct presidential elections. Although the FKGP had col-
lected more than the required 100,000 signatures, the Constitutional Court found that since the initiative con-
tained a possible change of the constitutional order, it could not be subject to a referendum.   
 
H9 [07-97] 2 – Art. 28C (“National Referendum”) 
The government proposed to organise a non-binding referendum on NATO accession, for "the public's expression 
of opinion" (in accordance with art 28.4 of the constitution). The opposition claimed that the referendum should 
be binding (in accordance with art 28.C.3). Government gave in.   
 
H10 [08-97] 2 – derived (Parliamentary elections) 
After the elections, one new party got in parliament: MIEP (right wing Justice and Life Party). The party got 5.47 
% of the vote and had 14 MPs. Although MIEP had cleared the electoral threshold, the latter figure gave rise to 
controversy as the parliamentary standing orders of 1994 accept only 15 members as a legitimate parliamentary 
group (amended in 1994, amongst others to prevent right-wing parties to enter parliament). The Constitutional 
Court provided for the MIEP to form a 14-member parliamentary caucus.     
 
H11 [11-98] 2 – Art. 22 (“Sessions”) 
The governing majority sought to introduce majoritarian practices and to acquire domineering positions in the 
political sphere. These attempts became manifest in the fact that parliamentary sessions were only held every 
third week after February (previously plenary sessions were held three times a week). As a result, in 1999 the 
parliament was sitting for 16 weeks as opposed to 37-42 weeks in previous years. The opposition turned to the 
Constitutional Court to re-establish that old practice and although the Court ruled that parliamentary continuity is 
a constitutional requirement, it did not specify the details. By the end of the year even MPs of the largest govern-
ing party became critical of the new timetable.     
 
H12 [12-98] 3 – Art. 19 (j) (“Deployment Foreign Troops”)  
A constitutional amendment transferring the right to sanction the deployment of foreign troops in Hungary and 
Hungarian troops abroad from parliament to government was defeated in parliament. The amendment was seen 
as a pre-condition for accession to NATO. 
 
H13 [05-99] 1 – Art. 29B (“Nomination, Election Procedure”) 
The Constitutional Court rejected a referendum initiative of the Social Democratic Youth Movement in favour of 
the direct popular election of the head of state on the grounds that a citizen-initiated referendum is not entitled to 
determine affairs of constitutional significance. 
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Latvia [13 conflicts] 
 
LV1 [03-93] 2 – Art. 9 (“Eligibility”) 
Parliament passed on the first reading an amendment to the October 1992 election law, prohibiting former em-
ployees of foreign intelligence services from running for elections to the Saeima (Latvian parliament). MP and 
leader of the Democratic Labour Party Jury Boyars - who openly admitted to have worked for the KGB - charged 
that the amendment is directed at him and stated that it is anti-constitutional. Amendment requires 2nd reading.    
 
LV2 [07-93] 1 – Art. 36 (“Election” of the President) 
Election of Guntis Ulmanis (Union of Peasants of Latvia) as president by parliament. Opposition parties Equality 
(ex-communists) and Concord (social democrats) did not participate, opposing the constitutional provision that 
stipulates the election by parliament, and viewing it as the people's prerogative. Draft amendments to the consti-
tution regarding this topic have been unsuccessful.   
 
LV3 [04-94] 2 – Art. 28 and 29 (“Indemnity” and “Immunity”) 
Five MPs, including the minister of foreign affairs and the leader of the DP (Labour Party) - were suspended by 
parliament after their names appeared in KGB dossiers. The government declared the ruling unconstitutional, 
since provisions exist for deputies' mandates to be nullified, but not suspended.    
 
LV4 [07-94] 2 – Art. 9 (“Eligibility”) 
New rules were added to the parliamentary standing rules, most contentiously those regarding language profi-
ciency requirements for MPs. MP Siegerist (Latvian-German) failed to pass the proficiency test and faced being 
expelled from Saeima. Backed by the LW faction (claiming unconstitutionality and undemocratic character of the 
provision) parliament voted against Siegerist's expulsion.   
 
LV5 [02-95] 2 – Art. 2 and 9 (“popular Sovereignty” and “Eligibility”) 
Upcoming parliamentary elections prompted the Saeima to adopt a new electoral law. An amendment allowing 
only parties and coalitions to submit candidate lists created controversy. The parliamentary opposition claimed 
that this was unconstitutional, referring to 100 citizens' right to present a list. It moreover violated constitutional 
art. 2 (sovereign power to the people) and 9 (any Latvian citizen > 21 may be elected). The amendments were 
adopted in May anyway.    
 
LV6 [10-95] 5 – Art. 85 (“Constitutional Court”) 
Progress on passing the law "On the Constitutional Court" was stalled by a provision providing the Court the right 
to independently review the constitutionality of laws passed by parliament, and deeming Constitutional Court 
decisions immutable. This meant that the CC would develop into an active balancing force of the strong parlia-
ment. Opposition MPs drafted a amendments to the law allowing parliament to vote on the acceptance of court 
decisions, thus maintaining legislative dominance.  The amendments were adopted in 9602. 
 
LV7 [05-96] 1 – Art. 37 (“Eligibility”) 
Aimed at banning Alfreds Rubiks (condemned for his activities during communism and involvement in the 1991 
coup) from the presidential election process, FU and LNIM proposed a bill that prevented members of banned 
organizations (KGB, communist party) from participating in the elections. Parliament's legal commission opposed 
to the law, claiming that regulations concerning presidential election should be covered in constitutional amend-
ments. The law was adopted nonetheless, but could not be applied to prevent Rubiks from candidature. 
 
LV8 [12-97] 1 – Art. 47 (“Legislative Initiative”) 
Disagreements about the citizenship issue between president Ulmanis and several FFF deputies, when the ruling 
FFF protested against the president's intention to re-launch a discussion on liberalizing the citizenship law, after 
amendments to the law had been voted down in parliament in October. In spite of the president’s constitutional 
right to legislative initiative, parliament's deputy speaker (FFP) speculated that the president might be dismissed 
for transgressing his authority. 
 
LV9 [04-98] 3 – Art. 59 (“Confidence of Parliament, Responsibility”) 
Two votes of confidence, one in Prime Minister Krasts and one in the entire government failed by large margins. 
In both cases, many members of coalition party DP-Saimnieks did not participate in the voting. Art. 59 of the 
constitution states "If the Saeima expresses…", which was interpreted by DP-S as a requirement for the full 
Saeima to be present at the voting. DP-S filed a request at the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality 
of the votes. The court decided that, despite procedural norms had not been applied well, the votes were valid 
(Judgement No. 03-04 (98) of 13 July 1998).    
 
LV10 [06-99] 1 – Art. 37 (“Eligibility”) 
In the run up to the presidential elections of July 1999, deputies from coalition parties LPP and FFF proposed 
amendments to the parliamentary standing rules (in which the method for electing the president is specified) in 
order to prohibit members of the former communist Party’s central committee from being nominated president. 
The proposal was aimed at prohibiting the minister of transportation, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, from running. Par-
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liament decided to postpone consideration of the proposals until after the election, which was won by Vaira Vike-
Freiberga. 
 
LV11 [08-99] 5 – Art. 85 (“Constitutional Court”) 
The new minister of justice, Birkavs proposed abolishing the Constitutional Court and transferring its functions to 
a higher court of the regular judiciary. The Prime Minister, agreeing that the Constitutional Court's workload was 
not very heavy, supported the elimination proposal. Court chairman Endzins replied that the proposal was hasty 
and he revealed that the Premier, as well as several other politicians had tried to influence a case on the State 
Property Agency (which had distributed free apartments among politicians and high ranking officials). After a 
meeting between government and Court representatives, the Prime Minister promised to support the court. 
 
LV12 [09-00] 2 – Art. 89 and 101 (“Recognition and Protection by the State”, “Political Activity”) 
Opposition MPs filed a request at the Constitutional Court, asking to rule on the constitutionality of the electoral 
law, which prohibits from being elected persons who were members of parties/organisations with strong commu-
nist associations after 1991, as well as former USSR employees or Latvian KGB employees. The articles were 
claimed to contradict articles 89 and 101 of the constitution, as well as article 14 of the European Convention. The 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the law, and ruled that the stipulations related to a person’s illegal activities, 
not his or her ideological standpoint (Judgement no. 2000-03-01 of 30 August 2000).    
 
LV13 [01-01] 1 – Art. 35 and 41 (“Term” and “Functions”)   
Proposals by LSDWP's chairman Juris Bojars for direct presidential elections and an extension of the president's 
powers, most notably in the area of foreign affairs. Coalition members rejected the proposal.    
 
 
Lithuania [15 conflicts] 
 
LT1 [03-93] 2 – Art. 69 (“Adoption of Legislation”)  
The Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) adopts amendments to the Election Law, establishing new principles for the 
formation of the Chief Elections Committee (CEC), after the right-wing dominated CEC had refused to put into 
effect a Supreme Court decision concerning the final election results of three constituencies. The Court overturned 
earlier CEC decisions which had given seats apparently won by left-wing candidates to their right wing opponents. 
The new CEC will consist of 6 lawyers (appointed by the minister of justice and by the Lithuanian Lawyers Soci-
ety) and representatives of all parliamentary parties in the Seimas. Opposition parties file a petition with the Con-
stitutional Court to verify the constitutionality of the amendments, which was confirmed by the Court (Ruling of 8 
November 1993 ).   
 
LT2 [08-93] 1 – Art. 84 (2) (“Signing International Treaties, Submission to Parliament”) 
President Brazauskas intervenes directly in negotiations with Russia about the withdrawal of last Russian troops 
from Lithuanian soil, but omits to consult with parliament. After the negotiations had stalled, he argued that the 
official delegates were ineffective. Under strong criticism by the nationalist opposition, the president cancels his 
visit to Moscow to meet Yeltsin. He phoned Yeltsin however, and persuaded him to withdraw the troops anyway, 
boosting Brazauskas' popularity (Nekrasas, 1996). 
 
LT3 [06-94] 3 – Art. 101 (2) (“Changes of Ministers”) 
Facing a no-confidence motion by the opposition, Prime Minister Šleževičius nominates six new ministers, 
therewith trying to take away the justification for a no-confidence vote. However, according to the constitution 
(art. 101) a cabinet reshuffle of more than half of the ministers requires Seimas approval. The cabinet then moves 
by creating a new ministry on the environment, and splitting the ministry of education in two. Now, only 5 out of 
19 ministers are replaced, hence a Seimas vote was not necessary. The opposition maintains the motion of no-
confidence, but does not meet the required support in parliament.      
 
LT4 [08-94] 2 – Art. 71 (“Signing and Promulgation of Referendums”)  
Parliament passes a new law on referenda, restricting their use and the extent to which the results of referenda 
votes translate into law directly. Referenda can now only be held on "the most vital issues" facing the nation, and 
they only "determine the guidelines of legislation" and must become adopted in the Seimas and signed by the 
President before becoming law (indirect). The law reduces the legal status of referenda and seems to be based on a 
questionable interpretation of article 71 of the constitution. The issue was rooted in a conflict over privatization 
and compensation for Lithuanian's savings. The HU (Homeland Union, conservatives) collected signatures for a 
referendum to nullify privatizations and compensation for the savings many people lost in the transition. With the 
new referendum law, parliament thus tries to outplay the opposition. The referendum was organized, but after 
president Brazauskas announced he would not participate many Lithuanians followed him and the results were 
annulled due to low turnout. 
 
LT5 [09-94] 1 – Art. 84 (10) (“Appointment and Dismissal of State Officers”)  
Heated debate on the appointment of the new prosecutor general. President Brazauskas returns the first version 
of a new law on the prosecutor's office, claiming that the prosecutor general must be appointed by parliament but 
must first receive a recommendation from the president. After negotiations, parliament consents to the presi-
dent's formula and approves the law and the new nominee. 
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LT6 [05-95] 2 – Art. 63 (2) (“Termination of Mandates”) 
Since the death of LDDP MP Juozas Bastys in Oct 94, no candidate has emerged to assume his place. According to 
the law on the Seimas elections, the next candidate on the LDDP list should take over Bastys' mandate, but every-
one on the list was already in parliament. While HU(CL) leader Landsbergis suggested that the seat should be 
allotted representatively to other parties, the LDDP disagreed and proposed holding a party congress in the un-
represented district to elect an MP. 
 
LT7 [03-96] 3 – Art. 67 (“Powers of Parliament”) 
A Constitutional Court ruling on the separation of powers, petitioned by parliamentary legal committee member 
Ziemelis to review the constitutionality of the government stamp tax. A stamp tax law was passed in 1994, and 
stated that the amount of tax will be determined by government. Ziemelis referred to Art. 67 of the constitution, 
which states that Parliament alone has the right to levy taxes. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the law 
however, claiming that parliament itself had enabled the government to create the stamp tax, thus not overstep-
ping its jurisdiction (Ruling of 15 March 1996). 
 
LT8 [05-96] 2 –derived (Parliamentary elections)  
Parliament votes to raise the electoral threshold for individual parties from 4 to 5 percent, and to 7 for coalitions. 
Moreover the special 2% threshold for minority parties is banned, now demanding the same requirements for 
such parties. Some smaller factions, and the minority Polish and Russian parties object, but the amendments to 
the elections law are passed anyway. In the October elections, indeed none of the three earlier represented minor-
ity parties gained seats. 
 
LT9 [05-97] 1 – Art. 84 (“Powers of the President”) 
Struggle between parliamentary chairman Landsbergis (HU-LC) and president Brazauskas over control of Lithua-
nia's foreign policy. Both are heavyweight candidates in the upcoming presidential elections, so the struggle is 
widely interpreted as election campaign foreplay. While art. 84 gives the president powers in the area of foreign 
policy (signing treaties, settling basic foreign policies, and together with government implement foreign policy) 
Landsbergis has been extremely active in foreign affairs, most notably related to NATO accession lobbying and 
official visits. 
 
LT10 [05-97] 1 – Art. 78 (1) (“Eligibility”) 
37 MPs, including the LDDP, initiate an amendment to the constitution in order to abolish the requirement for 
presidential candidates of having lived in Lithuania for at least 3 years prior to the elections, instead asking for 
'being of Lithuanian descent'. The amendment was tailored to American-Lithuanian environmentalist Adamkus, 
who had recently lived in the US. HU(CL)’s 83-strong faction votes against making the amendment in the first 
reading into a failure. Adamkus registered as a candidate nonetheless, hoping that the vagueness of the require-
ment "to live in Lithuania" would be met by the fact that he owns an apartment in Lithuania. When the Central 
Elections Committee refused to register Adamkus, he filed a complaints with the Vilnius regional court, which he 
won. His attorney convinced the court that 'legal' residency was required, not 'physical' presence.   
 
LT11 [09-97] 1 – Art. 7 (2) and 70 (“Validity of Laws” and “Enactment”)  
Constitutional bickering surrounding the leadership of National Radio and Television (NRTV). In December 1996, 
the newly elected parliament - dominated by the HU(LC) - rushed to replace the old NRTV board, including its 
chairman who was allegedly associated with the former ruling LDDP. A new board was formed before president 
Brazauskas could countersign the dismissal, a procedure which was now deemed unconstitutional by the Consti-
tutional Court (art. 7 & 70). On 25 September the Seimas amended the law on public media and empowered the 
board of NRTV to sack the director, who resigned on Oct 21. President Brazauskas refused to countersign the 
amendment and asked Parliament to revise them, citing the politicization of TV. The amendments were nonethe-
less signed into law by Landsbergis (Seimas chairman).   
 
LT12 [01-98] 1 – Art. 92 (“Appointment and Dismissal of Cabinets”)  
During the presidential election campaign, candidate Arturas Paulauskas claims his right to nominate a new 
Prime Minister and cabinet if he would win the elections. He based his claim on art. 92, which says that the gov-
ernment shall return its powers to the president upon the election of the president of the republic. He interprets 
this as a resignation by government (in line with art 84.7). Prime Minister Vagnorius files a case with the Consti-
tutional Court, which rules on January 10 that only after a parliamentary election the government must resign, 
while after a presidential election parliament (from which government stems) is still functioning, thus no resigna-
tion is needed.   
 
LT13 [01-99] 3 – Art. 101 (“Cabinet Changes”) 
Prime Minister Vagnorius asks the constitutional court to rule on the necessity of parliamentary re-approval after 
more than half of the ministers in a cabinet are replaced. Art. 101 of the constitution requires parliamentary ap-
proval in such cases, and a planned change of transport minister would mean that more than half of the ministers 
have changed since the 1996 elections. A related issue was at stake in January 1998, but the Prime Minister 
claimed that following the presidential elections government’s authority had been newly legitimized (in accor-
dance with the CC ruling of 9801). On Dec 17, the Constitutional Court indeed confirmed that the government was 
a new government since Adamkus' election into office. 
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LT14 [12-99] 4 – Art. 5 (2), 84 (11) and 112 (“Separation of Powers”, “Nomination of Judges”) 
The Constitutional Court rules unconstitutional the 1994 Law on the Courts, which gives the minister of justice the 
prerogative to nominate judges for presidential approval. According to the constitution, this right is reserved for 
the judicial college, and the 1994 law is a violation of the separation of powers (Ruling of 21 December 1999). The 
ruling was criticised by the justice minister and coalition parties.  
 
LT15 [11-02] 3 – Art. 95 (“Directives”)  
The Constitutional Court rules unconstitutional the policy of the former Vagnorius cabinet to sell shares of sugar 
refineries to a Danish company. The policy was performed not by formal directive - requiring signature by the PM, 
and the involved minister and subsequent publication in the official gazette - but by " protocol ruling". This vio-
lates art. 95 of the constitution, and the Court claimed that only published laws are valid. The Constitutional Court 
did not rule on the content of the deal. (MP's representing agriculture interests had issued the case out of concern 
about the privatization process). 
 
 
Poland [20 conflicts] 
 
P1 [03-91] 1  
On March 7 President Wałęsa called for early Sejm (Polish parliament) elections to be held on May 26, arguing 
that democratic legitimation was needed as soon as possible. Wałęsa was supported by groups outside and inside 
parliament, but outvoted in the Sejm, where it was argued that Wałęsa does not have the authority to call elec-
tions. Sejm speaker Kozakiewicz later said that the final decision on the election date does lie with the president.    
 
P2 [01-92] 1 
Prime Minister Olszewksi approved the forced retirement of a vice-admiral and former defence minister in the 
ministry of defence, claiming that his position had become obsolete with appointment of a civilian defence Min-
ster in 1991. Wałęsa said he was astonished by Olszewski’s move on what he claimed was his turf as Commander-
in-Chief, but took no action.     
 
P3 [04-92] 1 
Defence minister Parys fired several high-ranking defence commanders (in the context of lustration), but did so 
without consulting the president - who is also Commander-in-Chief. It was unclear where supreme responsibility 
lies. Wałęsa criticizes the act; Parys accuses him of preparing a coup d'état, after which Parys is forced to resign.    
 
P4 [05-92] 2 
A majority of the Sejm forces, in arguable violation of constitution, the government to disclose secret police files to 
find ‘collaborators with communism’. The government then gives out certain names of people whose records are 
kept, among them some opposition leaders. This causes public and political outcry, Wałęsa moves to dismiss the 
government. The Sejm votes the government down on June 5. 
 
P5 [09-92] 2 
The Senate proposes 40 amendments to the forthcoming 'Little Constitution'. In reaction, the Sejm changes its 
internal regulations out of fear for amendments pending. Instead of a block vote, now a single vote per amend-
ment by ordinary majority, which allows for adoption of the constitutions, and rejection of many of the Senate 
amendments. The Senate files a complaint with the Constitutional Tribunal, which rules in favour of the Sejm. 
 
P6 [05-93] 2 – Art. 9 (of the 1992 ‘Little’ Constitution) (“Debates”) 
During its last meeting before the elections parliament adopts a new electoral law, including a 5 percent threshold 
for national lists, and 8 percent for coalitions of parties. Some small parties object to the timing of the introduc-
tion by the outgoing parliament claiming that not enough time was available to discuss the amendments. The 
amendments were adopted nonetheless. 
 
P7 [05-93] 3 – Art. 66 (“Votes of No-Confidence”)  
Prime Minister Hannah Suchoka lost a parliamentary vote of no confidence on 28 May. After the vote there was 
considerable controversy over whether the deputies had voted in a constructive or non-constructive vote of no 
confidence. Specifically, the interpretation of the term 'simultaneously' in article 66 of the Little Constitution was 
subject to confusion. Many deputies thought there would be an opportunity to propose an alternative PM during 
the same parliamentary session (and not linked with the actual vote of no-confidence). The Sejm presidium how-
ever decided that it should be linked with the vote, and that because parliament failed to do so, the initiative 
shifted to the president. Wałęsa indeed quickly dissolved parliament and called new elections for 19 September. 
An appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal to rule on the case was dismissed.    
 
P8 [10-93] 1 – Art. 61 (“Nomination of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Security, Defence”) 
New coalition (SLD + PSL) bows to Wałęsa’s interpretation of art. 61 of the interim constitution and accepts min-
isters of foreign affairs, national defence and internal affairs picked by Wałęsa. Also, the coalition wins a show-
down with Wałęsa over the nomination of a Prime Minister. The constitution gives the President 1st choice of a 
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candidate, if not accepted by Sejm (absolute majority) president must accept Sejm’s candidate (also absolute ma-
jority). Coalition had such a large majority that Wałęsa would have to accept these parties’ will. In a pretended 
gesture of goodwill, the President asks PSL and SLD to submit three candidates, of which he would choose the 
most appropriate. They refused and stuck to their own candidate (Pawlak). 
 
P9 [03-94] 1 – Art. 68 (2) (“Nomination of Individual Ministers”)  
Coalition (SLD + PSL) and Wałęsa struggle over new candidate minister of finance (Rosati) proposed by the SLD, 
but rejected by Wałęsa. Arguably Wałęsa wanted to test his power vis-à-vis the coalition and its internal durability. 
A group of coalition deputies reacts by submitting draft constitutional amendment severely limiting the Presi-
dent’s powers. The party leadership however withdraws their candidate and president accepts new choice (Ko-
łodko). 
 
P10 [05-94] 1 – Art. 47 derived (President’s appointment powers)  
Wałęsa fires the chairman of the National Broadcasting Council. Parliament questions the constitutionality of this 
act, since the statute on the NBC only gives the President the right to nominate the chairman, and remains silent 
about dismissal. The constitutional tribunal rules against the President, calling the dismissal beyond the Presi-
dent's competency. 
 
P11 [08-94] 1 – Art. 34 (“General Supervision Regarding Security”)   
The Commander-in-chief of the State Police resigns after allegations of corruption. Minister of Internal Affairs 
proposes a candidate, who is endorsed by Wałęsa, but the Prime Minister refuses this. A conflict about responsi-
bilities over presidential portfolios follows, and Wałęsa claims to exercise his constitutional responsibilities, in-
cluding full discretion in personnel politics. 
 
P12 [10-94] 1 – Art. 50 (“Accountability, Impeachment”)  
Sejm passes appeal to Wałęsa to cease activities that might threaten or destabilize democracy - this is one step 
short of impeachment. Wałęsa had the intention of introducing a presidential system, insisting that a strong 
president would bring order to Poland. Wałęsa questions the constitutionality of Sejm's appeal.    
 
P13 [10-94] 1 – Art. 35 (“Supreme Commander”)  
Wałęsa requests the resignation of Defence Minister Kolodziejczyk, but the cabinet rejects it. Kolodziejczyk ac-
cuses Wałęsa of setting up high officials in ministry against him, having pushed for a motion of no confidence 
against Kolodziejczyk while being at the Baltic coast with these officials. Wałęsa claims to exercise his constitu-
tional responsibilities over presidential portfolios. Prime Minister Pawlak finally fires defence minister.   
 
P14 [01-95] 1 – Art. 21 (4) (“Timing Budget Approval”)  
Deadlock over state budget. Wałęsa refuses to sign the 1995 budget and sends it to the Constitutional Tribunal for 
review, which – according to the constitution – would mean that Wałęsa could dissolve the Sejm (no budget 
within three months after submission of draft by cabinet). Both coalition and opposition are outraged, and claim 
that the delay caused deliberately by President is no legal ground for dismissal of parliament. Wałęsa hints that he 
might sign if Pawlak is removed as Prime Minister. The SLD (coalition partner to Pawlak’s PSL) gives in and sub-
mits a constructive vote of no confidence. Also, Wałęsa negotiates control over presidential portfolios with SLD’s 
new Prime Minister Oleksy.   
 
P15 [08-95] 1 – Art. 35 (“Supreme Commander”)  
Wałęsa vetoes a defence bill that was approved by the Sejm - which stipulated that the chief of general staff would 
report to the Minister of National Defence who in turn would be subordinate exclusively to the Council of Minis-
ters. Wałęsa claims that control over defence should not be taken from the President. 
 
P16 [05-97] 2 – Art. 19 (3) (“Referendum Results”)  
Opposition parties (AWS, ROP and KPN) deny legality of the outcome of a referendum on the new constitution, as 
the turnout is not above 50 % (it was 42,9 %). The Constitutional Act of 1992 stipulates that for a referendum to be 
valid the turnout should be at least 50 %. Another Act of equal constitutional weight (Constitutional Act of 23 
April 1992) does not include this minimal requirement. Opposition parties now submit a protest to the Supreme 
Court. The Court rules that the 50 %-requirement does not apply in this case and the referendum is valid. 
 
P17 [10-97] 3 – Art. 25 and 155 (“Questions and Interpellations”, “Vote of Confidence”) 
Disagreement between coalition and opposition about new Standing Rules of Parliament. They no longer provided 
for the questioning of ministers in parliamentary committees prior to a vote of confidence in government. The 
opposition complains about a new rule under which ministers may send a representative, but the change passed 
by a vote of 249 : 170.   
 
P18 [01-98] 1 – Art. 141 (“Convening of Cabinet Council”) 
Several presidential vetoes of bills that were proposed by the cabinet led Prime Minister Buzek to stating that the 
presence of presidential representatives at cabinet meetings lacks constitutional basis. Kwasniewksi responded by 
convening Cabinet Council (Council of Ministers, Prime Minister, preceded by president), but fails to obtain 
Buzek's permission to have a representative at cabinet meetings.   
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P19 [02-98] 1 – Art. 134 (“Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces”)  
Conflict about a government decision to send troops to Iraq, prior to which the president (as supreme com-
mander, art. 134) was not consulted. The President and government put forward competing legislative drafts 
(each claiming final responsibility). A compromise is reached on a bill that gives the President the prerogative to 
decide to send troops after a government proposal, and to be followed by Prime Ministerial countersignature. 
 
P20 [11-99] 3 – Art. 119 (“Bills and Amendments”)  
SLD and other opposition parties obstruct a government bill on tax-reform. They sent large numbers of formal 
motions and technical amendments in order to prevent the bill being implemented before the legal deadline (No-
vember 20). To break the obstruction, the government coalition votes its own proposal down in the financial 
committee but ten re-submits an unchanged bill as a minority motion so that the deadline does not apply. The 
President vetoes it, citing the ‘formal tricks’ used by the coalition parties as the reason for his rejection of the bill, 
and explicitly stating that he would have signed the bill without these legal tactics. 
 
 
 
Romania [8 conflicts] 
 
R1 [12-91] 1 – Title III, chapter II (“The President of Romania”) 
The new constitution was approved by parliament and endorsed in a national referendum, but was criticised by 
opposition parties as to grant the president too much power. The Hungarian minority had also overwhelmingly 
voted against the constitution as it omitted to grant them special minority or language rights.     
 
R2 [10-93] 3 – Art. 102 (2) (“Investiture”) 
A motion of no confidence against the cabinet was induced by the opposition (DC-NSF, led by former Prime Min-
ister Petre Roman), arguing that Prime Minister Vacariou had assigned four ministers without parliamentary 
approval. The cabinet survived the vote. 
 
R3 [01-94] 3 – Art. 114 (“Legislative Delegation”) 
In a ruling on January 11 the Constitutional Court upheld a law granting the government the right to rule by de-
cree during the parliamentary recess (in January). Opposition parties had argued that the law was invalid claim-
ing that their boycott of the vote approving the law in December 1993 had rendered the Chamber of Deputies 
inquorate. 
 
R4 [10-96] 1 – Art. 83 (“Term in Office”) 
Opposition parties brought a challenge before the Constitutional Court against Ion Iliescu's candidacy for the 
presidential elections, claiming that Iliescu had served his maximum of two terms under the current constitution. 
Iliescu was elected in 1990, and re-elected in 1992, when the constitution did not yet contain the two-term limit. 
Iliescu therefore claimed that he had only served one under the current constitution and that this rule could not 
be applied retroactively (ex post facto). The Constitutional Court supported Iliescu's interpretation.   
 
R5 [11-98] 2 – Art. 75 (“Sending Draft Laws and Legislative Proposals from One Chamber to An-
other”)  
Opposition Party PDSR threatened to boycott sessions of the bicameral legislature if the ruling coalition would not 
sign a pledge to respect the opposition’s right to express its view in legislature. PDSR had taken this action after 
the Senate had refused to discuss a PDSR motion against president Constantinescu. Two other opposition parties 
supported the act. The boycott ended after the three parties agreed with the chairman of the Senate, Petre Roman, 
to establish committees to discuss a parliamentary relations code.    
 
R6 [04-99] 1 – Art. 91 (“Powers in the Area of Foreign Policy”) 
A conflict erupted between the president and the prime minister: Prime Minister Radu Vasile accused President 
Constantinescu of meddling in policy areas that lay beyond his constitutional authority. Constantinescu had en-
dorsed NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, and had tried to engineer the appointment of former prime minister 
Theodor Stolojan to the deputy premiership. Constantinescu denied the allegations, but relations deteriorated. 
Interior Minister Iliescu proposed to curtail the president’s constitutional powers. 
 
R7 [12-99] 1 – Art. 85 (2) (“Government Reorganization”) 
Prime minister Vasile refused to accept President Constantinescu's decision to dismiss Vasile, saying that the 
move was illegal according to constitutional rules. The constitution provides that a cabinet member can be dis-
missed under certain circumstances but it provides no explicit mention on dismissal of the Prime Minister. Con-
sequently, Vasile failed to recognise his removal from office insisting that he was still the "constitutional Prime 
Minister". Later, Vasile tendered his resignation.   
 
R8 [12-99] 2 –derived (Parliamentary elections) 
The parliament voted for the raise of the electoral threshold from 3 to 5% for single parties and for an additional 
3% for members in electoral alliances. The plan raised severe protests from small minority organisations.   
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Slovakia [29 conflicts] 
 
SK1 [01-93] 3 – Art. 134 (2) (“Appointment of Judges”) 
Parliamentary opposition criticises Prime Minister Mečiar for appointing judges to the constitutional court. Under 
the constitution, parliament selects twenty candidates, ten of which are named by the President. Mečiar re-
sponded that the appointments were apolitical and that only the court itself could rule on their constitutionality. 
Also, he claimed that he was acting in place of the yet unnamed President.   
 
SK2 [06-93] 1 – 102 (f) (“Appointing and Recalling Ministers”) and 116 (3) (4) (idem) 
Prime Minister Mečiar began dismissing ambassadors and ministers who resisted him. President Kováč peti-
tioned the Constitutional Court to decide whether the president or the prime minister has the power to dismiss 
ministers. The Court ruled that only the president has the power to appoint or dismiss ministers and ministry 
officials, while the prime minister may propose dismissals and appointments to the president (Malová 2001: 361-
362; Court Ruling 93/05). 
 
SK3 [07-93] 2 – Art. 73 (2) (“Imperative Mandate”) 
Coalition talks between MDS and SNP broke down over MDS proposal for changing the internal regulations of the 
National Council. Elected representatives who leave their party would be replaced by a substitute from the original 
party list. The provision would be applied retroactively since Jan 1 and was allegedly aimed at former MDS deputy 
and foreign affairs minister Knazko who left the party with 7 deputies in January. 
 
SK4 [11-93] 1 – Art. 111 (“Appointment of Other Members of the Government”)  
Disagreement between president Kováč (supported by CDM) and the new MDS/SNP coalition about their condi-
tion that the president would have to accept or refuse the entire proposed cabinet list, and not individual ministers 
on it. Kováč and the opposition claimed the condition was unconstitutional, and Kováč rejected the nomination of 
one minister. Mečiar withdrew all 7 nominations and resubmitted a list of six, and criticised Kováč for going back 
on an earlier promise, which Kováč denied.   
 
SK5 [02-94] 2 – Art. 83 (1) and (2) (“Call of Meetings National Council by Chairman”)  
All MDS deputies left the parliamentary session in which the separation of positions was voted on. Presided over 
by Vice Speaker Cernak, parliament could continue with 76 deputies present - the minimum for a quorum. 
Speaker Gasparovic (MDS) returned to parliament and claimed that the current session was unconstitutional, as 
only the speaker may convene sessions. The constitution however did not say anything about the speaker's power 
to end sessions already convened. The constitutional court stated that it was not entitled to rule on conflicts within 
a single institution, the session was declared constitutional.    
 
SK6 [03-94] 2 – Art. 73 (2) (“Imperative Mandate”) 
The MDS minority government lost more and more support in parliament. Mečiar decided to push for early elec-
tions and dismissal of deputies who switched party affiliation after the last elections, through a referendum. 
President Kovác, who would have to call the referendum refused to do so, claiming that the dismissal of deputies 
would contradict the constitutional prohibition on imperative mandates. After the Council of Europe threatened 
to re-evaluate Slovakia's membership status, the proposal was off the table and Mečiar 's position even further 
weakened. 
 
SK7 [11-94] 1 – Art. 102 (“The President – Specific Powers”) 
Following the Sep/Oct elections, president Kováč stated that members of Moravčík’s cabinet who had been elected 
in the new parliament, could not attend Parliament's opening session. This was based on a constitutional rule on 
incompatibility of governmental and parliamentary positions, and Kováč invited substitutes. Parliamentary chair 
Gašparovič claimed that this was outside the president's jurisdiction, falling instead under the chairman's pre-
rogative, but allowed substitutes. 
 
SK8 [11-94] 2 – Art. 92 (1) (“Committees”) 
Debate on committee membership in parliament’s opening session. The current "Act on Legislature Procedures" 
does not determine the system for allocating MPs to committees. Practice was to distribute seats on proportional 
basis, but MDS proposed a pure majoritarian system, which was introduced and led to a majority on all commit-
tees for the new coalition (MDS/SNP/AWS). Opposition parties walked out of the session and called the arrange-
ment unconstitutional.     
 
SK9 [11-94] 3 – Art. 116 (3) (“Votes of no-Confidence in Individual Government Members”)  
Outgoing PM Moravcík called many of the decisions made by parliament during its first two post-election sessions 
unconstitutional. Two ministers were dismissed during these sessions, although they had already resigned. Mo-
ravcík also claimed that parliament could only dismiss an entire cabinet, not two individual ministers. 
 
SK10 [12-94] 4 – Art. 128 (2) (“Incompetence on Compatibility of Draft Laws with Constitution”)  
Constitutional Court ruling a Ministry of Health order requiring patient participation in medication and medical 
services costs. The Court held that the ministry did not have the authority to unilaterally alter medical privileges, 
and that only parliament could do so by law. The Ministry of Health replied it would not obey the Court's order, 
which led chairman Milan Cic to respond that the court's rulings are binding. Mečiar subsequently attacked the 
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court stating, "a situation where the CC by its interpretation of the law broadens or changes the constitution can-
not be tolerated". Cic was also deprived of his car and bodyguard. 
 
SK11 [01-95] 3 – Art. 113 (“Presentation of Government Programme”)  
The new government programme was made available to parliament on January 11. Opposition leaders decried the 
program as unconstitutional because it was four days late. No petition to the Constitutional Court was submitted 
though and the programme was approved on Jan 20, with a strict party-line vote. 
 
SK12 [03-95] 1 – Art. 102 (g) (“Appointment of State Officials”) 
Parliament passed an amendment to the law on the Slovak Intelligence Service, transferring the power to appoint 
and remove the SIS director from the president to government. Opponents in parliament of the law criticised the 
politicisation of the SIS. Nevertheless, the amendment was passed in parliament, then vetoed by president Kovác, 
and passed the second time.   
 
SK13 [05-95] 1 – Art. 102 (g) (“Appointment of State Officials”) 
Government submitted a draft law transferring to itself full power to name the chief of the general staff of the 
army. Currently the holder of that post is nominated by the defence minister, and needs approval by the president. 
 
SK14 [05-95] 1 – Art. 95 and 102 (m) (“Calling of Referendums”)  
The Constitutional Court rejected an amendment to the referendum law, which would have curtailed presidential 
powers by shifting a right to screen the authenticity of referendum petitions from the president to parliament. The 
court based its decision on constitutional articles stating, "a referendum shall be announced by the president". 
 
SK15 [10-95] 1 – At. 102 (r) (“Presence at Government Meetings”) 
President Kováč requested – in line with const. Art. 102 – to attend cabinet meetings and to receive cabinet re-
ports. The cabinet declined, interpreting Kovác’s request as an attempt to hand out tasks to ministers, and thus 
trampling on the power of the PM. The cabinet petitioned the CC to investigate the constitutionality of Kovác’s 
request. Although the CC ruled in favour of the president, he did not press the issue and thus never received the 
reports from the ministers (Malová 2001: 362). 
 
SK16 [10-95] 4 – derived (Role constitutional court)  
Following a pro-opposition ruling by the Constitutional Court, government party MDS launched an initiative to 
restrict the court's powers. The proposal envisaged that a 4/5 majority of the court's 10 judges is needed in order 
to declare a law unconstitutional, and that interpretations of the constitution need unanimity. When unable to 
reach unanimity, the court will fail to give interpretation. 
 
SK17 [04-96] 1 – Art. 102 (b) (“Accreditation of Ambassadors”) 
Government files complaint with Constitutional Court on President Kováč’s refusal to appoint Labour minister 
Keltosova as ambassador to the UN. Kováč had stated to approve the appointment if the minister would distance 
herself from cabinet rulings demanding Kováč's resignation. The government argued that - in spite of Kovác’s 
constitutional right to approve or reject ambassadors – he cannot make an appointment conditional on certain 
demands.   
 
SK18 [03-97] 2 – Art. 73 (2) (“Imperative Mandate”) 
Conflict on the composition of the Central Referendum Commission, towards the referendum on NATO member-
ship and reform of the presidential electoral system. In accordance with law, the CRC should contain representa-
tives of each party in parliament. The MDS objected to the nomination of DP (Dem Party) representative Jan 
Langos, who had gained his seat running for the CDM (Chr Dem Mov) and crossed over to DP. He was accordingly 
'not legitimately represented in parliament'. After a week of debates, MDS relented and recognized DP's right to 
be represented in the CRC. 
 
SK19 [05-97] 2 – Art. 2 (1) (“Citizens Execute State Power”)  
Discussion on legality of ratifying the constitutional amendment on direct presidential elections through a refer-
endum. Coalition claimed that only parliament could do so, while opposition referred to const art 2.1, which lends 
legitimacy to lawmaking by the people. The issue was presented to the Constitutional Court, which ruled in an 
ambiguous manner. It stated that the referendum on presidential elections is legal, and that the constitution can 
be amended this way. It also argued however, that the new text that was appended to the referendum question 
contradicts the referendum act: it should be part of the question itself instead. In order for the amendment to gain 
legal status, it should therefore also pass parliament by a 3/5 majority. The coalition interpreted this ruling to 
mean that the question on presidential elections could not be included and issued distribution of ballots only 
containing the NATO question. The CRC subsequently announced the referendum invalid, as the question on 
presidential elections should have been included.     
 
SK20 [06-97] 2 – Art. 73 (2) (“Imperative Mandate”) 
The Constitutional Court ruled that parliament had violated the constitutional rights of MP Frantisek Gaulieder. 
He had resigned from the HZDS in 11/96 and joined an opposition party, after which the immunity and mandate 
commission received a letter of resignation from parliament - allegedly signed by Gaulieder – as well as a letter 
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from him that he did not want to resign. Parliamentary chair Gašparovic refused to reinstate Gaulieder, and a 
bomb exploded outside the MP’s home (Human Rights Watch Report 1998).   
 
SK21 [07-97] 1 – Art. 102 (g) (“Appointment of State Officials”) 
Cabinet tries to change rules for appointment of the Commander in Chief of the General Staff. Attempts fail and it 
remains the prerogative of the President. 
 
SK22 [02-98] 2 – Art. 93 (1) and (2) (“Use of Referendum”) 
President Kovác scheduled a new referendum on NATO entry and direct presidential elections. It was still contro-
versial though whether or not the referendum would be binding. The opposition claims yes, while the coalition 
maintains that the constitutional cannot be changed this way. 
 
SK23 [03-98] 3 – Art. 105 (1) (“Transfer of Some Presidential Powers to Prime Minister”) 
Mečiar assumes certain presidential powers as parliament repeatedly fails to elect a new president. Among other 
things, Mečiar immediately cancelled the 2nd referendum on direct presidential elections - called by Kovác on 
April 19. His decision was challenged by the opposition, which claimed that Mečiar did not have the authority to 
do so. The referendum was cancelled anyway as the opposition failed to make a fist. 
 
SK24 [09-98] 2 – Art. 73 (2) (“Imperative Mandate”) 
Opposition challenges before the Constitutional Court amendments to the electoral law, and passed in parliament 
by the MDS majority in May 1998. One of the amendments constituted the question of filling vacant seats in par-
liament. The law grants parties to choose replacements, the opposition sees automatic filling by the next in line as 
constitutional. Apparently, Mečiar had changed the law in order to grant amnesty to former secret service director 
Lexa who allegedly was involved in the kidnapping of Kovác Jr. Only in March 1999 the court ruled on this issue, 
and found all amendments unconstitutional.    
 
SK25 [01-99] 2 – Art. 102 (i) (“Granting of Amnesties and Pardons”) 
After the defeat of Mečiar and the MDS in the 1998 elections, new PM Dzurinda annulled the amnesties granted 
by Mečiar to interior minister Krajci and counterintelligence chief Lexa - allegedly involved in the kidnapping of 
Kovác’s son. Mečiar had used his presidential powers, temporarily granted to him as parliament had been unable 
to elect a new president. Now, MDS deputies challenged Dzurinda's action, claiming that the constitution (art. 
102.i) grants the president the right to grant amnesties. The Constitutional Court agreed with the MDS.   
 
SK26 [07-99] 2 – Art. 93 (2) (“Use of Referendum”) 
Opposition parties (MDS, SNP) gathered signatures to call for a referendum on a minority language bill (and 
privatization). Debate arose as to whether issues of human rights can be changed by referendum. President Schus-
ter finally decided against calling a referendum for this very reason. The referendum organisers stated that they 
would appeal to the Constitutional Court, claiming that Schuster had violated the rights of the citizens who signed 
the petition.   
 
SK27 [07-99] 3 – Art. 105 (“Transfer of Presidential Powers”)  
President Schuster was hospitalised, and his situation worsened. This raised the question of the transfer of his 
prerogatives in the event the current officeholder dies or is disabled. Dzurinda and parliamentary chair Migas 
were entrusted with most powers, but opposition MDS refused to recognize the transfer, questioning its constitu-
tionality. 
 
SK28 [09-99] 2 – Art. 73 (1) (“Election for Four-year Terms”)   
MDS initiated a referendum on early elections, through a petition signed by 700,000 citizens. President Schuster 
accepted the petition and scheduled the referendum for Nov 11. The ruling coalition protested, arguing that early 
elections would violate the rights of current deputies to serve out their full terms. Schuster however responded 
that he was constitutionally obliged to call the referendum. Eventually, it failed due to low turnout. 
 
SK29 [10-00] 2 – Art. 77 (1) (“Incompatibility of Deputy Post”) 
Discussion on new law on political parties. The opposition managed to include an amendment prohibiting simul-
taneous membership in 2 political parties. This created problems for the ruling coalition, as some of their deputies 
were members of two coalition parties. Some coalition MPs voted in favour of the provision, while Dzurinda and 
his allies asked the Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the dual membership ban. In Sep 2001, 
the Court overturned the law. 
 
 
Slovenia [10 conflicts] 
 
SL1 [03-93] 1 – Art. 102 (“Office of President of the Republic”) 
Dispute between President Kucan and defence minister Jansa over competencies in the area of defence, rooted in 
discrepancy between the role of the commander in chief (president) as defined in the new constitution and in the 
1991 Defence Act. While the latter assigned this role to 'the presidency', the constitution referred to 'the president 
of the republic'. Jansa stated that the president could not automatically take over the competencies of the presi-
dency until a new Defence Act was adopted. Accordingly, Jansa neglected to inform the president on several de-
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fence matters (new national security strategy, personnel policy, reducing military term, wire tapping). The presi-
dent claimed that he was not able to perform as supreme commander of the armed forces, and asked parliament 
to adopt a new Defence Act or to change the constitution. Only in January 1995, a new Defence Act would be 
adopted, stating that the supreme commander is the president of the republic.    
 
SL2 [06-93] 3 – Art. 118 (“Interpellation”) 
The National Assembly discussed an interpellation, requested by the opposition, of Minister of Justice Miha Koz-
inc aimed at his past activities when he was connected to the Yugoslav 'Stasi'. The coalition refused to discuss the 
challenge, as it was not directed at the minister's "work", as article 118 of the Constitution requires. Formally, the 
coalition was correct, but the opposition left parliament and would return only if the matter was discussed. This 
deadlock lasted several days. When the interpellation was finally discussed, the majority of deputies expressed 
confidence in Kozinc. (EECR 1993)   
 
SL3 [04-94] 3 – Art. 112 (“Appointment of Ministers”) 
‘Depala Vas affair’: Controversy over the procedure for replacing ministers following the proposal by Prime Minis-
ter Drnovšek to fire minister of defence Jansa (after a scandal involving violence by military officers against a 
civilian and wire tapping). Art. 112 of the constitution states that "Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the 
National Assembly on the proposal of the President of the Government", according to Jansa supporters (Soc-Dem 
Party), the Premier attempted to act unilaterally. Jansa was fired by parliament, notwithstanding demonstrations 
by citizens and Jansa's popularity (Malesic 2003). 
 
SL4 [10-95] 2 – Art. 61-65 (“National Minorities”)  
Two opposition deputies (Lap - SNR, and Matus SPP) launched an initiative in support of a referendum demand-
ing a change of the law on citizenship, which would lead to the rebuttal of dual citizenship (affecting about 
170,000 persons). Members of the governing coalition claimed the initiative was unconstitutional (art. 61 - 65) 
and announced that they would make a case at the constitutional court. In November, the court ruled the referen-
dum in violation of the constitution (case U-I-266/95 of 20 November 1995). 
 
SL5 [05-96] 2 – Art. 43 (“Right to Vote”) 
Again a conflict re the holding of referenda. This time, several parties proposed referendum initiatives to change 
the electoral law, in a so-called referendum race (EECR Spring 96). The changes to the electoral law conflicted 
with each other (PR, FTPT, mixed), and the constitutional court was called to decide which proposal should be 
submitted for popular approval. The referendum law excludes mutually exclusive proposals, but does not provide 
in a procedure to deal with them. When parliament decided to proceed with all referenda, and to start with the 
one proposed by LDP/SCDP and SPP, the SDP complained with the CC, which invalidated parliament's decision 
and stated that the referendum law should be amended, that it was inappropriate to change the election law close 
to the elections, and that one of proposals contradicted art. 43 of the constitution (case U-I-265/96 of 31 July 
1996).   
 
SL6 [05-96] 2 – Art. 82 (“Deputies”) 
SDP collected the required signatures to initiate a constitutional amendment to provide for the recall of elected 
deputies by their constituents. It was widely criticized in parliament and outside, and viewed as a disruption of the 
political process, and undermining the constitutional principle of "free and representative mandate" (art. 82 of the 
Slovenian Constitution).   
 
SL7 [06-96] 2 – Art. 169 (“Acts Amending the Constitution”) 
On 10 June, Slovenia signed its association agreement with the EU, with which it also promised deregulation of 
land ownership laws (foreigners would be able to acquire land within 4 years). Ratification of the agreement 
turned out to contravene the constitution (art. 169). The Constitutional Court ruled that the constitution would 
have to be amended prior to ratification of the agreement. In the emergency session on June 24, it turned out 
difficult to reach the two-thirds majority. The opposition required two conditions prior to amendment: more care-
ful regulation of property sales and that the government steps down if Slovenia was not invited in the second 
round of EU negotiations. Government agreed, and the constitution was amended. 
 
SL8 [07-96] 3 – Art. 148 (“Budgets”) 
Opposition party SDP requested an appellation of the entire government, accusing it among others of failing to 
send to parliament the 1997 budget proposal on time. Neither the constitution nor the budget law provide for a 
deadline for passing the annual budget, so SDP's criticism was legally groundless. However, the opposition found 
that government was now spending money from an unapproved budget, which was unconstitutional (art 148). In 
the plenary session, only 26 of 70 deputies supported the interpellation.   
 
SL9 [04-98] 3 – Art. 86 and 153 (“Decision-Making” and “Conformity of Legal Acts”) 
Impeachment proposal against Prime Minister Drnovšek, forwarded by deputies of the SDP. Drnovšek was ac-
cused of having violated the constitution through his involvement in a secret security agreement between Israel 
and Slovenia. SDP deputies claimed that the agreement had the status of international agreement, and thus 
should have been ratified by parliament (art. 86 and 153). Drnovšek claimed the agreement was of an "operative-
technical nature" and did not require assembly approval. The petition by SDP deputies that the agreement itself 
was unconstitutional was rejected by the CC in September (case U-I-128/98 of 23 September 1998).   
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SL10 [05-00] 3 – Art. 80 (“Composition and Election of National Assembly”) 
After Drnovšek's coalition fell in April, parliament approved a government to be formed by Andrej Bajuk 
(SPP+CDP/SDP). Bajuk's list of ministers was however rejected by the Assembly. When he lost a second confi-
dence vote, the PM + candidates filed a suit with the Supreme Court stating that their constitutional right to be 
elected had been violated. The court dismissed the suit, as it found no violation of the candidates' constitutional 
right, since such rights are protected only in the case of general elections and not in case of state officials who are 
chosen indirectly.  Bajuk's cabinet was later approved anyway. 
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Appendix B 
 
List of country experts and model of data assessment form 
 
 
Below, the names and institutional affiliations of the country experts who validated 
the constitutional conflicts in the conflict dataset are listed. The experts were asked to 
check the conflict descriptions and the interpretation of the conflicts for accuracy, 
and to point out mistakes or omissions. Following the list of country experts, a model 
of the data assessment form is presented that was sent along with a list of conflicts. 
The experts were approached between December 2007 and October 2008. Their as-
sistance to this study has been invaluable, and is gratefully acknowledged.  
 
Bulgaria 
Professor Venelin Ganev 
Department of Political Science 
Miami University  
Oxford OH, USA 
 
  
Czech Republic 
Dr. Petr Kopecký 
Department of Political Science 
Leiden University  
Leiden, the Netherlands 
 
  
Estonia 
Professor Rein Taagepera 
School of Social Sciences  
University of California 
Irvine CA, USA 
 
  
Hungary 
Professor Attila Ágh 
Department of Political Science 
Corvinus University 
Budapest, Hungary 
 
 
Professor András Bozoki 
Department of Political Science 
Central European University 
Budapest, Hungary 
 
Professor Czaba Nikolanyi 
Department of Political Science 
University of British Columbia 
Montréal, Québec, Canada 
Latvia 
Professor Juris Dreifelds 
Department of Political Science 
Brock University 
St. Catherines, Canada 
 
Professor Rasma Karklins 
Department of Political Science 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
Chicago Il, USA 
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Lithuania 
Vykintas Pugačiauskas,  
Assistant Professor 
Department of Political Science 
Vilnius University 
Vilnius, Lithuania 
 
  
 
 
Poland 
Professor Krysztof Jasiewicz 
Department of Sociology and An-
thropology 
Washington and Lee University 
Lexington VA, USA 
 
  
Romania 
Dr. Romana Careja 
Faculty of Management, Econom-
ics and Social Sciences 
University of Cologne 
Cologne, Germany 
 
  
Slovakia 
Dr. Tim Haughton 
Center for Russian and East Euro-
pean Studies 
University of Birmingham 
Birmingham, UK 
 
 
Dr. Marek Rybár 
Department of Political Science 
Comenius University 
Bratislava, Slovakia 
 
Slovenia 
Professor Danika Fink-Hafner 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
University of Ljubljana 
Ljubljana, Slovenia 
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Data set constitutional conflict in East Central Europe 
 
  
Country:   [country name]   
Number of conflicts: [number of conflicts] 
Expert:   [name of the expert] 
 
Please return to:  Jasper de Raadt 
  JB.de.Raadt@fsw.vu.nl  
 
Contact:  t +31 20 598 6905 
f +31 20 298 6820 
 
 
Below you find a list of conflict descriptions for [country name], with classifications for each 
conflict of (i) the actors involved in the conflict, (ii) the topic of contention, and (iii) the (po-
tential) institutional impact of the conflict.  
 
Please indicate on the enclosed assessment sheet whether you think the conflicts on the list 
were justifiably labelled as instances of constitutional conflict, that is, explicit disagreement 
about the interpretation or functioning of formal (mostly constitutional) relations between or 
within state institutions. Please also indicate whether you agree with the classification given 
to each conflict in categories (i)-(iii).  
 
On the assessment sheet there is the opportunity to indicate why you disagree with inclusion 
of any of the conflicts or with the way in which they were categorised, to refer to institutional 
conflicts you believe were omitted, and to give an overall assessment of the validity of the 
data.  
 
You only need to return the assessment sheet and supplementary page(s) you may have used 
to describe omitted institutional conflicts. Would you be so kind to return the assessment 
sheet with the enclosed return envelope? Thank you for your time and consideration.  
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Assessment sheet [country name] – Page I 
 
Please tick ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, depending on your answer.   
 
 Assessment sheet [country name] – Page II 
 
If you have ticked ‘No’ for any of the conflicts, could you indicate below why you do not agree 
with that conflict being labelled as a constitutional conflict, or why you disagree with the clas-
sification of actors, topic, or institutional impact? Feel free to use the backside or the en-
closed extra sheet of paper.  
 
Can you think of constitutional conflicts that were omitted in the data set for [country name]? 
If so, please describe them briefly here, indicating the year and month in which they oc-
curred. If possible, could you also mention the actors involved, and the topic of discussion? 
Feel free to use the backside or the enclosed extra sheet of paper.  
 
How would you assess the validity of the data vis-à-vis your expert knowledge of constitu-
tional conflict in post-communist [country name]? Please tick the appropriate box accord-
ingly to your opinion. 
 
Poor  
Below average  
Average  
Good  
Excellent  
 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration.  
 
For this conflict, do you agree with the classification of: Con-
flict 
num-
ber 
Do you consider this 
conflict a constitu-
tional conflict as 
defined on page 1? Actors Topic Institutional impact 
 YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
1 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
2 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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Table to chapter 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.1: Key events in intra-executive conflict and constitutional development in Po-
land and Hungary, 1989-1997 
 Poland  Hungary 
Apr & Dec 
1989 
Fundamental amendments to 
1952 basic law (“April Noveli-
sation”) 
Oct 1989 
Fundamental amendments to 1949 
basic law 
Sep 1990 
Introduction of direct presi-
dential elections 
Oct 1990 
Gasoline crisis; clash between presi-
dent Arpád Göncz and Antall govern-
ment  
Nov & Dec 
1990 
First direct presidential elec-
tions, won by Lech Wałęsa  Jan 1991 
Conflict over Göncz’s presence at 
Visegrád summit  
Apr 1992 
Conflict between Wałęsa and 
defence minister Parys  Apr 1991 
Conflict over reshuffle army command 
structure; referred to constitutional 
court 
Dec 1992 
Adoption of ‘Little Constitu-
tion’ Sep 1991 
Constitutional Court decision 
48/1992: on the powers of the presi-
dent as head of the armed forces and 
his authority over state appointments  
Oct 1994 
Drawsko affair (conflict over 
defence authority) 
Dec 1991 & 
Jan 92 
Göncz refuses countersignature of 
dismissal state-radio director; gov-
ernment turns of constitutional court  
Jan 1995 
Budget affair; Sejm amends 
constitution; Wałęsa ousts 
PM Pawlak; reaches deal 
with new PM Oleksy  
Jun 1992 
Constitutional Court decision 
36/1992:  on the president’s right to 
refuse nominations and dismissals  
Aug 1995 
Sejm approves bill to curtail 
president’s defence authority, 
vetoed by Wałęsa  
  
Apr 1997 Adoption of new constitution   
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Tables to chapter 6  
 
 
Table D.1: Constitutional articles related to amendment procedures in ECE 
Country Year of constitution Initiative Majority Referendum 
Bulgaria 1991 Art. 153 & 154 Art. 155 - 
Czech Republic 1992 Art. 9 & 41 Art. 39 (4) - 
Estonia 1992 Art. 161 Art. 162, 165, 166 Art. 162, 163, 164 
Hungary 1989 Art. 25 Art. 24 - 
Latvia 1993 Art. 78 Art. 76 Art. 77 
Lithuania 1992 Art. 147 Art. 148  Art. 148 
Poland 1992 Art. 15 Art. 106 - 
Poland  1997 Art. 235 (1) Art. 235 (2-5)  Art. 235 (6) 
Romania 1991 Art. 150 Art. 147 (1&2) Art. 147 (3) 
Slovakia 1992 Art. 95 Art. 84 Art. 93 
Slovenia 1991 Art. 168 Art. 169 Art. 170 
Sources: Constitutions of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
(1997) Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in Tschentscher (2008), 1992 Constitutional Act of Poland in 
Ludwikowski (1996).   
 
 
Table D.2: Comparison of constitutional rigidity index and CPDS II in-
dex of constitutional flexibility 
Country Rigidity Index Rank CPDS II Rank 
Bulgaria 5 1 4.5 1 
Czech Republic 4 3 2 4 
Estonia 4.5 2 2 4 
Hungary 3.5 4 3 3 
Latvia 4.5 2 3.5 2 
Lithuania 5 1 3.5 2 
Poland 1992 3 5 1 5 
Poland 1997 4.5 2 2 4 
Romania 5 1 3.5 2 
Slovakia 4.5 2 2 4 
Slovenia 4.5 2 3 3 
The Spearman’s Rho correlation between the Rigidity Index developed in chapter 6, 
and the CPDS II Index of Constitutional Flexibility (which actually measures the 
difficulty of amendment) is 0.743, and is significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Tables to chapter 7 
 
 
Table E.1: Cabinet periods in post-communist ECE  
Country  Cabinet Start  Conflicts Country  Cabinet Start Conflicts 
Bulgaria Popov  
Dimitrov 
Berov  
Videnov  
Sofiyanski  
Kostov  
Saksoburgotski 
Saksoburgotski *  
Stanisyev 
12 July 1991 
8 November 1991 
30 December 1992 
25 January 1995 
12 February 1997 
21 May 1997 
24 July 2001 
22 January 2002 
15 August 2005 
1 
2 
3 
6 
1 
6 
0 
0 
0 
Lithuania Abišala  
Lubys  
Šleževičius  
Stankevičius  
Vagnorius  
Paksas  
Kubilius  
Paksas II  
Brazauskas  
Brazauskas * 
Brazauskas * 
Brazauskas II  
25 October 1992 
2 December 1992 
16 March 1993 
23 February 1996 
10 December 1996 
18 May 1999 
29 October 1999 
26 October 2000 
3 July 2001 
26 February 2003 
12 July 2004 
14 December 2004 
 
0 
0 
6 
2 
5 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Czech R.  Klaus  
Klaus II  
Toškovský  
Zeman  
Špidla  
Spidla * 
Gross  
Paroubek  
16 December 1992 
5 July 1996 
2 January 1998 
17 July 1998 
15 July 2002 
7 March 2003 
4 August 2004 
25 April 2005 
5 
1 
1 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Poland Bielecki  
Olszewski  
Suchocka  
Suchocka II  
Pawlak  
Oleksy  
Cimoszewicz  
Buzek  
Buzek II  
Miller 
Miller II  
Belka  
Marcinkiewicz  
4 January 1991 
23 December 1991 
11 July 1992 
28 April 1993 
26 October 1993 
4 March 1995 
7 February 1996 
31 October 1997 
7 July 2000 
19 October 2001 
1 March 2003 
2 May 2004 
31 October 2005 
1 
3 
1 
2 
7 
1 
1 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
Estonia Laar  
Tarand  
Vähi II  
Vähi III  
Vähi IV  
Siiman  
Laar II  
Laar II * 
Kallas  
Parts  
Ansip  
21 October 1992 
3 November 1994 
17 April 1995 
3 November 1995 
2 December 1996 
14 March 1997 
25 March 1999 
8 October 2001 
28 January 2002 
10 April 2003 
12 April 2005 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
Romania Stolojan  
Vacariou  
Vacariou II  
Vacariou III  
Ciorbea  
Dejeu  
Vasile  
Anthanasiu  
Isărescu  
Năstase  
Popescu-T.  
8 December 1991 
13 November 1992 
18 August 1994 
2 September 1996 
12 December 1996 
30 March 1998 
15 April 1998 
13 December 1999 
22 December 1999 
28 December 2000 
29 December 2004  
1 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Hungary Antall  
Boross  
Horn  
Orbán  
Medgyessy  
Gyurcsány  
23 May 1990 
21 December 1993 
15 July 1994 
8 July 1998 
27 May 2002 
30 September 2004 
4 
0 
4 
3 
0 
0 
Slovakia Mečiar  
Mečiar II  
Mečiar III  
Moravčík  
Mečiar IV  
Dzurinda  
Dzurinda * 
Dzurinda II  
Dzurinda II * 
1 September 1992 
19 March 1993 
17 November 1993 
16 March 1994 
13 December 19974 
30 October 1998 
5 June 1999 
16 October 2002 
15 June 2004 
1 
3 
2 
3 
13 
1 
4 
0 
0 
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Latvia Birkavs  
Gailis  
Šķēle   
Šķēle  II  
Krasts  
Krasts II 
Kristopans  
Kristopans II 
Šķēle  III  
Bērziņš  
Repše  
Emsis 
Kalvïtis  
6 July 1993 
15 September 1994 
21 December 1995 
13 February 1997 
7 August 1997 
8 April 1998 
26 November 1998 
4 February 1999 
16 July 1999 
4 May 2000 
7 November 2002 
9 March 2004 
2 December 2004 
3 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
 
Slovenia Drnovšek I  
Drnovšek II  
Drnovšek III  
Drnovšek IV  
Bajuk  
Drnovšek V  
Rop  
Jansa  
14 May 1992 
29 March 1994 
7 February 1996 
27 February 1997 
7 June 2000 
30 November 2000 
19 December 2002 
19 November 2004 
3 
1 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
Note: numbers in the column “Conflicts” denote the total amount of executive-legislative and intra-executive conflicts during a cabi-
net period. Starting dates of cabinets may differ from the actual day a cabinet came into office, as the date of constitutional replace-
ment was taken as a reference point for the analysis of constitutional conflict and for the calculation of government duration.     
 
Table E.2: Cabinets in post-communist ECE with levels of intra-executive and executive-legislative conflict 
Country  Cabinet Type INEX EXLEG Country  Cabinet Type INEX EXLEG 
Bulgaria Popov 90-91 
Dimitrov  91-92 
Berov 92-94 
Videnov 95-97 
Sofiyanski 97  
Kostov 97-01 
Saksoburgotski 01-02 
Saksoburgotski 02-05*  
Stanisyev 05 
2 
3 
6 
5 
3 
5 
6 
6 
2 
- 
18 
6 
24 
- 
5 
- 
- 
- 
 
31 
- 
11 
5 
38 
10 
- 
- 
- 
 
Lithuania Abišala 92 
Lubys 92-93 
Šleževičius 93-96 
Stankevičius 96 
Vagnorius 96-99 
Paksas 99 
Kubilius 99-00 
Paksas II 00-01 
Brazauskas 01-03 
Brazauskas 03-04* 
Brazauskas 04* 
Brazauskas II 04-05 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
2 
2 
8 
6 
6 
6 
2 
- 
- 
7 
- 
16 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
14 
25 
4 
- 
- 
- 
3 
- 
- 
- 
 
Czech R.  Klaus 92-96 
Klaus II 96-98 
Toškovský 98 
Zeman 98-02 
Špidla 02-03 
Spidla 03-04* 
Gross 04-05 
Paroubek 05 
6 
8 
8 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
 
- 
- 
5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
6 
6 
18 
3 
- 
- 
- 
 
Poland Bielecki 91 
Olszewski 91-92 
Suchocka 92-93 
Suchocka II 93 
Pawlak 93-95 
Oleksy 95-96 
Cimoszewicz 96-97 
Buzek I 97-00 
Buzek II 00-01 
Miller I 01-03 
Miller II 03-04 
Belka 04-05 
Marcinkiewicz 05 
3 
8 
8 
8 
6 
6 
2 
6 
7 
2 
3 
2 
7 
11 
36 
- 
- 
52 
11 
- 
5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
18 
13 
41 
- 
- 
6 
5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
Estonia Laar I 92-94 
Tarand 94-95 
Vähi II 95 
Vähi III 95-96 
Vähi IV 96-97 
Siiman 97-99 
Laar II 99-01 
Laar II 01-02* 
Kallas 02-03 
Parts 03-05  
Ansip 05 
2 
2 
6 
6 
7 
7 
2 
6 
8 
2 
2 
11 
22 
- 
- 
- 
5 
8 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
10 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Romania Stolojan 91-92 
Vacariou 92-94 
Vacariou II 94-96 
Vacariou III 96 
Ciorbea 96-98 
Dejeu 98 
Vasile 98-99 
Anthanasiu 99 
Isărescu 99-00 
Năstase 00-04 
Popescu-T. 04-05 
2 
3 
8 
7 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
11 
- 
- 
37 
- 
- 
12 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
11 
- 
- 
- 
- 
6 
- 
10 
- 
- 
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Hungary Antall 90-93 
Boross 93-94 
Horn 94-98 
Orbán 98-02 
Medgyessy 02-04 
Gyurcsány 04-05 
6 
6 
2 
6 
6 
6 
 
7 
- 
3 
3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
8 
5 
- 
- 
Slovakia Mečiar 92-93 
Mečiar II 93 
Mečiar III 93-94 
Moravčík 94 
Mečiar IV 94-98 
Dzurinda 98-99 
Dzurinda 99-02* 
Dzurinda II 02-04 
Dzurinda II 04-05* 
2 
3 
2 
8 
2 
6 
2 
6 
6 
- 
30 
- 
14 
16 
- 
- 
- 
- 
16 
15 
62 
27 
18 
17 
12 
- 
- 
Latvia Birkavs 93-94 
Gailis 94-95 
Šķēle  95-97 
Šķēle  II 97 
Krasts 97-98 
Krasts II 98 
Kristopans 98-99 
Kristopans II 99 
Šķēle  III 99-00 
Bērziņš  00-02 
Repše 02-04 
Emsis 04 
Kalvïtis 04-05 
3 
8 
2 
2 
2 
4 
8 
6 
6 
6 
6 
8 
6 
9 
8 
- 
- 
15 
- 
- 
23 
- 
4 
- 
- 
- 
17 
8 
- 
- 
15 
- 
- 
- 
- 
4 
- 
- 
- 
 
Slovenia Drnovšek I 92-94 
Drnovšek II 94-96 
Drnovšek III 96-97 
Drnovšek IV 97-00 
Bajuk 00 
Drnovšek V 00-02 
Rop 02-04 
Jansa 04-05 
6 
6 
6 
6 
8 
6 
2 
8 
5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
11 
5 
- 
9 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
Note: INEX denotes the level of intra-executive conflict during a cabinet period, EXLEG the level of executive-legislative and 
intra-legislative conflict. Levels of intra-executive conflict and executive-legislative conflict were calculated by dividing the num-
ber of conflicts in that particular category by the time in office (in years), multiplied by ten. The numbers were rounded. Asterisk 
(*) denotes an incumbent prime minister with a newly elected president.   
 
Table E.3: Coding scheme for fuzzy set and crisp set scores of outcomes and conditions. 
 
Name  Original values 
Membership 
scores 
Membership 
status 
High level of intra-
executive conflict 
22 – 52 
10 – 18 
3 – 9  
0 
1 
.67 
.33 
0 
Fully in the set 
More in than out 
More out than in 
Fully out of the set 
Conditions  
High level of execu-
tive-legislative con-
flict  
25 – 62 
11 – 18  
3 – 10  
0 
1 
.67 
.33 
0 
Fully in the set 
More in than out 
More out than in 
Fully out of the set 
Shared party-
political orientation 
president and cabi-
net  
President’s (original) party 
takes part in cabinet 
 
President’s (original) party is 
no part of cabinet   
1 
 
 
 
0 
In the set 
 
 
 
Out of the set 
Cabinet’s majority 
support in parlia-
ment 
Cabinet party/ies have a ma-
jority of seats in parliament 
 
Cabinet party/ies have a mi-
nority of seats in parliament   
1 
 
 
 
0 
In the set 
 
 
 
Out of the set 
Outcomes 
Single party status of 
cabinet 
Cabinet exists of a single party 
 
Cabinet exists of two or more 
parties 
1 
 
 
0 
In the set 
 
 
Out of the set 
Note: The party-political orientation of the president and cabinet is shared if the president’s party takes part in the 
cabinet, or if the party on whose ticket the president ran during the presidential elections takes part in the cabinet. 
In a number of countries, the president is constitutionally barred from representing a political party. Unpartisan 
presidents were always coded as 0, thus not sharing ideological orientation with the cabinet. Majority support in 
parliament was determined by the seat share in the legislature. More than 50 percent constitutes a majority, 50 
percent of the seats or less constitutes a minority. Sources: Baylis (2007); Berglund, Ekman and Aarebrot (2004); 
Woldendorp, Budge and Keman (2000); Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss and Harfs (2004).      
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Table E.4: Membership scores in sufficient paths and outcomes for 100 ECE cabinets 
Cabinet 
Outcome 
~INEX 
Path 1 
single 
Path 2 
SHARE  * 
MAJ 
Outcome 
~EXLEG 
Path 1 
SHARE * 
single 
Path 2 MAJ * 
single 
Popov 90-91 
Dimitrov  91-92 
Berov 92-94 
Videnov 95-97 
Sofiyanski 97  
Kostov 97-01 
Saksoburgotski 01-02 
Saksoburgotski 02-05*  
Stanisyev 05 
1 
.33 
.67 
0 
1 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
.33 
.67 
0 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
 
Klaus I 92-96 
Klaus II 96-98 
Toškovský 98 
Zeman 98-02 
Špidla 02-03 
Spidla 03-04* 
Gross 04-05 
Paroubek 05 
.67 
1 
1 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
.67 
.67 
.33 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Laar I 92-94 
Tarand 94-95 
Vähi I 95 
Vähi II 95-96 
Vähi III 96-97 
Siiman 97-99 
Laar II 99-01 
Laar II 01-02* 
Kallas 02-03 
Parts 03-05  
Ansip 05 
.33 
0 
1 
1 
1 
.67 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
 
Antall 90-93 
Boross 93-94 
Horn 94-98 
Orbán 98-02 
Medgyessy 02-04 
Gyurcsány 04-05 
.67 
1 
.67 
.67 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
.67 
.67 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Birkavs 93-94 
Gailis 94-95 
Šķēle  95-97 
Šķēle  II 97 
Krasts 97-98 
Krasts II 98 
Kristopans 98-99 
Kristopans II 99 
Šķēle  III 99-00 
Bērziņš  00-02 
Repše 02-04 
Emsis 04 
Kalvïtis 04-05 
.67 
.67 
1 
1 
.33 
1 
1 
0 
1 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
.33 
.67 
1 
1 
.33 
1 
1 
1 
1 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
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Abišala 92 
Lubys 92-93 
Šleževičius 93-96 
Stankevičius 96 
Vagnorius 96-99 
Paksas 99 
Kubilius 99-00 
Paksas II 00-01 
Brazauskas 01-03 
Brazauskas 03-04* 
Brazauskas 04* 
Brazauskas II 04-05 
1 
1 
.67 
1 
.33 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
.33 
0 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Bielecki 91 
Olszewski 91-92 
Suchocka 92-93 
Suchocka II 93 
Pawlak 93-95 
Oleksy 95-96 
Cimozewicz 96-97 
Buzek I 97-00 
Buzek II 00-01 
Miller I 01-03 
Miller II 03-04 
Belka 04-05 
Marcinkiewicz 05 
.33 
0 
1 
1 
0 
.33 
1 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
.33 
.33 
0 
1 
1 
.67 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
Stolojan 91-92 
Vacariou 92-94 
Vacariou II 94-96 
Vacariou III 96 
Ciorbea 96-98 
Dejeu 98 
Vasile 98-99 
Anthanasiu 99 
Isărescu 99-00 
Năstase 00-04 
Popescu-T. 04-05 
.33 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
.33 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
.33 
1 
1 
1 
1 
.67 
1 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
Mečiar 92-93 
Mečiar II 93 
Mečiar III 93-94 
Moravčík 94 
Mečiar IV 94-98 
Dzurinda 98-99 
Dzurinda 99-02* 
Dzurinda II 02-04 
Dzurinda II 04-05* 
1 
0 
1 
.33 
.33 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.33 
.33 
0 
0 
.33 
.33 
.33 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Drnovšek I 92-94 
Drnovšek II 94-96 
Drnovšek III 96-97 
Drnovšek IV 97-00 
Bajuk 00 
Drnovšek V 00-02 
Rop 02-04 
Jansa 04-05 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
.33 
.67 
1 
.67 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
Consistency 
Coverage 
 
.81 
.83 
.83 
.33 
 
.82 
.31 
.83 
.69 
Note: The values refer to the degree of membership in a set. The set membership for the outcomes ~INEX and 
~EXLEG was calculated by subtracting the membership in the outcome INEX and EXLEG from 1. Hence, 1 
refers to full membership in the outcome absence a high level of conflict. Cases in bold are fully in or more in 
than out of that particular set. Popescu-T. is the cabinet Popescu-Tăriceanu. The outcome for ~EXLEG of the 
cabinets Zeman, Vähi III, Siiman, Marcinkiewicz and Vacariou III can be explained by the omitted solution 
share * maj * SINGLE.   
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Samenvatting 
 
Betwiste Constituties: Constitutioneel Design, Conflict en Verandering in 
Postcommunistisch Centraal- en Oost-Europa.  
 
 
Inleiding 
Een democratische grondwet bevat, naast de fundamentele rechten waar burgers zich 
op kunnen beroepen, de basisregels van het politieke spel. Hiermee stelt de grondwet 
grenzen aan het handelen van politici en bepaalt mede het functioneren van politieke 
instituties en hun onderlinge interacties. Vanwege deze invloed op politici en institu-
ties is een grondwet daarom meer dan een juridisch document: zij beïnvloedt de ver-
deling van de politieke macht. Als politici ontevreden zijn met die verdeling kunnen 
zij proberen om de grondwet aan te passen, of zodanig te interpreteren en toe te pas-
sen dat zij daar politiek garen bij spinnen. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de omstandig-
heden waaronder politici zulke pogingen ondernemen, de politieke conflicten die 
daaruit voortvloeien en de gevolgen daarvan voor democratische en constitutionele 
ontwikkeling. De focus ligt daarbij op tien Centraal- en Oost-Europese landen sinds 
daar aan het einde van de jaren ’80 en het begin van de jaren ’90 en masse nieuwe 
grondwetten werden aangenomen. Deze landen zijn Bulgarije, Estland, Hongarije, 
Letland, Litouwen, Polen, Roemenië, Slovenië, Slowakije en Tsjechië.  
 
Democratisering en constitutioneel conflict in Centraal- en Oost-Europa 
Na de val van de Berlijnse Muur in 1989 begonnen in grote delen van Centraal- en 
Oost-Europa onderhandelingen tussen de communistische machthebbers en opposi-
tiegroepen. In zogenaamde Rondetafel Besprekingen werden de voorwaarden voor 
het ontmantelen van de communistische alleenheerschappij bepaald en ontstonden 
de contouren van het nieuwe, democratische politieke systeem. Vrije en eerlijke ver-
kiezingen en het principe van scheiding der machten waren belangrijke kenmerken 
van dat systeem. De uitwerking en vastlegging van deze zaken in een grondwet werd 
vaak uitgesteld tot na de eerste democratische verkiezingen, zodat zoveel mogelijk 
partijen konden meebeslissen over het nieuw in te voeren systeem. Na vaak langduri-
ge onderhandelingen in gekozen parlementen en constitutionele assemblees werd 
zodoende tussen april 1989 en juli 1993 in tien Centraal- en Oost-Europese landen de 
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communistische constitutie vervangen door een democratisch vastgestelde grondwet. 
In een aantal gevallen werden deze nieuwe grondwetten ook nog voorgelegd aan de 
bevolking, die in referenda met grote meerderheid haar goedkeuring uitsprak.  
Daarmee verdween het vraagstuk over de inrichting van het politieke systeem 
echter niet van de politieke agenda. In de tien landen die dit proefschrift bestudeert, 
duurde het soms wel tot het begin van de 21e eeuw voordat de politieke discussie en 
het conflict over de toepassing en interpretatie van de nieuwe grondwetten kon wor-
den afgesloten. De hoeveelheid en intensiteit van dergelijke constitutionele conflic-
ten, de belangrijkste onderwerpen van discussie en ook de betrokken politieke acto-
ren verschilden tussen de landen. Door het vergelijken van conflictpatronen over de 
tijd en tussen de landen verklaart dit proefschrift deze variatie en brengt het de oor-
zaken en gevolgen van constitutioneel conflict in postcommunistisch Centraal- en 
Oost-Europa in kaart. Hiervoor is een dataset ontwikkeld waarin de belangrijkste 
constitutionele conflicten tot 2005 opgenomen zijn.  
 Met het begrip constitutioneel conflict introduceert dit proefschrift een nieuw 
theoretisch concept en empirisch instrument om het democratiseringsproces in Cen-
traal- en Oost-Europa, en de rol van politieke actoren daarin, beter te begrijpen. Het 
verhoudt zich daarbij kritisch tot twee belangrijke stromingen in de vergelijkende 
politicologie die zich bezighouden met het bestuderen van democratische ontwikke-
ling en institutionele verandering: de democratiseringsliteratuur en het nieuw insti-
tutionalisme. In de democratiseringsliteratuur bestaat de overtuiging dat instituties – 
en in het bijzonder grondwetten – zowel legitiem als stabiel dienen te zijn. Dit zou 
ertoe bijdragen dat politici de regels van het politieke spel respecteren en ervan uit 
kunnen gaan dat ook anderen dat zullen doen. Een zorgvuldig ontworpen grondwet 
kan maatschappelijk conflict in goede banen leiden en bijdragen aan het ontstaan van 
politieke consensus en samenwerking. Het nieuw institutionalisme beschouwt insti-
tuties als lastig te veranderen structuren waarop politieke actoren weinig invloed 
kunnen uitoefenen. Eenmaal gekozen instituties worden verondersteld voort te be-
staan, tenzij ze onder externe druk komen – zoals in het geval van oorlog of andere 
vormen van crisis. Beide assumpties – dat een democratische grondwet stabiel en 
legitiem dient te zijn en dat politici de grondwet lastig kunnen veranderen – zijn ech-
ter moeilijk te rijmen met het fenomeen constitutioneel conflict. Binnen de democra-
tiseringsliteratuur worden conflicten over de grondwet al snel als een bedreiging voor 
democratie gezien, omdat daarmee de basisregels van het democratische politieke 
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spel onder druk komen. Het nieuw institutionalisme op zijn beurt gaat ervan uit dat 
politici niet snel pogingen zullen ondernemen om de grondwet te veranderen, omdat 
er maar een kleine kans is dat deze tot het door de actoren gewenste resultaat zullen 
leiden.  
De hoeveelheid constitutioneel conflict in postcommunistisch Centraal- en 
Oost-Europa en de manier waarop die conflicten zijn opgelost en omgezet in grond-
wetsveranderingen, laat echter zien dat discussies over de grondwet wel degelijk 
kunnen samengaan met – en zelfs bijdragen aan – democratiseringsprocessen en dat 
politici bereid en in staat zijn om invloed uit te oefenen op hun institutionele omge-
ving. Constitutionele conflicten in de tien in deze studie opgenomen landen zijn op 
een enkele uitzondering na volgens democratische spelregels uitgevochten en hebben 
nergens tot democratieondermijnende grondwetsveranderingen geleid. Veelal wer-
den constitutionele conflicten voorgelegd aan constitutionele hoven, die op basis van 
hun mandaat de grondwet konden interpreteren en daarmee bijdroegen aan implicie-
te constitutionele verandering. In het geval van veel andere conflicten werd uiteinde-
lijk politieke overeenstemming bereikt in bijvoorbeeld parlementaire debatten. Het 
resultaat was dat de nieuw overeengekomen interpretatie of toepassing van de 
grondwet door vrijwel alle politieke actoren werd onderschreven. De belangrijkste 
conclusie van dit proefschrift is dan ook dat het proces van constitutioneel conflict, 
overeenstemming en verandering intrinsiek heeft deeluitgemaakt van het democrati-
seringsproces in Centraal en Oost-Europa. In tegenstelling tot wat op basis van de 
democratiseringsliteratuur kan worden verwacht, ondergroeven deze conflicten niet 
de stabiliteit en legitimiteit van de nieuw ingevoerde grondwetten, maar droegen ze 
daar juist aan bij. De motieven voor politici om constitutioneel conflict aan te gaan 
lagen niet in een wens om het democratische karakter van de nieuwe grondwetten te 
ondermijnen, terwijl de strategieën die zij daarbij hanteerden veelal in overeenstem-
ming waren met het democratisch toelaatbare.  
 
Bevindingen  
Waarin lagen dan wel de motieven voor Centraal- en Oost-Europese politici om con-
flicten over de constitutie aan te gaan? Dit proefschrift onderzoekt drie factoren die 
het samenspel vormen van partijpolitieke en institutionele motieven dat politieke 
actoren ertoe kan aanzetten om te proberen de grondwet te wijzigen en daarmee het 
conflict aan te gaan met voorstanders van de constitutionele status-quo.  
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De eerste factor die dit proefschrift onderzoekt is het karakter van het 
grondwetsvernieuwingsproces. Er wordt vaak verondersteld dat toegankelijke 
en representatieve onderhandelingen en besluitvorming over een nieuwe grondwet, 
en het betrekken van de bevolking in het ratificatieproces, bijdragen aan een legitie-
me constitutie. In de context van dit onderzoek zou dit betekenen dat constitutioneel 
conflict minder voorkomt na grondwetsvernieuwingsprocessen waaraan oppositie-
groepen en de bevolking konden deelnemen. Hoewel er een duidelijke variatie waar-
neembaar is in de grondwetsvernieuwingsprocessen in de regio, kan een verband met 
de mate van constitutioneel conflict niet worden aangetoond. De landen met de hoog-
ste aantallen constitutioneel conflict – Bulgarije en Slowakije – kenmerkten zich door 
een relatief open vernieuwingsproces, terwijl in Polen en Hongarije, waar de commu-
nistische grondwetten lange tijd grotendeels in stand bleven, in vergelijking veel 
minder conflicten voorkwamen. Het blijkt dat de manier waarop grondwetten in Cen-
traal- en Oost-Europa werden ontworpen en vastgesteld geen duidelijke invloed heeft 
gehad op de legitimiteit van het document.  
Een factor die wel van belang is voor het begrijpen van constitutioneel conflict 
in Centraal- en Oost-Europa is constitutioneel design of, in andere woorden, de 
inhoud van de grondwet. Deze factor wordt in dit proefschrift op twee manieren on-
derzocht. Ten eerste wordt gekeken naar de invloed van constitutionele ambiguï-
teit. Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 laten zien dat een onduidelijke afbakening van competen-
ties en ontransparante procedures in een groot aantal gevallen tot conflicten heeft 
geleid. Dit was vooral het geval bij discussies over de rol van presidenten in de regio. 
In alle landen is gekozen voor zogenaamde duale executieven. In deze constitutionele 
setting moeten de president en ministers in het kabinet uitvoerende verantwoorde-
lijkheden delen en het is gebleken dat een dergelijke verdeling niet eenvoudig is vast 
te leggen in de grondwet. Regelmatig kwam het daarom voor dat de ambities van pre-
sidenten op bijvoorbeeld het terrein van buitenlands beleid of defensie botsten met 
de lezing van de grondwet door ministers of de premier. Deze zagen de positie van de 
president als voornamelijk ceremonieel, terwijl presidenten als Václav Havel en Lech 
Wałęsa zich een veel actievere rol toedichtten. De tweede manier waarop de effecten 
van constitutioneel design worden onderzocht, is door te kijken naar de verschillen in 
het constitutionele raamwerk van de tien landen. Meer specifiek ligt daarbij de 
nadruk op de effecten van machtsdeling en machtsconcentratie en de gevolgen van 
constitutionele bescherming door middel van rigide amenderingregels en sterke con-
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stitutionele hoven. Op basis van het werk van Arend Lijphart wordt in hoofdstuk 6 
onderzocht of machtsdeling door middel van de constitutie bijdraagt tot meer legi-
tieme, en daardoor minder betwiste, grondwetten. Er zijn wat het constitutioneel 
raamwerk betreft grote verschillen waarneembaar tussen de tien landen, maar het 
bewijs voor een effect van machtsdeling op het niveau van constitutioneel conflict is 
niet eenduidig. Zo dienen de meeste Centraal- en Oost-Europese presidenten hun 
grondwettelijke macht te delen met kabinetten en parlementen, maar de positie van 
presidenten was tevens het meest betwiste onderwerp in de regio. Dit kan worden 
toegeschreven aan de vele pogingen door presidenten om meer macht naar zich toe te 
trekken ten koste van andere instituties. Hieruit blijkt dat de dreiging van machts-
concentratie bij de president tot constitutioneel conflict heeft geleid. Ook de verhou-
ding tussen parlementen en kabinetten was een terugkerend onderwerp van discus-
sie. Vooral conflicten over de zogenaamde checks and balances en de voorwaarden 
voor en procedures bij moties van wantrouwen waren regelmatig aan de orde. Ook 
hier moet de verklaring voor conflict worden gezocht in constitutionele dynamiek en 
niet zozeer in de bestaande machtsverdeling. Waren het aan het begin van de jaren 
’90 parlementen die een zeer machtige positie hadden ten opzichte van kabinetten, in 
de loop van de tijd kwamen de verhoudingen meer in balans. Dit heeft te maken met 
de toenemende professionaliteit en stabiliteit van regeringen en met groeiende par-
tijdiscipline waardoor kabinetten konden rekenen op meer steun van hun eigen par-
tijen in het parlement. Dat deze ontwikkelingen het vaakst gepaard gingen met con-
flict in landen waar het parlement aanvankelijk de meeste macht had, duidt erop dat 
machtsconcentratie (bij het parlement) tot constitutioneel conflict heeft geleid. De 
analyse in hoofdstuk 6 laat verder zien dat in landen met de machtigste en actiefste 
constitutionele hoven het meeste conflict over de rol en bevoegdheden van deze in-
stellingen heeft plaatsgevonden. Constitutionele hoven waren echter steeds in staat 
om aanvallen op hun positie door vooral regeringen af te slaan en om een belangrijke 
rol te blijven spelen in de constitutionele ontwikkeling in Centraal- en Oost-Europa.  
De derde factor die dit proefschrift in beschouwing neemt, is de rol van par-
tijpolitieke en strategische belangen in constitutionele conflicten. Waar de eer-
ste twee factoren vooral betrekking hadden op de institutionele context van conflict, 
laten de analyses in hoofdstukken 4 en 7 zien dat partijpolitiek in belangrijke mate 
heeft bijgedragen aan het ontstaan van constitutionele conflicten. Hoofdstuk 4 toont 
aan dat constitutioneel conflict vooral intens was gedurende perioden van politieke 
BETWISTE CONSTITUTIES 
 234 
polarisatie en na electorale verschuivingen en kabinetswisselingen. Dit was bijvoor-
beeld het geval in het begin van de jaren ’90, toen links en rechts in veel landen te-
genover elkaar kwamen te staan op het onderwerp van economische hervormingen. 
Tussen 1993 en 1995 kwamen in Bulgarije, Polen, Roemenië en Slowakije radicaal 
linkse en nationalistische regeringen aan de macht die de eerder doorgevoerde eco-
nomische maatregelen trachtten terug te draaien. Dit leidde tot soms hevige inhoude-
lijke, maar ook constitutionele conflicten met de parlementaire oppositie en met pre-
sidenten die vaak voor liberalisering waren. In hoofdstuk 7 wordt gekeken onder wel-
ke politieke omstandigheden gedurende 100 Centraal- en Oost-Europese kabinetten 
constitutioneel conflict heeft plaatsgevonden. Ook hier blijkt dat de meest intensieve 
periodes van conflict werden gekenmerkt door partijpolitieke verschillen. Zo laat de 
analyse zien dat coalities waarin de partij van de president deelneemt, minder vaak in 
conflict raken met de president. Ook de politieke verhouding tussen het kabinet en de 
parlementaire meerderheid is van invloed op het niveau van constitutioneel conflict. 
Regeringen die steun van de meerderheid in het parlement genieten waren duidelijk 
minder vaak betrokken in conflicten over de machtsbalans tussen uitvoerende en 
wetgevende macht. Opvallend is wel dat partijpolitieke verhoudingen er aan het begin 
van de jaren ’90 minder toe leken te doen. Dat blijkt vooral uit het feit dat presiden-
ten in de eerste periode hun macht ten opzichte van het kabinet probeerden uit te 
breiden zonder daarbij rekening te houden met de politieke kleur van de zittende re-
gering. Zelfs als daarin hun eigen partij deelnam, deden presidenten als Wałęsa en 
Zhelev pogingen om executieve verantwoordelijkheden naar zich toe te trekken. Dit 
laat zien dat de eerste presidenten in de regio vooral geïnteresseerd waren in het uit-
breiden van hun constitutionele macht en niet zozeer conflicten aangingen met als 
doel het beïnvloeden van beleid.  
 
Conclusie 
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat constitutioneel conflict in postcommunistisch Centraal- 
en Oost-Europa veelal onderdeel was van reguliere politiek, waarbij vooral strategi-
sche en partijpolitieke motivaties een rol speelden. Politici maakten daarnaast ge-
bruik van onduidelijkheden en hiaten in de nieuw ingevoerde grondwetten om te 
proberen hun constitutionele en politieke positie te verstevigen. In een aantal geval-
len leidde dit tot wijzigingen in de grondwet of tot nieuwe interpretaties en toepas-
singen van constitutionele artikelen. Uitspraken van constitutionele hoven en parle-
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mentaire debatten speelden een belangrijke rol bij het oplossen van constitutionele 
conflicten.  
Hiermee was het proces van constitutionele discussie, overeenstemming en 
aanpassing verenigbaar met het democratiseringsproces in de Centraal- en Oost-
Europese regio. Deze bevindingen onderschrijven het idee dat conflict en competitie 
centraal staan in een democratie en dat een democratische politieke cultuur ruimte 
moet bieden aan discussie, ook als deze over de grondwet gaat. Zonder een dergelijke 
ruimte en de mogelijkheid om de grondwet aan te passen bestaat namelijk de kans 
dat de constitutie haar legitimiteit verliest en dat politici andere – ondemocratische – 
wegen zullen bewandelen om hun onvrede met de grondwet te uiten.  
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